Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats) | Oireachtas source

I was attending a committee meeting, so I suspect I am going to be repeating some of what was said before. The Bill is to replace the Control of Exports Act 2008 and provide a comprehensive and robust framework for regulating these goods. It is focused on military and human rights issues. The EU operates a system of export controls that forms part of a multilateral framework to support global security by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promoting regional stability, preventing terrorism and protecting human rights. Obviously, the EU controls apply to military equipment and dual-use items, but although EU instruments apply, the trade in military equipment is a national competence, which is why this legislation is required.

We will be supporting the Bill. I imagine it will attract widespread support. While it is a technical Bill, it has a particular emphasis. The overarching goal in bringing forward the legislation is to mitigate the risk of controlled items and how they could be exported from Ireland and used to cause injury in regional conflicts or violate human rights in third countries, which, of course, is to be welcomed. When a company based here makes microchips, for example, or other components and it is granted a licence to export to other European countries or a third country, and those items are subsequently moved on, where does the liability rest? By virtue of complying with the legislation, is that it? Is there a tracking mechanism in regard to others who ultimately violate what is aimed at in the provisions of this Bill?

The US banned the export of American semi-conductors to Russia, for example, except for humanitarian purposes and other special exceptions, in February 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine. However, Russia continued to access these very components via small traders in Hong Kong and China. Records obtained by Nikkei publications showed 3,292 transactions worth at least $100,000 each, of which 2,258 or 70% were labelled as products from US chip makers such as Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Texas Instruments. The total value of these transactions was at least $740 million. The US would not have intended those goods to be sent on but that just demonstrates what can happen. We need to understand from the EU what additional measures can be taken to prevent that kind of selling on, which undermines what we are all trying to achieve here.

The same point can be made in respect of chemicals produced here. A chemical can be exported for a defined purpose in good faith. However, it may be part of a batch of ingredients that can be used to construct something all together more sinister. As referred to earlier, there is a list of products in Annex I. Following research and development, there will be different products but how will they be added to the list? An SME could produce something that could be made into something more sinister. There may be difficulties with exports because of the time it might take to actually change some things, particularly where there is evolving research and development or uses for things that will be produced in the future that we cannot even envisage now. How can we assure ourselves that items produced here and exported are not embarking on roundabout, logistical routes to really bad actors?

It may not be defined or prescribed in the Bill, but knowledge and expertise in the field of programming in the context of ICT could be considered as an intangible export. I refer, for example, to a programmer going to work somewhere else, for example, for a company, in the context of a delivering a service. There is a multitude of industries that rely on engineering and IT skills that could be considered dual use and I would like to hear some clarification from the Minister of State on this. Is there a conflict there? Is the Minister of State satisfied that the Bill fully covers all of that?

I agree with some of the points made by the previous speaker on the changing nature of war and we are seeing that play out at the moment. We are playing catch-up in terms of understanding the kinds of influences involved. We are trying to catch-up, via legislation, with things that will probably be out of date soon in the context of the way hybrid warfare is happening. We see ourselves as a little country on the edge of Europe and wonder who would be bothered with us but that is very definitely not so. Indeed, there are Russian ships off the coast of Ireland, in our international waters. What are they doing there? We really need to start taking these kinds of things very seriously. This Bill is being introduced in the context of a wider European initiative and we need to understand that we are part of a bigger continent. We are not just a little island off the west coast of Europe that is immune from any of these issues. The cyberattack on the HSE made that clear. There is no plainer way to see the kind of thing that can happen.

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