Dara Calleary (Mayo, Fianna Fail)
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I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

I am pleased to bring the Control of Exports Bill before the House. With an ever-changing geopolitical landscape and advances in technology, there is a need to strengthen and modernise the current legislative framework for export controls in Ireland. This Bill will repeal and replace the Control of Exports Act 2008. It will ensure that Ireland continues to operate a robust framework for regulating the export of controlled items, principally dual-use and military items. I will begin by briefly summarising the nature and purpose of export controls to provide Deputies with some context. I will then outline the rationale for enhancing the current Act. I will finish by summarising the structure and main provisions in the new Bill.

Export controls are a multilateral, global mechanism that contribute to international peace and security and seek to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in addition to conventional weapons. Controls usually take the form of a legal obligation on exporters to obtain prior authorisation, that is an export licence, to export designated items to other countries. The success of controls is reliant on uniform and consistent multilateral implementation. A list-based approach to controlled items aims to provide regulatory transparency and certainty for exporters. While maintaining international stability and security is at the heart of export controls there is a need to strike a balance with the pursuit of free trade and the functioning of open markets. With that in mind, controls are targeted and proportionate and aim to minimise the burden on reputable exporters engaged in legitimate, low-risk trade.

The legislative framework for export controls in Ireland is established by both national and EU instruments. There are two key EU instruments relevant to this Bill. The first is EU Regulation 821 of 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. Trade in dual-use items is an EU competence and this regulation has direct, legal effect in all member states. However, member states are obliged to establish in national legislation effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties applicable in the event of infringements of the provisions of the regulation.

The EU regulation also provides member states with discretion to adopt certain additional national measures, such as control of dual-use items other than those listed in Annex 1 of the dual-use regulation. The Bill fully avails of such discretion to ensure Ireland has the most effective controls at its disposal. Dual-use items are defined as products and components, including software and technology, that can be used for both civilian and military applications. The list of items subject to export control is set out in Annex 1 to the regulation. The majority of dual-use exports from Ireland are mainstream business ICT products, both hardware and software, for example networking, data storage or cybersecurity. They are categorised as dual use as they use strong encryption for data protection purposes.

The second key EU instrument is the Council Common Position 944 of 2008 defining common rules for the control of exports of military technology and equipment. The categories of military technology and equipment to which these rules should apply are set out in the EU Common Military List. The common position sets out eight criteria against which authorisation applications should be assessed. The common position does not have direct legal effect in member states. As the export of military items is a national competence, its provisions must be given effect by national, primary legislation.

Military export controls overlap with dual-use export controls in several ways. It is vital that dual-use and military items are closely co-ordinated and that there is a common policy framework in place to ensure consistency and transparency. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment is the national competent authority for export controls in Ireland. The current Act must be updated to reflect the significant advances in technology, new developments in business practices, updates to EU instruments and the evolving geopolitical risk landscape.

I will now outline the structure and key provisions of the Bill. The Bill contains eight Parts. It has been structured to set out clearly controls for dual-use and military items, provisions for authorisations, appeals, enforcement provisions and the penalties that apply for breach of controls.

Part 1, the preliminary and general Part, primarily deals with matters common to legislation, including commencement, interpretation, reporting obligations, regulations and service of documents. This Part also designates the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment as the competent authority for the dual-use regulation and repeals the Control of Exports Act 2008 and associated statutory instruments.

Part 2 focuses on the control of dual-use items and sets out definitions specific to this Part. It provides for offences for breach of the directly applicable provisions in the dual-use regulation that are primarily related to dual-use items listed in Annex I of the regulation. This Part also sets out provisions in relation to discretionary national controls on dual-use items other than those listed in Annex I of the dual-use regulation. It covers the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.

To ensure controls are adaptable to emerging technology not listed in Annex I, the Bill provides that an exporter must notify the competent authority if they are aware that items not listed in Annex I are intended, in their entirety or in part, for purposes prescribed in the regulation. The Minister must, on receipt of notification, decide whether to make the export concerned subject to authorisation. The Minister may in restricted circumstances by order prohibit the export of a non-listed dual-use item without an authorisation. The Minister may give notice directing an exporter to apply for an authorisation to export a dual-use item not specified in Annex I of the dual-use regulation. Similar obligation, notification and direction controls are set out in sections 13 to 20, inclusive, with respect to brokering services, providers of technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use non-listed items.

Part 3 deals with the control of military items. It focuses on the control of military items and sets out definitions specific to this Part. Section 23 establishes a prescribed list of military items known as the national military export control list. This list will primarily comprise items from the common military list of the EU. Section 24 provides that it is an offence to export a military item without an authorisation. Section 25 sets out that it is an offence to provide brokering services in respect of a military item without an authorisation. Section 26 sets out controls in respect of the transit of a military item through or from the State without an authorisation. Section 27 provides exemption for temporary export of military items by the Defence Forces or the Garda Síochána.

Part 4 describes provisions related to authorisations. Sections 33 to 36, inclusive, set out the following in respect of authorisations for dual-use and military exports: the procedure for applying for an authorisation; the assessment of an application; prohibition on transfer of an authorisation; record-keeping requirements; revocation, suspension or modification of an authorisation; and the process for lifting the suspension of an authorisation. The Minister may prescribe certain matters relating to an authorisation, including the application procedure and any fees to be paid. This section provides for consultation with other Ministers of the Government where appropriate. Reasons for an authorisation denial must be provided to an applicant. In certain narrow circumstances it may be necessary for the Minister to withhold information to protect the security and public order of the State.

Part 5 sets out provisions related to internal review and appeals. It consists of five chapters. This Part balances the need to ensure fair process with the security requirements of the State while also complying with recent case law. Chapter 1 provides for a process for internal review of an application that has been denied. It also sets out the process for an internal review. Chapter 2 sets out provisions in relation to adjudicators who will hear formal appeals. Sections 39 to 41, inclusive, provide for the appointment of persons as adjudicators, the conditions of appointment, revocation of their appointment and the liability of adjudicators. Section 42 provides that rules may be prescribed in relation to appeals to be determined by an adjudicator. Provision is made for consultation with named Ministers and other Ministers that may be deemed appropriate. Chapter 3 provides for the details of a review of a relevant decision in the Bill, provides that an adjudicator may determine an appeal without an oral hearing, and provides that the adjudicator shall decide to allow the appeal and remit the matter to the Minister, or affirm the relevant decision. Chapter 3 also details provisions regarding sensitive material and evidence in exceptional circumstances. As part of the decision-making process, highly sensitive information may be shared with the Minister. Section 43 provides that the adjudicator may determine whether disclosure of information to an appellant would create a risk to the security or public order of the State and make certain directions regarding the disclosure of such relevant information. Chapter 4 provides for a further appeal to the High Court.

Part 6 deals with monitoring compliance of export controls and the enforcement of same. This Part provides for the appointment of authorised officers and their powers. It aims to ensure there are clear and reasonable powers for an authorised officer to carry out their functions under the Act. An authorised officer will investigate cases where violations of the controls are suspected and will carry out both desk-based audits and site visits to ensure exporters are aware of, and are fulfilling, their obligations in respect of conditions attached to authorisations. Section 57 provides that an authorised officer may request relevant information or records and enter any premises that has been or is being used in connection with a relevant activity. Section 58 sets out the powers of an authorised officer upon entry to a premises and the conditions on the use of those powers. Section 61 provides that an authorised officer may give a compliance notice to a person suspected of contravening a provision of the Act and sets out the rules of such notice. Sections 62 to 67, inclusive, provide further details on matters related to the courts, forfeiture and legal privilege.

Part 7 sets out offences and penalties for breaches of the Act. Offences are threaded throughout the Bill and are summarised together with associated penalties in this Part. The Bill establishes a range of penalties to provide for a proportionate response to breaches. This aims to be proportionate in dealing with minor infringements and gross negligence or misconduct. In addition to potentially facing a compliance notice for infringements of the Act, exporters may be prosecuted for violations of national legal provisions in relation to dual-use and military trade controls. The Bill increases penalties set out in the 2008 Act to establish levels more consistent with other member states and should act as a deterrent to exporters.

Part 8 provides for miscellaneous and transitional provisions. It provides a transparent framework for information-sharing between the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment and the named bodies relevant to export control. It also provides for transitional arrangements for authorisations issued prior to the commencement of this Act.

In summary, the Control of Exports Bill 2023 provides that Ireland has a sound legal basis for administering export controls by providing for controls related to dual-use items; controls related to military items; the establishment of a national military export control list; the rules and conditions for obtaining and using authorisations; the establishment of an independent adjudication panel to hear appeals and disclosure requests; an effective enforcement capability for authorised officers; establishment of a comprehensive set of offences for infringements of the controls; and proportionate, graduated and dissuasive penalties for breaches.

I commend the Bill to the House and look forward to contributions from Deputies.

Louise O'Reilly (Dublin Fingal, Sinn Fein)
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Before I make my contribution, I ask if we can have some form of standardised issue for ministerial contributions. This one, to be fair, is better than most because it is printed on both sides and on recycled paper. We could have narrow margins and smaller print. We do not need it big for reading out.

Catherine Connolly (Galway West, Independent)
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Some of us do.

Louise O'Reilly (Dublin Fingal, Sinn Fein)
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Well, yes, but I think for distribution, it would save a bit of paper if it was standardised. It is nobody's fault. I just think it should be standardised.

I thank the Leas-Cheann Comhairle for the opportunity to speak on this important legislation. Export controls on the export of items that can be used for civil or military purposes is an important measure in ensuring that items do not fall into the hands of those who would use them to cause injury or death in regional conflicts or to violate human rights in third countries. Such controls are important now more than ever as we see conflicts raging across the world. In addition to the brutal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, other horrible and devastating wars and conflicts are also raging across continents and countries and have been for many years. In Syria, Yemen, Sudan and so on, war rages in some way, shape or form on a daily basis.

In Yemen, it is believed that the eight-year-long civil war, which has led to the deaths of thousands of Yemenis and created a major humanitarian crisis, is in fact getting more violent. I specifically raise the war in Yemen because weapons and items are being sent to third countries, which are subsequently sending the items and weapons to Yemen to be used for war and human rights abuses. For instance, human rights organisations have called for criminal investigations into a number of European companies for their possible complicity in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Yemen by exporting arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are then sent to Yemen. We must be extremely aware in this regard, as the former Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, who is now An Taoiseach, conducted a number of trade missions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and trade agreements have been reached.

A truce has been agreed in Ethiopia after a two-year civil war, in which the former head of the African Union and Ghent University estimate as many as 600,000 people may have been killed, making it one of the world's deadliest conflicts of recent times. In addition, it is alleged that a whole host of war crimes and human rights abuses have been committed.

The Bill is to ensure that items that can be used for civil or military purposes do not head in these directions to be used for war, death and mayhem. This is a technical Bill but it has huge geopolitical and economic importance. In the first instance, it gives full effect to European Council regulations setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. It also provides for control of the export of military items and control of the provision of brokering services and transit of those items. Furthermore, it provides for the Minister to grant authorisations to undertake certain activities relating to dual-use items and military items.

Importantly, the Bill provides for a process for appealing certain decisions of the Minister with due regard to the potentially sensitive nature of the subject matter of the appeal and, for those purposes, to establish a panel of persons to deal with appeals. Finally, it provides for enforcement and information-sharing while repealing the Control of Exports Act 2008. The legislative framework for export controls in Ireland is established in a number of linked national and EU instruments, namely Regulation (EU) 2021/821 and Council Common Position 2008. Trade in dual-use items is an EU competence and Regulation (EU) 2021/821 has direct legal effect in all member states. However, member states are obliged to establish in national legislation effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties applicable in the event of the infringement of the provisions of these regulations.

The EU regulation also provides member states with discretion to adopt a certain additional measure in their national legislation. Dual-use items are defined as products and components, including software and technology, that can be used for both civilian and military applications. The regulation explicitly identifies 1,850 types of dual-use items spanning ten categories, including nuclear materials and equipment, special materials and related equipment, telecommunications and information security, aerospace and propulsion.

The Council common position governs control of exports of military technology and equipment. The categories of military technology and equipment to which these rules should apply are set out in the common military list of the EU. The common position sets out the eight criteria against which licence applications should be assessed. Control of the export of military equipment is a national competence and the common position does not have direct effect in member states. Therefore, its provisions must be given effect by national primary legislation. The national legislation comprises the Control of Exports Act 2008 and a number of statutory instruments. However, this legislation and its provisions need to be updated in light of new developments and new EU regulations. As a result, we have the legislation before us today.

The primary purpose of the Control of Exports Bill is to establish national export controls of military items, services and technology and provide for national measures to complement and supplement the EU dual-use regulation. This will fulfil Ireland's EU obligations to have common licensing requirements and procedures for the export of dual-use items, and give legal effect in Irish law to the Council common position on activities involving military items. The State has a commitment to providing a robust, transparent export control system. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment is the national competent authority for these controls.

The goal of the Bill is to bring forward legislation to mitigate the risk that controlled items could be exported from Ireland and used to cause injury in regional conflicts or to violate human rights in third countries. To this end, it is essential that Ireland has a comprehensive and robust legal framework for regulating the exports of controlled goods and, in particular, to ensure comprehensive and effective powers of enforcement. Given the advances of technology, new developments in business practices, updates to EU instruments, and the evolved geopolitical risk landscape, it is extremely important that legislation in this area is updated.

Export controls are a multilateral global mechanism designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to preserve regional stability, to prevent terrorism and to protect human rights. Export controls generally take the form of a legal obligation to exporters to obtain prior authorisation. The success of export controls is predicated on uniform and consistent implementation on a multilateral basis. A published list of controlled items is a prerequisite for achieving this objective. A list-based approach also provides regulatory transparency and certainty for exporters.

Regulatory regimes such as export controls need to be targeted and proportionate and must endeavour to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences. They must be uniform and applied without fear or favour. Given the damage that the export of the listed items can cause, it is essential to make it illegal for individuals and entities to export controlled goods without authorisation. That means where there are violations, there must be administrative sanctions for infringements and prosecutions for violations of national legal provisions in relation to dual-use and military trade controls. On this point, I would like to say that with regard to the severity of offences and punishments under the Bill, it is important that any documents or notices served on individuals are delivered directly to the individual or entity and that a record of receipt is confirmed.

Given the conflicts I have cited, it is important that we do not allow certain items to be exported for use in those conflicts or for the repression of human rights. These controls are important to address intentional and unintentional trade of military and dual-use items. However, it is important that legislation is proportionate in dealing with minor infringements and gross negligence or misconduct. This is particularly important when the regulations apply to SMEs, which can be disproportionately impacted by the regulatory burden on their limited resources and inability to benefit from economies of scale in ameliorating set-up and ongoing operational costs. To this end, we must ensure that these export controls are designed to minimise the burden on reputable exporters engaged in legitimate, low-risk trade.

The new system must be effective and proportionate and applied uniformly. For instance, Part 3 of the Bill, in the section on military controls, states that the Bill seeks to set a high common standard for the management of and restraint in the transfer of military technology and equipment. Key to that is preventing the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability.

In such instances we must be consistent, such as in assessing exports to states in areas of conflict or breaches of human rights, including Israel, where we see repression and aggression against the Palestinian people. It is essential there are enough authorised officers to police export controls. This means the necessary funding for human and financial resources. Providing the Minister with powers to legislate by way of the Bill is welcome, but a two-way dialogue with the Opposition of the day is also necessary. This is legislation we should all support, and it is necessary for the Oireachtas to know the risks at play in order that I can have oversight of regulations as soon and as early as possible.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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What we see in the Bill is the laying down of the necessary legislative framework. We are speaking about the export of items that can be used for civil or military purposes and for the control of the provision of brokering services and technical assistance and of the transit of those items. We all have big worries about the sale of weapons. We are especially worried about weapons of mass destruction. We all know the history, which is not so recent anymore, of flawed intelligence.

There has been much talk about several conflict areas that have been absolutely ravaged. We need to provide a framework and ensure we have due diligence and proper administration through having lists of what we need to ensure we do not add fire to the flames, for want of a better term. Recently, we and others had need of humanitarian intervention to get some of our citizens out of Sudan. We know what has been happening in Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Ukraine. There is no doubt about what the Palestinian people have been going through for many years. We are coming to the 75th anniversary of the Nakba.

I accept we will have to be able to deal sensibly with dual-use items. Anybody involved years ago in trying to get cryptographic materials or resources from the United States knows they were generally considered in the same bracket as munitions. There are engineering and gauging materials that may use lasers, sensors and infra-red. They can fall within these brackets. We need to allow a free flow for our SMEs, large corporations and those who require these items. This is necessary.

As was said by my colleague Deputy O'Reilly, we all want us to have these rules and lists. Of course, we would like to see a decent amount of over-and-back and dialogue with the Opposition of the day in order that everything is transparent and above board. We should make sure we deal with those trying to contravene these rules in any way, shape or form. As in all circumstances and all regulatory set-ups, this will not work unless we have the resources for enforcement, unless we ensure we have the lists and know who is selling, what they are meant to be selling, and unless we make sure we can discover that no one is brokering, selling, trading or exporting - call it what you will - items that could be used to breach of human rights or, in some cases, for the murderous acts of regimes around the world.

A very important point made was that we need to ensure we follow this due diligence and do not allow selling to third-party countries. There is much talk about European countries that have delivered directly to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Weapons that have been given to these countries have found their way into Yemen. Many thousands of people are dead based on those weapons being introduced into what is an utterly cruel and inhumane war.

No matter the conversation we have in this House, and sometimes among the great and the good, the Irish people love the idea of Ireland being a fair player on the international scene and being utterly committed to military neutrality and military non-alignment. This is not to say we do not call out oppression or involve ourselves from a humanitarian point of view and provide any other help we can where people face oppression. While we welcome the solidarity throughout Europe and beyond with regard to Ukraine, it is fair to say the west, Europe and many countries that are sometimes qualified as our allies have not necessarily been as forthright about other conflict zones.

Next week my party will deal with a Bill on divestment. This will deal with the unsavoury position that the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund, ISIF, is a shareholder in nine companies involved in illegal settlements in Palestine. We all realise the great wrong that has been done and continues to be done, even in recent days, to the Palestinian people. We know the Irish people have been on the side of the Palestinian people. I do not think it is particularly great for us that, through ISIF, which is a State entity, we are shareholders in what are internationally criminal actions by a right-wing Israeli regime. I would like to think we would have support across the House for making it illegal for ISIF to invest in and be a shareholder in companies involved in something that is utterly reprehensible. We are approaching 15 May, which is the 75th anniversary of the Nakba and the great catastrophe of what was forced upon many Palestinian people in 1948. Many of them have not been able to make that journey back to what was their homeland. We all know the issues, whether we are speaking about the West Bank or what we can only describe as the prison that is the Gaza Strip.

To return to the Bill we are speaking about, regarding any conflict zone I have mentioned or any other conflict zone, we need to ensure Irish companies and companies operating out of here do not fan the flames of what are brutal attacks on human rights and, beyond that, murderous campaigns by particular regimes. It is not all right with the Irish people and I do not think it is all right with many of us here. We need to ensure we have the means to carry out due diligence in order t hat we can have transparency. We need to provide protections to SMEs and companies that require the goods, but we must ensure Ireland does not fan flames in places where we need to be doing our utmost, as the international straight player we are seen to be, to make this a far more peaceful world.

The Minister of State will get support on this. We need to ensure on every Stage that we carry out our own due diligence and that the Minister of State engages properly with the Opposition in order that we get the best fit-for-purpose legislation and ensure Ireland continues to play its best part as a fair player on the international stage. We certainly do not want to be involved in anything, whether brokering, exporting or providing weapons or other items, that is connected with state-sponsored murder or brutal human rights violations. That would not be acceptable to the entirety of the Irish people.

I might stray slightly in order to ask a question that I was not able to ask earlier.

Catherine Connolly (Galway West, Independent)
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On this topic.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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It is very close to the topic. It relates to taxation from the point of view of remote working, North and South. The matter relates to PayPal. Some 120 staff of the latter had to be transferred to PayPal UK lately because they are remote working and it is no longer possible for them to continue to be paid in the South. There are obviously particular conditions around that. However, we are at a different stage now and we need to look at bilateral arrangements with the British Government, which is probably more possible than it was three or four months ago.

Richard Bruton (Dublin Bay North, Fine Gael)
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I am glad to have the opportunity to speak on the Bill. There is no doubt the world has become a much more dangerous place. It is very important that Ireland and the EU as a whole take a consistent approach to the sale of goods that might come into the wrong hands and have an adverse impact on the human rights of people across the globe. The Bill is welcome. It is a good structure that is being put in place, with lists of items and a system of authorisation, particularly in regard to items that have a dual use, giving the Minister the discretion to ban certain items on grounds of public security, prevention of terrorism or human rights considerations, and having an adjudication system. That is a robust and sensible way to approach the matter.

One question I would be interested to hear the Minister of State comment on is that we now have in place across Europe a much wider range of sanctions aimed not only at tradeable items but also at 1,500 officials in the case of the recent sanctions against Russia, and at hundreds of banks, companies, parties and apologists for regimes, with billions of euro worth of assets frozen. To what extent do the powers of the Minister reach into being able to oversee those sorts of sanctions, which are also a part of how we try to put some sort of strength into protections of human rights and protection of communities from terrorist acts or acts of wanton aggression, as we see all too often on our television screens? It seems that those areas in respect of which we seek sanctions present even greater complexity than trading in goods, where there is a more defined supply chain and more identifiable ways of identifying what creates a hazard.

I would also be interested to hear the Minister of State comment on the way in which a responsible Minister assesses issues, such as a risk to public security, prevention of terrorism or human rights considerations, and how that evolves in the context of different conflicts and different conflict zones. Is this an area where there is a fairly fixed and well understood pan-European approach or does it evolve with changing circumstances, and if it does, how does that process work? Is it consultative? Is there a role for the Oireachtas in understanding the approaches that we are taking?

The other thing that strikes me increasingly, as we look at terrorism and acts of warfare, is that it is becoming much more complicated. Increasingly, it is cybercrime. There is a very strong concern about the distortion of political choices by fake news, bots and attempts to hijack social media. Indeed, when we look at some of the regimes that are the greatest source of concern in terms of being the source of aggressive acts against others that jeopardise human rights, we see that there is nothing like the freedom of social media under those regimes when compared to our regimes, which are comparatively vulnerable to attack by those whose motives are entirely hostile to the best interests of either this country or human rights more widely. As we look at the role of the Oireachtas in trying to manage the risks that we now confront as a society, whereby we are seeing greater division and greater willingness to abandon concepts of human rights and multilateralism that have for a long time achieved a degree of consensus, how do we protect ourselves in those other areas that are much less susceptible to lists and specific agents who are legitimate, and who are making sure that legitimate items are not getting into the wrong hands? This is a difficult time, and it seems that this legislation is just one part of a very complex jigsaw. All of us need to become more aware of the potential hazards and the lengths to which some regimes will go to promote their particular views, which, as the Bill states, is contrary to public security, prevention of terrorism and human rights considerations.

I welcome the Bill. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Following our preliminary assessment, we reached the view that this robust Bill is to be welcomed. I would be interested to hear the Minister of State's comments on the wider threats and the use of other methods of sanction and control that might be in the hands of European Union member states to protect the very valuable heritage that we have achieved after such a period of devastating past wars among countries who are members of the EU.

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)
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I was attending a committee meeting, so I suspect I am going to be repeating some of what was said before. The Bill is to replace the Control of Exports Act 2008 and provide a comprehensive and robust framework for regulating these goods. It is focused on military and human rights issues. The EU operates a system of export controls that forms part of a multilateral framework to support global security by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promoting regional stability, preventing terrorism and protecting human rights. Obviously, the EU controls apply to military equipment and dual-use items, but although EU instruments apply, the trade in military equipment is a national competence, which is why this legislation is required.

We will be supporting the Bill. I imagine it will attract widespread support. While it is a technical Bill, it has a particular emphasis. The overarching goal in bringing forward the legislation is to mitigate the risk of controlled items and how they could be exported from Ireland and used to cause injury in regional conflicts or violate human rights in third countries, which, of course, is to be welcomed. When a company based here makes microchips, for example, or other components and it is granted a licence to export to other European countries or a third country, and those items are subsequently moved on, where does the liability rest? By virtue of complying with the legislation, is that it? Is there a tracking mechanism in regard to others who ultimately violate what is aimed at in the provisions of this Bill?

The US banned the export of American semi-conductors to Russia, for example, except for humanitarian purposes and other special exceptions, in February 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine. However, Russia continued to access these very components via small traders in Hong Kong and China. Records obtained by Nikkei publications showed 3,292 transactions worth at least $100,000 each, of which 2,258 or 70% were labelled as products from US chip makers such as Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Texas Instruments. The total value of these transactions was at least $740 million. The US would not have intended those goods to be sent on but that just demonstrates what can happen. We need to understand from the EU what additional measures can be taken to prevent that kind of selling on, which undermines what we are all trying to achieve here.

The same point can be made in respect of chemicals produced here. A chemical can be exported for a defined purpose in good faith. However, it may be part of a batch of ingredients that can be used to construct something all together more sinister. As referred to earlier, there is a list of products in Annex I. Following research and development, there will be different products but how will they be added to the list? An SME could produce something that could be made into something more sinister. There may be difficulties with exports because of the time it might take to actually change some things, particularly where there is evolving research and development or uses for things that will be produced in the future that we cannot even envisage now. How can we assure ourselves that items produced here and exported are not embarking on roundabout, logistical routes to really bad actors?

It may not be defined or prescribed in the Bill, but knowledge and expertise in the field of programming in the context of ICT could be considered as an intangible export. I refer, for example, to a programmer going to work somewhere else, for example, for a company, in the context of a delivering a service. There is a multitude of industries that rely on engineering and IT skills that could be considered dual use and I would like to hear some clarification from the Minister of State on this. Is there a conflict there? Is the Minister of State satisfied that the Bill fully covers all of that?

I agree with some of the points made by the previous speaker on the changing nature of war and we are seeing that play out at the moment. We are playing catch-up in terms of understanding the kinds of influences involved. We are trying to catch-up, via legislation, with things that will probably be out of date soon in the context of the way hybrid warfare is happening. We see ourselves as a little country on the edge of Europe and wonder who would be bothered with us but that is very definitely not so. Indeed, there are Russian ships off the coast of Ireland, in our international waters. What are they doing there? We really need to start taking these kinds of things very seriously. This Bill is being introduced in the context of a wider European initiative and we need to understand that we are part of a bigger continent. We are not just a little island off the west coast of Europe that is immune from any of these issues. The cyberattack on the HSE made that clear. There is no plainer way to see the kind of thing that can happen.