Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Amendments Nos. 10, 11, 15 to 17, inclusive, 20, 22 and 24 propose the substitution of "third party" for "third country". The purpose of the Bill is to transpose the EU directive and the Bill, accordingly, is limited to the scope of third countries and excludes the EU and associated countries, the EEA, Switzerland and the UK. The substitution of "third party" for "third country" broadens the scope of the Bill and would mean the Bill would apply to the EU and associated countries. The amendments must, therefore, be ruled out of order in accordance with Standing Order 187(1) as they are outside the scope of the Bill.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Amendments Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 60 are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 1:

In page 9, line 21, after “2002;” to insert “to amend the Digital Hub Development Agency Act 2003;”.

The effect of amendment No. 60 to the Digital Hub Development Agency Act 2003 is to reduce the membership of the agency from 14 to eight. As the nature and focus of the work of the agency necessarily narrows during the period ahead of dissolution, there is a lower requirement for a board size originally provided for in the Digital Hub Development Agency Act. Amendment No. 60 also proposes a reduction in the number required for a quorum, from six to four. This will permit for a continued functioning board throughout the dissolution process and mitigate against the risk of the board becoming inquorate during the wind-down and dissolution period. There are currently eight members on the board of the Digital Hub Development Agency, DHDA. The membership at present comprises six men and two women, a breakdown of 75% male and 25% female. Departments are required, in line with the Government decision of 23 July 2014, to achieve the target of at least 40% for representation of each gender on State boards.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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It is worth pointing out that there has been unease in the local community in respect of the removal of the digital hub. We sometimes deal with communities that have not necessarily been dealt a fair hand by the State through many years. All present know the reality of what needs to be done in such communities. We all know the real way of dealing with problems such as poverty and associated issues is through education and employment. Where there are projects that are working, facilitating people and engaging with them, that should be sustained. We need more such projects. Consideration has to be given to these sorts of projects, particularly those that are technologically based, whether they are training schemes or projects that otherwise engage with communities. Certain people come from different places and sometimes a huge amount of preliminary work is necessary. One could be dealing with people who may have dropped out of education at a very early stage and have an unease and, let us say, a lack of confidence in that regard. One has to create the conditions where those people feel safe and secure in order to build up that confidence and provide them with the necessary skill sets. That is how we can bridge those gaps. Dealing with that wider issue would require a significant number of interventions the State has failed to provide, some of which relate to wholesale early interventions for families and communities. That could almost break the poverty trap with which we are dealing.

I reiterate the point that there is unease in respect of what is being proposed here. There is an onus on the Government to realise that and to look at the possibilities it may have in the future of engaging with the community and all the necessary stakeholders and then looking at worthwhile projects. What we are talking about here is bridging those gaps. It is about creating a more level playing field and providing people with skills, roadmaps and through-paths into education and employment. Some of that will require heavy lifting by the Government. It has been a failing of this State for many years. Unless we want to continue with some of the current circumstances in communities that have been disadvantaged, the State will have to get its hands dirty. The Minister of State needs to consider what is being taken away here and what is a best-case scenario that can be provided back to these communities.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I note the comments of the Deputy and I agree substantially with them. There is a vital role for the Government in education in IT. It is our investment for the future in a successful economy. We need to educate people and provide them with the skills they need for a knowledge economy. That is a focus and responsibility for the Minister for Further and Higher Education, Research, Innovation and Science, Deputy Harris, among others. We have to make sure we are regenerating locations such as the urban centre in which the DHDA was located. The plan for that area is for it to become mixed-use development with a lot of housing, led by the Land Development Agency, LDA. I look forward to the regeneration that will bring to the Guinness centre. I visited the site recently. Guinness showed me the other development plans it has for the area, including for the other side of the street.

There is also a role for the Government in supporting start-ups, including high-tech start-ups, in order to catch up with the start-up culture that exists on the west coast of the US. I have been collaborating with ministers of other European countries, including Portugal and France, on how we can make sure our start-ups scale.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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I welcome the recognition by the Minister of State of the need for a significant number of this level of interventions. Technology and start-ups are vital but sometimes there is a fundamental piece that has to be done with regard to communities and some of those who have not necessarily had a perfect roadmap through the education system and have become somewhat distant from it. I accept what the Minister of State is saying regarding regeneration. Everybody accepts we are in a housing crisis and all the rest of it and there is an absolute need for accommodation but we also need to address the fundamental flaws in the context of the failure of the State to deliver for these communities through many years.

We are probably trying to do something now that is more difficult than it would have been 20 or 30 years ago, given the other conditions that prevail, particularly in big urban settings under the cosh owing to issues that exist throughout this State and island and most of the modern world, such as organised crime and drug use. These issues affect communities in particular, but we have to facilitate people to escape poverty. The only way we can do that is by engaging with the communities, putting in the supports necessary and then bringing people to a place where we can provide for the engagements required, whether they relate to technology training or other types of education and training, and then provide employment. Employment is the big one that can change people's lives altogether.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I wish to make a point of order. I may be incorrect on the matter but I ask the Acting Chairman to rule on it nonetheless. Parts of this Bill involve a draw on the Exchequer. A money message was provided when the Bill initially went through Committee Stage but there were many amendments made. There was a new Part 3 introduced with regard to high-risk vendors etc. Anything the Minister does under that measure will involve a cost to the Exchequer because compensation will be payable in accordance with the optional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Netherlands, among other countries, has acknowledged that. We are implementing similar procedures here.

The digital hub elements were also introduced after completion of Committee Stage. My understanding is that no subsequent money message was provided for the Bill. I may be wrong on that and would welcome clarification. If it is the case, I do not see how this Bill can proceed at this stage without a money message to cover the costs that would accrue from the amendments made on Committee Stage. I do not believe there was a subsequent money message but I am open to correction.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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I am not aware of how this Bill passed through Committee Stage. We are in committee at the moment dealing with the four amendments, so I do not know the position.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There is no financial implication as a result of this amendment regarding the DHDA. I realise the Deputy is referring to other parts of the legislation but there is no money message required in respect of the amendments we are discussing.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Is Deputy McNamara happy with that? We are in committee. The four amendments are just amendments that relate to the Digital Hub Development Agency. There may be other areas.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Even in respect of the Digital Hub Development Agency, I would have thought the transfer and so on would involve a cost on the Exchequer. Is it not proposed to transfer it? That would involve works by the Chief State Solicitor's Office. If I am wrong and if the Minister of State is happy to assure the House that there are no ancillary costs, such as conveyancing costs, I will stand corrected.

The more significant aspect pertains to the high-risk vendor, the compensation that will arise therefrom and the lack of a money message in that regard. I would have thought that even the Digital Hub Development Agency would require a money message.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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There was an overall money message that covers all the expenditure related to this Bill, I have been informed.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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There was a money message but that would have covered the expenditure involved in the Bill at the time it was passed. Obviously, however, a money message cannot give a carte blanche into the future. There were amendments made on Committee Stage that would involve a further cost to the Exchequer and they were not covered by any money message.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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That would be true of any Bill to which there were amendments.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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It would be true of some Bills but not every Bill. Some Bills involve a cost to the Exchequer but some do not. Engaging in conveyancing or compensating third parties where you are basically banning pieces of infrastructure lawfully included up to that point will not be covered by the money message because the money message relates to the Bill when it was first to proceed to Committee Stage.

Rather than do it all in a transparent manner and deal with it, the Minister of State, particularly in amendments around the end of October, gave us amendments the night before Committee Stage, but there was no subsequent money message to account for that.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Money messages usually cover all expenditure, including that referred to in amendments, until the Bill becomes law. However, if the Deputy wishes to take this matter up with the Office of the Ceann Comhairle, I would encourage him to do so. The Bill, as we are dealing with it now, must proceed.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Amendment No. 2, in the name of the Aire, is grouped with amendment No. 61.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 2

In page 9, line 21, after "2002;" to insert the following: "to amend the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983 to enable funding to be made available for the purposes of maintaining the post office network and countering consequences of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union;".

The Government decided on 31 May 2022 that €10 million per annum would be provided to the post office network over a three-year fixed term – 2023 to 2025 – to support a sustainable nationwide post office network in line with the commitment in the programme for Government. That decision noted that the amendment of the Post and Telecommunications Services Act 1983 would be required to provide a legal basis for the provision of funding from the Minister to An Post. A further Government decision, on 29 November, approved the drafting of an amendment to the Post and Telecommunications Services Act 1983 for inclusion in the Communications Regulation Bill 2022. The proposed amendment, No. 61, through subsection (1), will allow this financial support to be provided via An Post to the existing network of approximately 900 post offices. This funding will provide the necessary time for new commercial initiatives and services to develop, bring sustainability and certainty for postmasters and address concerns around any potential reduction in accessibility to services. The EU's Brexit adjustment reserve, BAR, aims to provide support to counter the adverse consequences of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. An Post has successfully submitted an application for funding of approximately €24 million from the BAR in relation to the management of EU customs and VAT requirements applying to all An Post UK traffic following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. This important change in international trade has had a significant negative impact on the postal sector in Ireland.

Brexit also coincided with long-planned extensive changes to EU customs regulations governing goods entering and leaving the EU. All traffic from the UK that was previously categorised as intra-EU became non-EU traffic and subject to customs-related obligations, which directly impacted on An Post operationally and commercially. The proposed amendment, in subsection (2), is required to provide a legal base for the funding granted under the EU regulation to be directed from the Minister to An Post as compensation for the impact of Brexit on the company. The proposed amendment, in subsection (3), ensures that the specific terms and conditions under which funding is to be provided to the post office network under subsection (1) and An Post under subsection (2) remain subject to the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform.

Amendment No. 2 is a consequential amendment to the Long Title to the Bill to reflect the inclusion of amendment No. 61.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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I do not believe it will come as any shock to the Minister of State, given that we have had this conversation earlier, that we support this. It is caught in one term: "sustainability". We all know the benefits provided by the post office network and the network's absolute necessity, particularly in rural communities that have lost many of their hubs. We welcome the fact that we are talking about the €10 million but it is a matter of ensuring it makes it exactly to where it needs to go. It is a matter of a fair break-up for the postmasters.

We have to commend the work done by a number of the stakeholders, particularly the Irish Postmasters Union. As I said previously, they put their money where their mouths are. We had the Grant Thornton report on what was necessary for sustainability. If anyone needed a lesson on the necessity of the post office network, that was provided during the Covid pandemic. We are all aware of the huge impact of the closure of a post office on a community. Therefore, it is all about sustainability.

I welcome that we were able to deal with the issues regarding state aid.

Other issues have been dealt with in the House regarding Coillte. We need to be able to bring about a similar solution there, whereby the likes of Coillte can be able to draw down money itself and does not necessarily need the help - for the want of a better term - of the likes of Gresham House. I imagine it is a particular help that Gresham House will do better from in the long run. Anyway, I digress, which I tend to do from time to time.

This is highly positive. It is an absolute necessity but whether we are talking about driver licences and everything right through from social protection to passports, perhaps we can look at those State services that can be provided within post offices. Again, we have heard from An Post and we have heard from the Irish Postmasters' Union previously about the need to look at the tendering process and to take into account the social dividend provided by the post office and the post office network. We need to be able to allow them to tender in a fair and equitable way. That is something we need to bring about. There is an obvious gain in this from the State's point of view. We all like the idea of the green digital hub where people can come to access necessary services, where they may be more comfortable going to the post office to access these services than they would be in other places.

Across the summer we had AIB and the possibility of the mass closures of a huge number of banking services across all our pillar banks. It is a fight that needs to be had. We need to ensure we maintain a necessary number of banks. Outside of that, there are financial services that can be provided, and are being provided at this point in time. A greater number of them can be provided by our post office network. This is my point. If we can get these services, then we can have a post office network that is making far more money and, in deriving that money it would, eventually, not need the state aid. We could get to that sustainable point in time. Obviously, it also means that from a business point of view, we make the post office a far more saleable entity than it is, unfortunately, for a considerable number of people out there who are under pressure. The reason we have so many in operation at this point is down to the commitment of a lot of postmasters in their communities. This is why we have this necessary legislation in front of us. It is something we need to do but long term we need to ensure we can make them more sustainable. The idea is that they would provide services and would be paid a fair price for the services, and this would facilitate everybody.

It is fair to say that I have an issue with the An Post proposal for a 10 cent increase in the price of a stamp. There has already been an increase in the cost of postage over the past year. My fear, and it is a fear the Irish Postmasters' Union, IPU, has put in the public domain also, is that we do not need an even smaller number of people to utilise the absolutely necessary postage system. Many people of a particular age not only have a certain grá for it, but sometimes they have a certain need for it too. It is the way they deal with State services and with other necessary services. It is a way that we can make sure people get informed of certain things. We do not need to put added costs onto other State agencies, and we do not need to pass costs onto individuals, and we certainly do not need to be putting pressure on businesses at a time like this.

We are all aware that things have changed in that area as there are multiple means of communication now that were not available years ago. Due to online purchasing, and whatever else, there is a completely different structure around the delivery of packages and so on. In this context there have been certain gains and certain losses for the post office network. First and foremost we are in support of this legislation. We need to ensure that it happens as quickly as possible and that the money goes to where it needs to go, and that it ensures we maintain the post office network we have at this point in time.

This does not fall just within the Minister of State's remit. There has been a huge amount of engagement on this, and especially at the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Transport and Communications, from the point of view of ensuring that post offices are able to offer multiple services, and that some of these would be State services. The post offices could offer the service and get paid for it and we could have a more sustainable post office network, and we would be all the better for it.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I thank the Deputy for his support for these amendments.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 3:

In page 9, line 26, after “Regulation” to insert “and Digital Hub Development Agency(Amendment)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 4:

In page 9, line 27, after “Act” to insert “(other than Parts10and 11)”.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Anois bogaimid ar aghaidh go dtí leasú Uimh. 5. Tá sé seo ceangailte le Uimh. 6, Uimh. 7, Uimh. 8, agus Uimh. 9 agus i gcás Uimh. 6 tá leasú ionadach ann. An bhfuil cóip ag gach duine? There is a substitute amendment for amendment No. 6.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 5:

In page 10, between lines 28 and 29, to insert the following:

“ “high-risk vendor measure” has the meaning given to it by section 25;”.

Before I discuss amendments Nos. 5 to 9, inclusive, I wish to draw my colleagues' attention to amendment No. 6, which is now included in a substitute list. This is to amend a cross-referencing error, which had previously read "a direction under section 32(2),”.", and which now reads "a direction under section 33(2),”."

I am introducing amendment No. 5 in order to define a “high-risk vendor measure”, of which eight measures are listed in section 25. Amendment No. 6 is required for these subsections to be defined as regulatory breaches under the Bill when enacted. The amendment will add these new subsections to the definition of regulatory breach. The definition will now mean that a failure to comply with these measures is a regulatory breach and subject to the administrative sanction process set out in Part 7 of the Bill.

Under section 33(2), ComReg may serve a direction on a provider requiring them to show information that they have complied with a high-risk vendor measure and if they have not complied to explain why not, to submit a possible security audit, and to bear any costs associated with that audit.

Amendment No. 7 is required to clarify that a person affected by a high-risk vendor measure or a variation of such a measure can only challenge the decision through an appeal to the High Court. This amendment is required to ensure consistency with the policy objectives and other similar provisions in the Bill, as currently an appeal of a measure under Part 2, security of networks and services, does not exclude the traditional judicial review but does allow the High Court to grant remedies on the basis of what might be called judicial review assessments.

I am not able to accept amendment No. 8 where the Deputy seeks "to delete "electronic communications networks or electronic communications services” and substitute “public 5G telecommunication networks”, as this would narrow the scope of the legislation and what it is setting out to achieve. This is future-facing legislation and it must be flexible to deal with emerging threats. It would be unwise to limit the legislation to just 5G networks prior to having carried out the risk assessment set forth in this section.

I do not propose to accept amendment No. 9. This would delete the definition of "high-risk vendor" from the interpretation of Part 3. I earlier introduced an amendment for the definition of “high-risk vendor measure” to follow the definition of “high-risk vendors". Both definitions have the meaning given to them in individual sections and it would not make sense to remove any of these from the interpretation sections.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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In fairness, I acknowledge that we will be dealing with some amendments that will look at this further, namely technological questions. We all get the idea of the changed geopolitical set-up in the world. We are all aware that the State, in the context of security, requires the necessary powers to ensure that communication networks are protected.

However, we need some sort of clarity on how decisions and determinations will be made. There is much talk about information as being provided by intelligence services and of course we will be dealing with a large number of people who have skin in the game.

Beyond that, I am always afraid when the power lies solely with the Minister. For example, what if an action is chosen to be taken in respect of components that cannot be used in communications technology?. We are going to have to understand why this is the case. We are definitely going to need some reasoning behind it. I understand the Minister might not be able to offer all the information into the public domain but there has to be some form of accountability. We cannot just have a Minister making decisions on this willy-nilly.

There was often talk in Europe in recent years about strategic autonomy. The issue was thrown up by Covid as regards semi-conductors, that we did not have the pool and supply chain that was necessary to deliver. We are still dealing with that now. We all understand the need for strategic autonomy since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We need to be able to maintain our communication devices and provide components in the wider world. I understand in respect of some of the companies that would fall under this - the high-risk vendor - that there are not many companies in Europe that can provide the alternative. They would probably need to do a significant amount of work to get themselves to that place from a technological point of view and in ensuring that they can provide the supply chain that would be necessary. Then we are getting into the wider question, if we are talking about taking communication components in and out. We are told that the core parts of some of these communication networks would not be using components provided by a high-risk vendor. That is information I have been given but I accept the Government will be carrying out an audit in respect of when they would be looking at carrying out something like this. We would need to make sure this could be done over a realistic period if it was necessary. I imagine if there is a high cost we would have to look at how the added costs would impact on those companies. I have no doubt there then would be talk of compensation and all the rest of it. I would like the Minister of State to go into some detail on that. I accept it might not be possible to provide all the details, even if a decision was made that a high-risk vendor would not be used and its components could not be used in our telecommunications infrastructure. However, I would like to think we would be provided with some information, that there would be some element of accountability and it would not be just a Minister making a decision. I would hope we would have some sight of the information leading to such a decision.

I assume there could be a fear about our control or a security issue in respect of our communication infrastructure. We all get the idea of how important communication infrastructure is. If some of us do not, we live in the age of hybrid attacks, cyber-warfare and almost cyber-to-physical attacks in this day and age. We know we need to look after our physical and digital infrastructure. We need to ensure it is protected in all ways. We need to make sure we can actually do this, that we do not leave ourselves in a logistical nightmare and that there is some element of oversight of what would be massive decisions. I doubt they would be made with just business consideration. I imagine there would be geopolitical concerns and relationships with countries of origin and so on that would be impacted by all of this. I would like to think decisions would be made on the basis of high-grade information that could be trusted, that was verified as much as possible and that we would be dealing with something logistically possible if this was necessary. A great many pieces need to fall into place first. The biggest of them is that if we made a determination tomorrow not to use one particular high-risk vendor, we might not be able to replace all those pieces. We should see if others are doing what we are doing. In the US they have made moves of a similar nature. We need to look at the means and process by which Government is going to make this determination. I do not like the idea that it is just the Minister who would have the power. We would need to see some decent protocols and there would need to be oversight by this House and by others in respect of the information that might lead to a possible call. What can we do from a technological point of view to enable ourselves to do this without impacting severely on our communications infrastructure? There are some big issues there and the Minister of State has to provide clarity to the House.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Like the previous speaker, I have concerns about this Part of the Bill. I do not know if his concerns extend to the whole Part but mine certainly do. As I previously stated, not only have I concern with the content of it, I also have a major concern with the process by which it was passed. As Deputy Ó Murchú pointed out, where the power is given to the Minister to proscribe a certain so-called high-risk vendor, it means any communications network will have to take it out of its network. That will involve a cost, of course. It was previously determined to be absolutely lawful and then suddenly it has become unlawful. Arguably they will incur a cost, almost certainly they will, and it will have to be borne by somebody. In Ireland it is usually the taxpayers who bear the cost, whether it is defective apartments, defective concrete blocks or using materials from a high-risk vendor. Somebody is going to carry the can and it is invariably going to be the taxpayer.

I had a look at this issue of money messages. The purpose of a Bill has to be recommended to the House before it goes to Committee Stage. If the purpose changes, and of course it was completely changed by Part 3, then it follows that a new money message is required. Be that as it may, the Acting Chair has ruled on it. It does seem to me to be problematic. The problem flows not from the Acting Chair's determination but the manner in which the Minister chose to implement this. Amendments were brought to committee the night before it was to hear them. It was not possible to put down amendments to those amendments or even to properly scrutinise them.

There was no revised explanatory memorandum. To this day there is no explanatory memorandum. There is a standing order to the effect that the Chair can require an explanatory memorandum to be provided. That can be done at any stage. There is an explanatory memorandum for the Bill but it did not include this. I suppose somebody decided not to bother our little minds in the House with this as it is high-level geopolitics. They decided to deal with it in that manner rather than have it debated here in the House. There is no explanatory memorandum. Does the Acting Chair wish to have an explanatory memorandum so that the House can fully understand what it is voting for? It is important that the House knows what it is voting for; it is the essence of a democracy. It is why we have this Chamber and why people are elected to it.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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I am not inclined to do so. We are in Committee.We are not on Report Stage at the moment. The Deputy can ask the Minister of State to explain himself on amendments. The Deputy has raised issues and the Minister of State will be given an opportunity to respond.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Okay, of course. I raised the definition of high-risk vendor with the Minister on Committee Stage in the committee room.

It had been inserted the night before, so there was not a great deal of time to analyse it, but we were assured it was common in this type of legislation across the EU and that we were implementing an EU framework. When I asked whether there was particular legislation, I was told there was. The Minister of State's officials were kind enough to send me translations from which they were working. I appreciated that greatly, but when I went through them, I found the term "high-risk vendor" nowhere. Maybe I missed it, as there was a great deal of legislation. There was legislation from practically every EU member state, but none of them used the term "high-risk vendor". Will the Minister of State point to another country that uses it specifically? He will not disagree with me when I say it is a pejorative term. No one would like to be labelled a high-risk vendor, even in a Sunday market, much less in the corporate world that the Bill is seeking to regulate. If someone is labelled a high-risk vendor, it will have implications. Name countries that use this term. Why did the Minister of State decide to use such a pejorative term? It is unusually pejorative for legislation, particularly legislation affecting companies that are, by definition, based outside Ireland. Pejorative terms have the habit of spiralling into conflicts. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not mean armed conflicts, but trade conflicts. People get upset. Is there no better terminology that could be used? What countries use this terminology and why is the Government using it?

Are we considering amendments Nos. 5 to 9, inclusive?

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Yes. I erred earlier, as we are now on Report Stage, not Committee Stage.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I thought so, but I did not want to contradict the Chair.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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We were on Committee Stage for the previous amendments.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Yes. On Committee Stage, I asked the Chairman of the committee to ask the Minister of State to provide an explanatory memorandum. The Chairman did not do so but, to be fair to him, he said he was sure the Minister of State would come forward with a detailed explanation of what Ireland was doing, why we were doing it and which other countries were doing the same. While I received a mountain of legislation from other countries, I received very little by way of explanation. One should not rely on rumours in the House, but I have heard rumours that the American ambassador was in a couple of times and had a particular interest in this Bill. Every embassy across the land has an interest in what we are doing. I sometimes wonder why, but that is the case. There is nothing untoward about an embassy taking a particular interest, but I would be concerned if that was being done not on the basis of national security, but on the basis of an economic realignment of the State that has not been discussed. I would like to know the Minister of State's reasons. In the absence of those, we will fall back on hearsay, innuendo and rumour.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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After the Minister of State responds, the Deputy will have another opportunity to contribute if he is still not satisfied.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Deputy Ó Murchú is concerned that the powers of designation rest solely with the Minister and that there should be some degree of oversight. The legislation as written provides for independent judicial oversight as well as consultation throughout the process. Where a vendor is designated, an independent judge can overturn that. The power does not rest solely with the Minister, which is not how other countries implemented the same objective. Instead, they made it so that their respective ministers solely could make a designation. In Ireland, a judge will be involved. The courts will have oversight and there will be consultation throughout. This provision is based on the EU process. In other words, it will be fair, non-discriminatory and transparent to the maximum extent without impacting national security.

The criteria come from the EU toolbox, which uses the phrase "high-risk supplier". That is the origin of our terminology. Deputy McNamara and other Deputies have complained to me in recent weeks about this specific wording, saying it is pejorative or inflammatory. Deputy McNamara asked me directly about which other countries used this term. The Netherlands was asked to change its term and it changed it to "untrusted vendors". I do not know how that is better. The UK uses the phrase "relevant vendor". Austria uses the phrase "designated high-risk vendors". The phrase in the EU toolbox, which is the template for how countries make their laws, is "high-risk supplier". Leaving aside the nomenclature, the main point is that these countries are all using the same criteria from the EU toolbox.

This is EU-led legislation. It came from the EU. I discussed with the Commissioner and European ministers what the criteria were and what objectives we were trying to achieve. This designation of vendors could apply to a vendor in any country outside the EEA and the UK, for example, in the US.

I will not call it an insinuation, but Deputy McNamara referred to a rumour about the US ambassador having a say in this legislation. I met the US ambassador in July and she did not mention it to me. The matter did not come up in conversation.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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I am not sure our backlogged court system will provide any solution, so I would hate it if anyone were to suggest that judicial review was the way to go. We know the issues with court services, which are insufficiently resourced.

Will the Minister of State go into some detail about the consultations he mentioned? All of this comes with the caveat of national security, which presumably allows for the gazumping of a large amount of oversight of the relevant information. I am jumping the gun in that regard, though, for want of a better term. Will the Minister of State provide details of what the consultation would look like in terms of the assessment of someone as a high-risk vendor and the carrying out of the nuclear option of removing the material from particular communications infrastructure?

While strategic autonomy is important in this day and age, I am led to believe that, if we were to take a particular vendor out of the equation in the morning, we would encounter technological difficulties and could end up dealing with companies that were not at the same technological level. Some of these components are being used because experts in the field believe they are the best in the business. If we are to go down this road, though, I want to know what the process will be, what conversations there have been across the EU about delivering along the supply chain, and what the story is with the information behind this provision. The only story that makes sense is that there are security questions. How much information would be before the House, in the public domain or wherever else? What is the possibility of there being oversight, consultation or whatever one wants to call it?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I thank the Minister of State for his clarification and explanation regarding the American ambassador. I am aware from responses to parliamentary questions that the ambassador met the Taoiseach several times since. I do not know whether this matter was discussed with the Taoiseach, but I do not wish to go down that rabbit hole. My primary concern has to do with the Minister of State's reference to oversight mechanisms, including the oversight provided by the courts. This is the main problem with the Bill. It does not matter whether I believe the Judiciary is excellent - I do - but we have an independent Judiciary in this State.

It is a Judiciary which many would argue is the organ of Government that has best served the State since its foundation, and to which one can have recourse in the event of one's rights being interfered with or trammelled. This Bill actually fetters the ability of the Judiciary to provide oversight. In a way, it simply interferes with its independence. The Minister will provide information to the court, which the court will take notice of, the appellant will not know what information has been provided to the court, the court may not provide that to the appellant, and yet the process goes on. That is anathema to how the courts have functioned in Ireland up to now. Even in the Special Criminal Court, the operation of which many would question, nothing like this has ever been envisaged. It was discussed, albeit in an entirely different context. The idea of whether the courts would have recourse to or take notice of information that was not provided to an appellant was discussed in the context of a refusal of citizenship on national security grounds. It was found that there was no possibility of that and that it would be a departure for the Irish courts to do that. That is what is proposed in this Bill. For the Minister of State to suggest that there is some kind of independent appeal process which makes it all fine is simply wrong.

Mattie McGrath (Tipperary, Independent)
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I, too, have concerns about this legislation, including the fact that is it being passed so quickly when we might have issues with the situation of the high-risk vendor or whatever wording the Government wants to use. Deputy McNamara has been a practitioner in the courts and knows more about them than I do. I would not be as loud in my praise for the Judiciary as he is. That is his entitlement. The Minister of State said that we will have recourse to the courts. Justice delayed is justice denied. There are queues out the door in the courts, as the Minister of State is aware. There are huge backlogs and delays in getting cases heard. I do not know if this is going to work. Where is the transparency? Deputy McNamara said that the Special Criminal Court sits behind closed doors. There is a behind-closed-doors element of this legislation because we, as legislators, are voting for a pig in a poke. We do not know exactly what the process will be other than there will be recourse to the courts. There is talk of this European tool box. It must be a mighty tool box. Like other colleagues, in the last few months in particular, I have heard regularly that we have a full tool box at our disposal to use whatever tools in it that we think desirable for reliefs for our hard-pressed people, but we have not used them or even opened the box. Now, apparently we have the padlock unlocked and it is wide open. The tool box is there to be used and explored and taken advantage of. It may be that there are very well-to-do companies that can afford to go to court. The cost for most companies of going down the road of judicial appeals and reviews is prohibitive. It is very vague to say that there will be recourse to the courts. What courts will they be? Will they be appeal courts or high courts? Will cases end up in the Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice if we are dealing with European companies? Why have something so loose and vague? It is very important that we get this right. As Teachtaí Dála we have to know what we are voting for here.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Deputy Ó Murchú asked about consultation and the importance of consultation. Consultation on what constitutes a critical component will include detailed consultation with the industry. There are provisions for the Minister to consult with any person the Minister considers appropriate in assessing the risk profile of a vendor. That would likely, in the vast majority of cases, include vendors. Section 23 provides for the Minister to consult with providers and vendors before making any high-risk vendor designations or measures. I think Deputy McNamara's feeling is that this is not independent judicial oversight and that the process is unfair. It is a judge who makes the decision over whether the designation is proportionate. It is a judge who decides what evidence should be shown to the appellant and whether it constitutes material that could pose a risk to national security. That is a decision for the judge and the independent Judiciary. It is out of the hands of the political system. I feel that it is independent. Those decisions are made on the basis of intelligence material that is supplied by the Minister to the judge. We have two intelligence agencies in the State and that is what they work on. I think have covered the points raised by Deputy McGrath with other Deputies, unless there is some specific point that he thinks I did not answer.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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It is about the technological logistics. Let us say a decision is made. It is about engaging with the alternative supplier and then with the companies, ensuring the supply chain is there and enough time is allowed so that we do not end up in a ridiculous situation where we take out components and we cannot make phone calls.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The way the process will work is it is focused on prevention. There is no compensation provided for operators who have equipment in their network that needs to be removed. We do not want to be in a situation where we are ordering operators to remove equipment. We want to be in a situation where the security measures we take are for the future. This is future-facing legislation about what we put into our network in the future. It would be a very extreme case where we would ask somebody to remove something that is already there.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 6:

In page 11, between lines 4 and 5, to insert the following:

“(b) a high-risk vendor measure,

(c) a confidentiality requirement of the Minister under section 26(1),

(d) a direction under section 33(2),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 7:

In page 18, between lines 36 and 37, to insert the following:

“(1) Neither a decision or a requirement of—

(a) the Commission under this Part or Part 4, or the Code Regulations (other than Regulation 98 and 99), or

(b) the Minister under Regulation 70, 76 or 100 of the Code Regulations,

shall be challenged, including as to its validity, other than by way of an appeal under this section.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt, in respect of a decision or requirement referred to in subsection (1) no proceeding (including an application for judicial review) may be brought before the courts other than an appeal under this section.”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 12:

In page 21, line 11, after “may” to insert “by order”.

Basically, this amendment seeks to insert the phrase "by order" in page 21, line 11. Section 20(1) states that, "The Minister may prescribe any component or any class of components as a critical component or critical components." I suppose it is unusual in that it is not clear at all how the Minister will do this. It would seem that an order should set that out. I do not think that order necessarily has issues of national security in it. It is more of a technological determination, but I think it ought to be open to challenge in the normal way that any order is open to challenge. It is only when it affects a particular company that the extremely restrictive measures the Minister has set out by way of the appeal of high-risk vendor measures. Saying that certain components or any class of components are a critical component is a technological determination that should be based on objective criteria and challengeable. Even if I do not accept the whole national security thing, it is a simple technological determination that should be made transparently, and should be challengeable in a transparent way. I am not expecting that it would be challenged particularly. I do not see why making an order doing this, in the same way that the Minister-----

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Gabh mo leithscéal, this amendment is grouped with amendments Nos. 13 and 14. Amendment No. 14 is also in the name of Deputy McNamara.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Amendment No. 14 seeks to set out a process. It does not delete anything, as was the case with the previous amendment. It merely sets out a process to be followed in making a determination that a component is a critical component, or a class of components are critical components, and requires that the Minister would publish the proposed component or class of components and give reasons for prescribing it or them as critical. It also calls on the Minister to specify a period during which submissions relating to the proposal may be made. In the event there is urgency involved, the Minister can override that. The new subsection (4) that I have proposed states:

The consultation process provided for in subsection (3)may be dispensed with where the Minister certifies that exceptional circumstances justified by urgent considerations of national security so require.”.

There is an opt-out for the Minister in that new subsection. I do not think that every order determining that something is a critical component will, or could possibly, involve national security. I am asking the Minister to put in place a process so that not everything comes down to the length of the Lord Chancellor's foot or the views of the Minister or his officials on particular components.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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This issue is similar to others we have conversed about already. It is about a process. We can get into components and how critical or not they are. Stakeholders who work in the field would consider every component critical in the sense that without it, the system would not work. The Minister of State has made his arguments about why determinations would be made. We need a greater level of clarity in respect of how the process will work and how many people would get a chance or opportunity of eyes-on. I accept what the Minister of State said about a judge making the final decision. I would like to think that a sufficient amount of consultation and due diligence would be carried out. I appreciate the Minister of State's description of this as a matter of future-proofing. That means, however, that a serious conversation must be had across Europe to ensure there is capacity among vendors who are not high risk to be able to deliver in a situation where people cannot access the supply chains they used previously. We need an answer on that point.

In fairness to Deputy McNamara - and the Minister of State can answer this point - he is seeking to ensure we have a process in play that provides accountability and includes a proper checklist system to allow us ensure that all the due diligence is carried out as necessary. That applies in respect of the making of these determinations. I would also like some detail as to how much conversation is happening at a wider, international level. If a decision is made in respect of future-proofing, are conversations happening about how delivery could be secured without any logistical hiccups when a project or new piece of infrastructure cannot be put in place because the relevant providers are waiting for a part that a company cannot deliver?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We are discussing the designation of critical components within our national electronic communication network. The discussion we are having around this amendment relates to when we are selecting which are critical components, which are the most vulnerable parts of our communications network, which are the weakest parts and which would it be most devastating were they to be attacked. We are considering whether to list those administratively or by order, that is, via a statutory instrument or executive order that would publicly list what those components are. Do we want to publish a list of the most vulnerable, weakest and most attackable parts of our communications network in an open way or not? We have a balance to strike between national security and transparency.

There must be consultation on this point. We cannot have a situation whereby the Minister or civil servants write this list. The consultation on this issue is happening in great detail with the industry at the moment. It will continue and reach a rational conclusion. The critical components and most vulnerable parts of the network will be listed. That is why I am proposing that we use an administrative listing.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I trust that the purpose of this exercise is to avoid the use of those components, where possible. If we want people to avoid the use of certain components, and the Minister of State has indicated to me that is the purpose of the exercise, but we do not tell companies or persons what components we want them to avoid using, it is entirely counter-productive. It is like saying we are going to proscribe certain substances under the Misuse of Drugs Act because we think it is objectively dangerous for people to take them but not telling people what those drugs are because then they would know what is dangerous. I fundamentally do not understand the logic.

I see the Minister of State wants to come back in. I am happy to allow him to do so. I trust I will be able to respond.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
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Because he is the mover of the amendment, the Deputy will have another seven minutes once the Minister of State has responded.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Deputy Ó Murchú may wish to come back in.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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I accept some of what the Minister of State said. Nobody wants to display our weak points and ask that no one kicks us there. I understand that point as it applies to infrastructure. However, Deputy McNamara made his point in a straight manner. The idea is that there are components that are not to be used. We are talking about a situation where a blanket ban could be applied in respect of components across the board. Definitions of what is critical and what is not could result in a very funny conversation at some point in time.

We all have a notion about the companies that could possibly be named as high-risk vendors. I am told that many parts made by a particular company are not necessarily in the core of the network infrastructure. Has there been any element of an audit arriving through consultation with communication infrastructure companies? Do we have detail on that point? Deputy McNamara is not proposing a process over which the Minister of State can stand. However, there needs to be a process. We need to put something in place whereby we make the determination from a technical point of view as to what is critical. Beyond that, we also need a process for when we make a determination as regards national security. There needs to be some element of oversight. I accept that the Government might not necessarily wish to put everything in the public domain but there will be a need for some element of accountability and due diligence across the board. Has there been some element of an audit of the infrastructure as it exists at the moment? I accept the Minister of State has said much of this is about future-proofing.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I will respond first to Deputy McNamara. He suggested that we should know which are the critical components that need to be excluded because they are dangerous and should not be in the network. I want to clarify this point and give the Deputy an explanatory memorandum. A number of things are happening here. The first is the designation of critical components. These are parts of the network which are critical to its function. They are not vendor-specific. We might say, for example, that a wireless tower is a critical component or that the cable that connects the wireless tower to another base station is a critical component. We would not want to remove those items from the network. There is then another part of the legislation which refers to security measures that we might take. There are two kinds of listing going on.

One is listing the vulnerable or risky parts of the network. The second part is saying the security measures we want to take. The security measure taken does not have to be the banning of a particular vendor and all its equipment from all areas of the communication network. It is much more likely that equipment from a particular vendor used in a particular way should not be used in a particular component of the network. It is a much narrower thing. It can be something for the future. It can be that when replacing the equipment, something else is to be put in. It can be that something is used in a particular way, such as that it has to be firewalled or configured in a certain way to make it safer. The idea is that measures would be released.

To respond to Deputy Ó Murchú, a number of vendors in the EU provide a lot of communications network equipment and there is a desire by the EU that vendors and countries diversify and a sense they will be stronger by having a diversified set of equipment. It does not have to be from either of the two major vendors. All countries are keen to promote open RAN and to see that type of open standard and equipment that is less bound to a brand or vendor used throughout.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I accept the Minister of State’s differentiation between the component and the security measures necessary to make that component safe, but I respectfully say that is all the more reason for the components to be listed in an objective, transparent way. I do not say the Minister should list the components by order and specify the security measures he requires to be undertaken to make sure they operate safely. That would be a bridge too far because it would enable people to use them in an unsafe way and to figure out readily from looking at the latest ministerial order how to circumvent the requirements. I refer to the components themselves, as opposed to the additional security measures required. Section 20(1) reads, “The Minister may prescribe any component or any class of components as a critical component or critical components.” It subsequently refers to things he can “have regard to”. I have no problem with that but it has to be set out objectively and have a process in place to set it out. I do not see any security implications in it. I see only a requirement of transparency so the Minister cannot act capriciously. Notwithstanding the manner in which these provisions were introduced to the House, I do not think the Minister would act capriciously. However, we do not legislate for the current Minister alone but for future Ministers too.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 15 to 17, inclusive, have been ruled out of order. Amendments Nos. 18, 19 and 23 fall because they are in the name of Deputy Cahill, who is not present. Amendments Nos. 20 to 22, inclusive, and 24 have been ruled out of order.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 25 to 29, inclusive, and 33 to 36, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 25:

In page 22, line 35, to delete “Part” and substitute “Act”.

The amendment will extend the definition of "high-risk vendor measure" to the rest of the Bill.

I introduced amendment No. 26 following concerns on Committee Stage about transparency. It will require the Minister to specify, in the high-risk vendor notice, that he or she considers it necessary to take the measures contained in the order to control risks to the security of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services that may affect national security, and if he or she considers that prior consultation could affect national security, to specify the reasons for this.

Amendment No. 27, in the name of Deputy McNamara, will not be necessary because of amendment No. 26, which is intended to serve the purpose, whereby the Minister will have to specify in the high-risk vendor notice that he or she considers it necessary to take the measures contained in the order to control risks to the security of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services that may affect national security, and where the Minister considers consultation would be contrary to the interests of national security, to specify the reasons this is so.

Neither will I accept amendment No. 28, because there will be occasions when it will be necessary, in the interests of national security, for a provider to which a high-risk vendor notice applies to maintain the existence or contents of the order as confidential whereby disclosure of the order could be contrary to the interests of national security. The importance of section 26 is underpinned by subsection (2), which sets out criminal sanctions for a provider found guilty of failing to comply with this requirement.

I will not accept amendment No. 29 because it is often the case it is not possible for myriad reasons to consult a vendor, including where the vendor is based in another jurisdiction, which may complicate contacting the vendor. The components could be open source components where it is not clear who the natural person or body corporate making the components are, or the vendor could simply no longer exist and, therefore, it would be disproportionate to remove the safeguard of "make reasonable efforts to", leading to the imposition of an administrative burden to have this requirement in place, preventing the Minister from taking the required measures.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I welcome the fact the Minister of State intends to remove from the section the reference to "public order", which is a step forward, and every step forward, no matter how small, is to be welcomed.

Regarding amendment No. 29, I do not accept the Minister of State’s reasoning. If the vendor is based outside the jurisdiction, it can still be contacted, and if it does not reply in time, that is the problem of the vendor, perhaps because it is precluded by distance and is selling something far away.

Nevertheless, I welcome the fact the Minister of State is seeking to remove the reference to "public order" in line 22 of page 24 such that the provision will be limited to national security. It is difficult to envisage circumstances where this matter would arise, although perhaps banning a Huawei component could lead to riots on the streets. I do not know. Deputy Ó Murchú rightly made the point it is all well and good to label something as a high-risk component, but are we going to be able to replace a component that comes from the good guys?

It seems this Bill is about good guys and bad guys, and we all have preconceived notions about who is who in that regard. That is my concern. National security apparatuses certainly work under the idea that there are good guys and bad guys and that there are states the information from which we receive is solid and reliable, along with their military hardware – I suppose we are moving in that direction generally - and other states whose information is not solid or reliable. Our officials travel to conferences in the capital cities of some of those states and meet their counterpart employees of the security apparatuses of those states and, therefore, we think they are the good guys.

I am not convinced, however, that there are good guys in the world of international espionage. I do not think any information we receive in regard to national security is going to come from the Phoenix Park. Rather, I think it will come from an embassy in either the Phoenix Park, Ballsbridge or somewhere like that. My concern is that there is so little scrutiny. I accept that the scrutiny of measures taken on the basis of national security is always going to be difficult, but that does not mean there should be no scrutiny, yet I fear that is, effectively, what the Minister of State is introducing. It is a mechanism by which the assertions of other states are going to be taken as read, and nobody will be in a position to say otherwise.

I accept that the Chinese are developing this and I have my doubts about them because the Americans told us we should do, but it would be naive to think that only China and Chinese companies are interested in espionage and in compromising the security of networks to their advantage.

I would have thought the American security apparatus or the British, French, Russian, Indian or Pakistani security apparatus - name your pick of any big power - would not be doing its job unless it felt it could compromise networks and get the information it needs out of them. The argument the Minister of State is making is that we have the rule of law in some states and the law is at least more robust in some states than in others. We have seen that in action over the past two years where, ironically, people can be brought before the Houses on Capitol Hill and made answer very awkward questions. Indeed, Zuckerberg was brought in and very awkward questions were asked in the House of Commons about some of the information for sale that was gleaned from Facebook and how that came about. While we accept these countries are not likely to be deemed as high-risk vendors because they have a robust rule of law and accountability structure, we are saying we should have no accountability structure whatsoever for these Houses, with no orders to be made, nothing to be set out and no way to challenge anything. We are saying it would be dangerous for us to even know what is being done because it would fry our little minds and we should leave it to the House. We trust the elected representatives of the American and British people to hold to account companies operating in their jurisdictions and make sure they are safe, we are going to just rely, carte blanche, on what they tell us. That is a fundamental problem I have with this Bill. It is one I have articulated previously to little avail, although at least the reference to "public order" has been taken out. Sometimes in this place, one stands over the very small successes.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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I will attempt not to repeat myself or labour the point but it is almost the same point that arises in relation to all of these matters. We are back to the need for a process. I accept that all states will make determinations on the basis of national security. There needs to be some element of oversight - we can call it accountability - and making sure there are eyes on, that due diligence is done and we do not necessarily accept without question the intelligence from certain quarters. It is fair to say all major states even spy on their friends from time to time. None of us is naive enough to think there are absolutely good guys and absolutely bad guys. There are an awful lot of people who are involved in this particular game. We need to do the work to ensure there is going to be the throughput - the supply chain - of material that can do the business from a technological point of view. I am not going to keep repeating these points but it comes back to that point of the process.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I will stick to the amendments we are debating. I thank Deputy McNamara for acknowledging that we have moved some distance towards trying to find a compromise on the worthwhile suggestions he made. We spent time trying to amend the legislation in order to go some distance towards his position. We do not feel we can guarantee that we can reach a vendor to consult with it but we will make the best effort we can. That is really what the legislation is trying to say. We know we can consult the mobile operators. We know we will regulate licensed operators in the Irish telecommunications sector because we know where they are and we can call around to discuss something. However, we cannot guarantee we will be able to consult a firm on the other side of the world that may have gone out of business or is not responding to us. That is what this amendment is about. I neglected to say I will also move amendments Nos. 33 and 36.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 26:

In page 23, between lines 19 and 20, to insert the following: “(b) that the Minister considers it necessary to take the measures contained in the order to control risks to the security of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services which may affect national security,

(c) where the Minister considers that consultation under section 27(1) would be contrary to the interests of national security, the reasons therefor,”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 27:

In page 23, line 24, to delete “or public order.” and substitute the following: “and whereso occurs the Minister shall certify that the notice was made in the interests of national security.”.

If the Minister is taking a measure on the basis of national security, as Ministers and Governments must do, what is wrong with saying a measure is being taken on the basis of national security? That is my only question.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Is Deputy McNamara saying there is some section of the Bill where the words "national security" are not actually directly used? Is that his question or does he have a proposed amendment on how I should word it?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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No, it is just this line 24 which I am trying to find. Given that the Minister is taking out the reference to "public order", it follows that a notice can only be made in the interests of national security. Presuming the Minister is going to move amendment No. 30, I think-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes, I am going to move it.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 30:

In page 24, line 22, to delete “or public order”.

I am accepting all proposed deletions of the words "or public order", specifically amendments Nos. 31 and 32 and 37 to 41, inclusive. I have brought forward an amendment of my own to specify on a high-risk vendor notice that the Minister considers it necessary to take the measures contained in the order to control risks to the security of electronic communications networks or electronic communication services which may affect national security and where the Minister considers that consultation under section 27(1) would be contrary to the interests of national security, and the reasons for this. Therefore, amendments Nos. 31 and 32 are not necessary.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 31:

In page 24, line 22, to delete “or public order” and substitute “and the Minister shall certify the reasons for dispensing with the requirement in subsection (1)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 33:

In page 24, between lines 23 and 24, to insert the following:

“(1) A high-risk vendor measure shall not be challenged, including as to its validity, other than by way of an appeal under this section.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt, in respect of a measure under section 25, no proceeding (including an application for judicial review) may be brought before the courts other than an appeal under this section.”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 34:

In page 24, between lines 26 and 27, to insert the following:

“(2) A person affected by a high-risk vendor measure or a variation of such measure shall be informed of the making of such order as soon as practicable after the making of such an order and in any event within 5 days of the making of such an order.”.

Is there a particular reason for this? I have reservations about the fact that the high-risk vendor notice has to remain confidential because it is going to be very strange if a certain component just disappears from the network. It seems almost sinister where it is a bit like those photographs where people just start disappearing from them, and nobody knows why. I do not want it to appear that I am reading something sinister into everything but surely in the commercial world in which one supplies an essential component, and it is determined by the Minister that it is from a high-risk vendor so, it then has to be removed and one then can no longer, presumably, provide a service as a result of that, albeit on a temporary or permanent basis, or a product cannot be provided on a temporary basis while one sources an alternative component.

As I understand it, this high-risk vendor notice comes into immediate effect and one cannot say that a high-risk vendor notice is going to come into effect some time in the future. If that is the case, if Eir, for example, and I do not wish to discuss any company that is provides communication networks, cannot fulfil its contractual obligations because a Minister has determined that it has obtained components from a high-risk vendor that the previous day were perfectly lawful and the company had done nothing wrong, but today the company must remove those components, surely the company should be in a position to offer a rational explanation for its failure to fulfil its contractual obligations.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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My apologies for interrupting the Deputy but I am aware that the clock is running. I am giving the Deputy a little leeway on time as this amendment has been discussed.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The other reason relates to the time. If a high-risk offender notice is issued in respect of a vendor, surely the vendor must be told within a particular period.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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I will allow the Minister to make a brief contribution because we are not in order.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I do not believe that the vendors would want us to publish its names. They might find that damaging to their reputation and they would prefer if this were handled without publication of the fact that we consider that a particular product and vendor constitutes a risk, if it puts in a particular section of the communications network. I do not believe that the vendors would want that to happen and I can see why it might be damaging to their reputations.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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What about the time period of five days?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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What exactly is the Deputy's question?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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If the Minister determines that somebody is a high-risk vendor, they must be informed within five days of the making of that determination.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is anticipated that any consultation around serving these notices would require sensitive consultation, with a process involving a measure with the sending of a notice to the providers, meaning that they will be informed as part of the Minister making a measure. Affected vendors will be informed, where appropriate.

The Deputy is then asking that there be a limit of five days.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I proposes that the vendors have to be told within five days.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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My apologies to the Deputy, but I will have to come back to him later with a reply to that question as I do not have the information he is requesting now.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 36:

In page 25, lines 36 to 38, to delete all words from and including “and—” in line 36, down to and including line 38, and in page 26 to delete lines 1 and 2 and substitute the following:

“, and remit the decision for reconsideration by the Minister subject to such directions as the Court considers appropriate.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 37:

In page 26, line 6, to delete “or public order”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 38:

In page 26, line 11, to delete “or public order”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 39:

In page 26, line 21, to delete “or public order”.

This, I believe, is one of the instances where the Minister is removing the words "public order".

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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I believe the Minister of State may have agreed to this, if I have picked him up correctly.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Are we discussing amendment No. 41?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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No, amendment No. 39.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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My apologies for interrupting, but the Minister of State has indicated his support for all of these amendments.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Yes, I believe the Minister of State has so indicated.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I accept the proposed deletion of "or public order" and, on that basis, I am accepting amendments Nos. 37 to 41, inclusive.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Deputy Ó Murchú is quite correct and I thank him for that contribution. Can the Minister of State clarify that the third amendment is accepted?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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My apologies.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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If the Minister of State is accepting this amendment we will revisit it, and if not we will move on.

Ruairi Ó Murchú (Louth, Sinn Fein)
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The Minister of State stated that he was accepting it but he had not bothered putting his own name to these references to "public order". "Public Order" is mentioned in multiple lines and Deputy McNamara has covered that base.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Deputy Ó Murchú is referring to amendments Nos. 38, 39 and 41.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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For clarity purposes, I am accepting all the amendments that have "or public order" in the text, apart from amendments Nos. 31 and 32 because they have additional text after the words "or public order".

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 38 and 39 are, therefore, accepted by the Minister of State.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 40 and 42 are related and will be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 40:

In page 26, lines 22 to 25, to delete all words from and including “party” in line 22, down to

and including line 25 and substitute the following:

“party, and

(c) take relevant material into account in making its decision in relation to the appeal regardless of the extent to which, or ways in which, the relevant

material is provided to the appellant in accordance with this section.”.

The amendment corrects a textual error in the legislation, which ascribes a role to the Minister that should have been ascribed to the court. I am not accepting amendment No. 42 as I believe that this is a disproportionate and unworkable step. Judicial independence is at the core of the proper judicial role in any free society and, on appointment, judges make a solemn declaration in a manner required by the Constitution that they will adjudicate impartially without fear or favour.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I would like to speak to amendment No. 42.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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The Deputy can move the amendment if he so wishes.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I can move amendment No. 41 then, as it has not been formally moved yet.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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No, we will return to amendment No. 41 afterwards.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I will discuss amendment No. 42. I do not understand the Minister's idea that this interferes with judicial independence. It merely states that if somebody challenges the making of a high-risk vendor notice, the Minister can go to court and provide it with all of the reasons he or she determines that the high-risk vendor notice is appropriate, much of which I anticipate will be based on national security grounds.

The judge then looks at it and determines what it is appropriate to give to the appellant, that is, the person who is challenging the notice. The appellant will be given some information or, indeed, all of the evidence that the Minister has put forward or, perhaps, none of it. There is a proposal in the Bill whereby the appellant can be given a summary of the information provided.

This amendment proposes that if a judge determines that some, but not all, of the information be given to the appellant, once that determination is made the judge will not go on to hear the substantive case. The idea that a judge will be able to act appropriately etc. is something with which I have no problem. The idea that a judge will be given information by the Minister in respect of the appellant, but the appellant will not have access to that information and may not even know what the information is about, depending on what the judge deems appropriate to give to the appellant, is a new departure.

It is something that exists in other jurisdictions, not in this context but in regards to terrorism charges or allegations of terrorist activity. There are special advocate procedures in place in the United Kingdom. On the Continent it is not unusual to have such a system. However, in the Irish system the judge is there to look at the information and all of the evidence. Both parties can challenge all of the evidence against them. That is the normal course. There is no facet of Irish law where that is not the case. There is no facet of Irish law where an appellant or a party to proceedings cannot challenge all of the assertions made against them and all of the evidence which supports such assertions.

In the Special Criminal Court there is an issue around a superintendent's assertion that somebody is a member of a prescribed organisation. The Chief Justice found that it would be unconstitutional if that was not required to be corroborated. In this instance there is no protection whatsoever. In the case of an appellant who goes to court, the Minister can state he or she has information from an embassy or security apparatus. Of course, the Minister will always say that there is a threat to national security to divulge the very fact that he or she is obtaining information from the Americans, British, French, Germans, Latvians or Lithuanians – take your pick.

The exchange of that information is contingent upon it being confidential. A Minister can argue that merely saying that information has been obtained from whatever security state will threaten our national security. Of course there will be an application that the information not be provided to the appellant. The judge may deem it appropriate to provide some, but not other, information. For the judge to then determine the case against an appellant based on evidence that the judge and Minister have, but which the appellant has never been provided with, is, as I have said, a novel departure in Irish law and one that I am not in any way comfortable with.

I am not comfortable with the process in any event, but my amendment could at least ensure that it essentially involves a different court. One way or the other, it will involve the High Court. A different judge of the High Court than the judge who would determine what information would be provided to the appellant would hear the case.

Of course, the amendment has the further effect that only the evidence provided to the appellant can be used in the appeal of the making of the high-risk vendor notice. Up to now, in all or any courts in Ireland both parties have had equal access to all of the evidence that a judge hears. That has not been controversial up to now. This is a Rubicon. It is a new departure, and one that I do not think is necessitated.

It is not proportionate to introduce it at this time and in this context. It is a concept that should not be introduced without a lot of debate. As I said, if the Minister can provide any context in Irish law where something like this occurs, I would welcome hearing about it. I am not aware of any such cases. I understand it was discussed in a case called APin court. I have no idea what the previous Chief Justice and Mr. Justice O'Donnell, who is now the Chief Justice, would find with regard to this, but it was clear from their judgments that this would be a new departure. Given that it is a new departure, it is something that needs to be very fully debated.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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This amendment specifies that a different judge should hear this section of the process. I feel this is an interference in judicial independence. The courts can determine which judge hears which hearing. That is a question for the courts, rather than the Minister, to determine.

There are alternative ways of dealing with the designation of vendors or specification of security measures. They could be done by writing the law in such a way that the Minister could simply issue the list on consultation with the security services, which is how it is done in other countries. We decided to introduce judicial oversight to make sure that it was taken out of the hands of the political system and handed over to the Judiciary so that it could make a decision. It will look at it independently, separate from any political party or holder of ministerial office, and make its determination.

Of course, intelligence information which is a risk to national security cannot be supplied to the appellant or written about in open court where it would cause a risk to the country. In fact, it would frustrate the entire purpose of the Bill, which is to protect the national security of the country. That is why we have tried, as far as possible, to separate the political system from the judicial system and make this an independent judicial decision, rather than a political one. We propose to provide as much information to the courts as possible and advise judges that they provide as much information as can safely be provided to the appellant without endangering national security. It is a fair balance.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The Minister of State has said that of course national security information cannot be made available to the appellant and recited in open court to be written about. That is not the way our legal system has operated up to now. Essentially, the Garda, the Director of Public Prosecutions or whoever is prosecuting a case has a determination to make. They have evidence and have two choices. If they want to use the evidence against an accused, they have to do so in open court and the defendant has to have access to it. That is how the administration of justice works in Ireland. If they are not prepared to do that, they simply cannot rely on that evidence as part of proceedings. They will have to have to seek to convict using other evidence.

This, of course, is not the status quo. It is not the way our justice system operates at the moment. In fact, it is the contrary. That is why this is a very new departure. Information can be used which is not provided to the other party. Nowhere else has this been done in Irish law up to now. It is something that needs an awful lot more debate. The Minister of State thinks it is entirely self-evident that information cannot be used against somebody. However, under the Irish justice system at the moment the accused is of course provided with all of the evidence that will be used against him or her in court by way of disclosure. We have a choice about whether we use that evidence, with the difficulties that entails.

There are two "of courses" and the Minister of State seems to think this proposal is perfectly rational. His position is not one that is out of kilter with other European states, but it is out of kilter with the administration of justice in Ireland. I am not happy for that Rubicon to be crossed without a vote.

Will each section be included in the Bill? Once we get to the end of the amendments, is that it? Do we then vote on the Bill or do we go through it section by section? Will the Acting Chairman ask that section 1 stand part of the Bill, section 2 and so forth?

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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No, not at this stage of the debate. We are on Report Stage. That is done on Committee Stage.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Okay, on that basis I will be pressing the amendment.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Do you wish to respond, Minister of State, or will we proceed?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I just want to say that in respect of this amendment, Deputy McNamara used the word "accused". If an individual is accused of a crime in Ireland, he or she would like to see the evidence against him or her but nobody is being accused here. This is about the designation of a vendor's equipment as being high risk in a particular section of the Irish communications network. It is a designation. It does not refer to a natural individual. Nobody is being charged with a criminal offence. We are talking about a foreign corporate entity and we have defined in the legislation that it has to be a corporate entity outside of the EU. We are not talking about a person whose rights are being infringed and drawing such a parallel is unfair.

We have to protect our national security. There is a war going on in Europe at the moment. That is what has spurred this legislation, to be absolutely clear. Countries are being attacked and we are providing safe harbour to tens of thousands of people who are refugees from war, who others are attempting to murder. If we find that a country which is in an offensive stance vis-à-visour country has equipment here which is provided by an untrusted part of that administration, then of course we have to remove it and we have to have the legal power to do so. We do not want to do it without having a legal basis and that is what this legislation is about. Its aim is to protect national security. There has to be a balance here.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 41:

In page 26, lines 39 and 40, to delete “or public order”.

I believe the Minister has already agreed to accept this amendment.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I move amendment No. 42:

In page 27, between lines 5 and 6, to insert the following: “(7) Where the High Court grants an order under subsection (6), the consideration and determination of the appeal under section 28 shall be carried out by a different judge

of the High Court who shall only hear such relevant material as has been provided to the appellant.”.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 43 and 44 are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 43:

In page 27, to delete lines 13 and 14 and substitute the following: “30. If the High Court is satisfied, on an application by the Minister, that the hearing of an appeal of a high-risk vendor measure, or a variation in such measure, is likely to result in

the disclosure of relevant material and that such disclosure would create a risk to the security of the State it shall exclude from the hearing of the appeal all persons except—”.

Following concerns raised on Committee Stage about the hearing of appeals, I am introducing amendment No. 43 in order to provide additional safeguards to ensure that the decision by a judge that the hearing of an appeal is held other than in public is only granted if the judge is satisfied, on an application by the Minister, that the hearing in public is likely to result in the disclosure of material relating to a risk to the security of the State.

In respect of amendment No. 44, as a result of the constructive feedback that I received on Committee Stage, I have already introduced an amendment to section 27 that provides that if the High Court is satisfied on an application by the Minister that the hearing of an appeal of a high-risk vendor measure or a variation in such measure is likely to result in the disclosure of relevant material and that such disclosure would create a risk to the security of the State, it should exclude from the hearing of the appeal all persons except the persons outlined in section 27. This should address the Deputy's concerns as addressed in his amendment and, as such, amendment No. 44 will not be required.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Deputy McNamara, do you wish to move your amendment?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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No. The Minister's amendment will have the same effect, as he has just pointed out.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 45 to 47, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 45:

In page 27, lines 31 and 32, to delete all words from and including “The” in line 31, down to and including line 32.

Following some helpful discussion on the role of ComReg in the Committee Stage debate, I have introduced amendment No. 46 in order to allow ComReg to monitor a provider's compliance with high-risk vendor measures. ComReg may, if required, serve a direction on the provider seeking further information or requiring it to submit to a security audit. These directions are applicable immediately on service, or in other cases, at the expiration of a period allowed for to make representations. Failure to comply with a direction from ComReg under this section is an offence.

In respect of amendment No. 47, on Committee Stage there was a request from the Chair that there should be a provision for a review of this part of the Bill after two years and I said I would consider bringing forward an amendment on Report Stage. I am introducing this amendment, as requested on Committee Stage, to allow a review of the operation of Part 3 of the Bill on high-risk vendors which will commence two years after the enactment of the Bill. The report will be made to both Houses of the Oireachtas within a year after the beginning of the review and will set out its findings and conclusions.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 46:

In page 27, after line 34, to insert the following: “Commission to monitor providers’ compliance with high-risk vendor measures

33. (1) The Commission shall take reasonable steps to monitor providers’ compliance with high-risk vendor measures.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Commission may serve a direction on a provider which may require the provider to do one or more of the following:

(a) to provide information needed to assess whether a provider has complied with a high-risk vendor measure taken by the Minister;

(b) where the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that a provider is failing, or has failed, to comply with a high-risk vendor measure, to provide a

statement to the Commission indicating what measures the provider has taken to comply with the measure and, where the provider has failed to comply with the

measure, explaining the reasons for such failure;

(c) to submit to a security audit referred to in subsection (3) by the Commission or a qualified independent person nominated by the Commission and to make the results of any security audit not carried out by the Commission available to the Commission;

(d) to bear the costs of an audit under paragraph (c).

(3) Where the Commission serves a direction on a provider under subsection (2) requiring the provider to submit to a security audit, the Commission may appoint such member

of the staff of the Commission or such other suitably qualified independent person as the Commission considers appropriate, (referred to in this section as a “security auditor”) to carry out the security audit in accordance with the direction.

(4) A security auditor shall, on his or her appointment, be provided by the Commission with a certificate of his or her appointment and when exercising a power referred to in subsection (5) shall, if requested by any person thereby affected, produce such certificate to that person for inspection.

(5) Where the Commission serves a direction under subsection (2) on a provider requiring the provider to submit to a security audit a security auditor may, for the purposes of carrying out the audit, exercise any power exercisable by an authorised officer under the Principal Act (other than a power exercisable for a purpose specified in section 39 (3A) of the Principal Act) and where a security auditor exercises such a power a reference to an authorised officer exercising such a power in the Principal Act shall include a reference to the security auditor.

(6) A direction under subsection (2) takes effect—

(a) immediately upon its service, where the Commission considers, and states in the direction, that it is necessary that the direction take effect immediately to prevent

a serious imminent risk to the security of networks and services, the health or safety of persons or to property, and

(b) in any other case upon the expiration of the period allowed for representations to be made under subsection (7).

(7) A provider that is the subject of a direction under subsection (2) may make written representations to the Commission in respect of the direction within the period of 14 days beginning on the date on which the direction is served on the provider and the Commission shall consider any representations made to it during that period and affirm (with or without modification) or withdraw the direction.

(8) Where a direction is affirmed under subsection (7), the Commission shall notify the provider concerned.

(9) A provider that fails to comply with a direction under subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a class A fine.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 47:

In page 27, after line 34, to insert the following: “Review of operation of Part

34. The Minister shall—

(a) not later than the end of the period of 2 years beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, commence a review of the operation of this Part, and

(b) not later than 12 months after the end of the period of 2 years referred to in paragraph (a), make a report to each House of the Oireachtas of the findings made on such review and of the conclusions drawn from those findings.”.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 48 to 53 are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 48:

In page 32, between lines 22 and 23, to insert the following: “ “Act of 2022” means the Consumer Rights Act 2022;”.

These amendments were flagged on Committee Stage and they refer to alternative dispute resolution procedures. These amendments amend sections 38 to 40, inclusive, of the Bill. The intention of these amendments is to broaden the definition of relevant dispute under section 38 to ensure that Article 25 of the code is adequately transposed, to preserve existing provisions and to make some further amendments to section 39 and 40 of the Bill that are consequential to the amendment to section 38.

As originally drafted, section 38 did not fully reflect Article 25 of the code as it restricted the type of disputes under the code that could be referred to the dispute resolution process to disputes under Articles 102 to 107, inclusive, and 115, whereas Article 25 of the directive determines that the dispute resolution process should be applicable to disputes between providers and consumers arising under the directive and relating to the performance of contracts more generally. It also reduced the scope of the dispute resolution process such that some disputes that could be resolved under regulation No. 27 of the universal service regulations, SI 337/2011, would not now be able to be resolved under Part 5 of the Bill. Under the 2011 regime, ComReg currently resolves disputes in relation to section 45 of the Communications Regulation Act 2002 regarding overcharging and to Part 3 and Part 4 of such regulations 21 and 22, and Part 5 of the EU consumer information, cancellation and other rights regulations of 2013. These amendments will ensure that ComReg continues to be able to resolve these other categories of disputes.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 49:

In page 33, to delete lines 1 to 3 and substitute the following:

“(b) a dispute between an end-user and a provider, arising under this Act or the Code Regulations, relating to contractual conditions or the performance of contracts (whether entered into or not),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 50:

In page 33, line 7, to delete “Regulation, and” and substitute the following:

“Regulation,

(e) a dispute between an end-user and a provider relating to the imposition or purported imposition of a charge referred to in section 45 of the Principal Act,

(f) a dispute between a consumer, within the meaning of the Act of 2022, and a trader, within the meaning of the Act of 2022, who is also a provider, relating to Part 5 (other than sections 119, 120 and 125) of the Act of 2022, and”

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 51:

In page 33, line 28, to delete “of electronic communications networks or services”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 52:

In page 33, line 30, after “settling” to insert “relevant”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 53:

In page 33, lines 30 and 31, to delete “with end-users relating to the contractual conditions or performance of contracts (whether entered into or not)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 54:

In page 34, between lines 11 and 12, to insert the following: “(3) The Commission may specify requirements to be met for the purpose of ensuring compliance with subsection (1) and the manner of publication of a code of practice referred to in that subsection including, without limitation, any requirements to ensure that the code of practice and procedures for dealing with complaints and settling disputes are fair, prompt, transparent, inexpensive and non-discriminatory.”.

This amendment was also flagged on Committee Stage and amends section 40 of the Bill. The purpose is to provide ComReg with the ability to specify requirements to be met to ensure compliance with section 41, which requires operators to have a code of practice. There is currently an obligation under regulation 27(2) of the universal service regulations for operators to have a code of practice for complaints handling.

Under this regulation, ComReg may specify requirements to be met to ensure compliance with this obligation. This is an important tool for ComReg and the amendment provides it with that same tool under Part 5.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 55:

In page 41, to delete lines 23 and 24 and substitute “or either such decision;”.

This is a minor technical and textual amendment that tidies up the original drafting language in section 57, which comprises the interpretation to Part 7. It makes no material change to the substance of the Bill, however.

Alan Farrell (Dublin Fingal, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 56 to 59, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 56:

In page 48, line 4, before “refer” to insert “subject to subsection (4),”.

The purpose of these amendments is to tidy up language in section 66, relating to settlements. The changes are purely technical in nature and merely seek to remove repetition from the section as originally drafted, as well as tidying up some cross-referencing. There has been no change in policy.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 57:

In page 48, to delete lines 5 to 14 and substitute the following: “(4) Where at the time the notified person is given a copy of the report in accordance with subsection (3)(b)where the matter has been referred for adjudication under section 67(b)—

(a) the authorised officer shall notify the adjudicator concerned of the withdrawal of the referral under section 67(b), and

(b) the matter shall be deemed to have been referred to an adjudicator under subsection 3(c)for an adjudication on consent.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 58:

In page 48, line 15, after “following” to insert “the confirmation of”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 59:

In page 48, line 19, after “consent” to insert “confirmed”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 60:

In page 96, after line 17, to insert the following:

“PART 10

AMENDMENTS TO DIGITAL HUB DEVELOPMENT AGENCY ACT 2003

Amendment of Digital Hub Development Agency Act 2003

133.The Digital Hub Development Agency Act 2003 is amended—

(a) in section 15(1), by the substitution of “8 members” for “14 members”, and

(b) in section 17(3), by the substitution of “4” for “6”.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 61:

In page 96, after line 17, to insert the following:

“PART 11

AMENDMENT TO POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES ACT 1983

Financing for the purposes of maintaining post office network and countering consequences of Brexit

134.The Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983 is amended by the insertion of the following section after section 29:

“29A.(1) The Minister may, out of such monies as are available to him or her from monies provided by the Oireachtas, with the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, make available to the postal company a sum not exceeding €30,000,000 for the purposes of maintaining a network of post offices.

(2) The Minister may, out of such monies as are available to him or her from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve established under Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021, with the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, make available to the postal company a sum not exceeding €25,000,000 for the purposes of providing support to the postal company to counter the adverse economic and social consequences of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

(3) Any amounts made available to the postal company under subsection (1) or (2) shall be provided in such form and manner and on such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the Minister and the company with the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform.”.”.