Dáil debates

Tuesday, 17 October 2006

Nuclear Test Ban Bill 2006: Second Stage

 

6:00 pm

Photo of Dick RocheDick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The purpose of this Bill is to enable the transposition into Irish law of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1999 but regrettably it has not, as yet, come into force.

The treaty requires a state party to the treaty to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction from carrying out or participating in the carrying out of a nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Since the first and thankfully, so far, the only use of nuclear weapons in 1945 the world has sought ways of preventing the proliferation of these horrific weapons. Ireland has been very much to the fore on the international stage in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. We have continually called on all states to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and to embrace nuclear disarmament.

While this Bill has been subject to some rather cheap shots from at least one senior political actor, it is nonetheless important that we pass legislation on the issue, which is what we are attempting to do today.

Growing concerns among states about the consequences of a large number of countries holding nuclear weapons, and the increased likelihood of their use if that happens, led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. This historic initiative was proposed by the late Mr. Frank Aiken in 1958. Another significant treaty, banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, was concluded in 1963.

Ireland is fully committed to the policy of promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is and always has been our view that the nuclear weapons states must speedily take steps towards achieving total nuclear disarmament. These states are obliged to do so under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is a strong moral obligation that should also drive them in this direction.

The current treaty structure — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water — has had considerable success in limiting the number of nuclear weapons states. However, that structure left a clear gap by permitting the nuclear weapons states to continue testing new weapons underground. The solution to this problem was found in the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which prohibits all nuclear weapons tests anywhere.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 September 1996 and opened for signature on 24 September 1996. Ireland signed on the first day. To date it has been signed by 176 countries and ratified by 135. All EU member states have ratified the treaty.

The treaty bans all nuclear test explosions, wherever they may be conducted. To verify compliance with the prohibition, the treaty provides for the establishment of an international monitoring system. This system comprises some 330 stations around the globe that will conduct continuous seismological, hydro-acoustic and radio-nuclide monitoring. This network of stations will permit the detection of any nuclear explosion.

The treaty provides for the establishment of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty organisation, known as the Treaty Organisation, to be based in Vienna at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The purpose of the Treaty Organisation is to achieve the objectives of the treaty, to ensure implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance, and to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among state parties.

The Treaty Organisation will be responsible for the running of the international monitoring system. It will have the power to inspect any sites on which it is suspected that nuclear testing has taken place. It will also have the technical expertise to make reliable judgments on suspicions.

As with other international organisations and bodies, the Treaty Organisation's budget will be provided by contributions from states' parties. Contributions will be based on the United Nations scale of assessment. Pending the entry into force of the treaty, a preparatory commission for the Treaty Organisation has been set up and it has begun to establish both the monitoring system and the organisation's administrative structure.

The treaty will enter into force when 44 specifically named countries have ratified it. The 44 countries in question are those which the International Atomic Energy Agency deems to have a nuclear capability, whether civilian or military. Ireland, naturally, is not among them. So far, 41 of the specified 44 states have signed the treaty. India, Pakistan and North Korea are the specified states which have not signed. Furthermore, only 34 of the 44 states have ratified it.

It is a matter of regret that, so far, the US has yet to ratify the treaty. Ireland and its European Union partners have expressed their deep regret that this is the case. There are hopes the US will see some sense in the matter. The treaty cannot enter into force without the ratification of the US. It would be an empty treaty without American adherence. However, the previous US administration's commitment to ratify the treaty, as well as its announcement that the US will abide by the moratorium on nuclear testing, in place since 1992, is welcome.

Provision was made that if the treaty had not entered into force within three years of opening for signature, namely, by 24 September 1999, a conference of states which had ratified it would be convened to consider ways of ensuring its rapid entry into force. A number of such conferences have taken place, the most recent being in September 2005, when the state parties agreed to spare no effort and use all available avenues to encourage signature and ratification of the treaty.

As the House will be aware, India and Pakistan in 1998 conducted tests of nuclear weapons. More recently, the need for the entry into force of the test ban treaty was brought home to all of us on Monday, 9 October last with the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it had conducted a nuclear weapons test. The test followed North Korea's announcement on 3 October that it intended to carry out such a test.

North Korea's announcement of intention was met with widespread international condemnation. On 6 October, the United Nations Security Council issued a presidential statement expressing its deep concern. The Security Council deemed that should North Korea carry out the test, it would jeopardise international peace, stability and security in the region and beyond. The statement further urged North Korea to refrain from its intended course of action and to comply fully with all of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006.

That resolution called on North Korea, inter alia, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Finally, the statement warned that should North Korea ignore the calls of the international community, the Security Council would act consistently with its responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations. Regrettably, North Korea failed to heed the concerns and warnings of the international community and, as I have already mentioned, it carried out a nuclear test on 9 October.

The response by the international community to the test was swift and universal in its condemnation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Dermot Ahern, issued a statement on behalf of the Government. It stated:

I strongly condemn the provocative decision by the DPRK to test a nuclear weapon. This is a threat to regional security and in direct contravention of the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It runs directly contrary to the will of the international community, as expressed by the UN Security Council, and it also ignores the patient efforts of the DPRK's neighbours to work constructively with it. I call on the DPRK to refrain from further dangerous acts and to return immediately and without preconditions to the six-party talks.

Following the test, the United Nations Security Council met last week to discuss the matter and on Saturday, 14 October, adopted a United Nations Security Council resolution. The resolution again calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. Furthermore, the Security Council has imposed stringent sanctions on North Korea in order to prevent further proliferation of goods into North Korea that could assist in its nuclear programme.

The preparatory commission for the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organisation also responded by convening an urgent open-ended meeting of its bureau on the day of the test. Even though the treaty has not entered into force, the provisional technical secretariat, PTS, is permitted to provide data and analysis to states. However, the provisional secretariat is not permitted to make any final judgments with regard to the nature of a specific event. Under the treaty, this is the responsibility of state parties.

The provisional technical secretariat confirmed to states' signatories on the afternoon of the test that 13 seismic stations worldwide had recorded an event that morning at 1.35 a.m. GMT at a location just south of the border between North Korea and China. The event registered 4 on the body wave magnitude scale, which registers the first wave of an event. The test by North Korea should serve not to discourage us but rather to reinforce our determination to strive for the earliest possible entry into force of this important treaty. Actions which contradict the purpose of this treaty merely serve to demonstrate the urgency and necessity of having a universally applicable test ban treaty.

As I stated at the outset, the Nuclear Test Ban Bill will give legislative effect in Ireland to the nuclear test ban treaty. Some aspects of the Bill may strike Members as a little odd, but it transposes the treaty into national law precisely, however remote it may be that Ireland would be exposed to such actions.

The Bill will make it an offence for any person to carry out, or cause the carrying out of a nuclear explosion in the State. That is something we should all hope never happens. It will similarly be an offence for an Irish citizen to carry out, or cause to be carried out, such an explosion outside of Ireland. These rather odd-looking provisions arise directly from the treaty, and they are a treaty obligation. It is therefore a requirement that we transpose the obligation specifically into law.

The Bill also designates the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland as the national authority for the implementation of the treaty. The institute will act as the national focal point for liaison with the treaty organisation and other contracting parties to the treaty, and it will facilitate any on-site inspection visits by the treaty organisation's technical secretariat.

The Bill also provides for the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government to appoint authorised officers who would have the power to, inter alia, enter a place where he or she has reasons to believe an offence under the Act has been committed and to remove any relevant documentation. These officers would also have the power to accompany the international inspection team on any site inspections. It is very unlikely these provisions will ever have to be implemented, but they are part of the requirement that we transpose them into law.

In the unlikely event that a major offence is committed under the Act, it would be an indictable offence and would be liable to penalties including imprisonment for life. There is one set of provisions relating to the District Court, and I mention it to Deputies because it gave me pause for thought when I read it.

Deputies will have noted the Bill also provides for the District Court, subject to the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, to try summarily a person charged with an offence under the Act where the court considers the facts alleged constitute a minor offence. Deputy O'Dowd is smiling as I smiled when I heard it.

Photo of Fergus O'DowdFergus O'Dowd (Louth, Fine Gael)
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We would be incinerated. The court would be heard in heaven.

Photo of Dick RocheDick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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I am absolutely assured this is a standard provision in all legislation involving a criminal offence. The more important point is that given Ireland's rejection of nuclear as a source of energy, and that nuclear medicine and industrial uses represent the main applications of nuclear materials in Ireland, it is reasonable to say it is extremely unlikely that this Bill, when enacted, will ever come into play in Ireland. We can all hope it will never come into play. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland is the regulator for all uses of radioactive materials in Ireland, and all such users must operate under a licence from the institute.

The costs to Ireland associated with implementing the treaty are relatively low. None of the treaty organisation's monitoring stations will be in Ireland, and given the absence of a nuclear industry here, it is not expected that Ireland will receive any inspections.

The main cost to Ireland is approximately €300,000 per year, which is our share of the establishment and running costs of the treaty organisation. The actual amount is decided in accordance with the UN scale of assessment used for determining states' contributions to UN bodies.

I should emphasise that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is a central international instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The implementation of a ban on testing nuclear devices and establishment of an effective mechanism to monitor the ban would add to all our security and that of the world.

The transposition of this treaty into Irish law is entirely appropriate. It is consistent with our current and historic position on the nuclear issue. It is consistent with the view that has been taken by every Government of any shade here, and it is certainly consistent with the views of the vast majority of Members, currently serving or who have ever served, in this House. Ireland's transposition will not in itself trigger the coming into effect of the treaty. It will ensure Ireland is in a position to discharge its obligations under the treaty and will give us the moral right to request others who are perhaps not so far-sighted to get into line.

This Bill is straightforward and strictly non-contentious dealing with a subject on which there is the widest cross-party support. Its enactment will be in line with Ireland's strong stance on nuclear disarmament and our historic contribution on non-proliferation. I hope our transposition of the treaty into Irish law will serve as an encouragement to other states to ratify it and accelerate its entry into force. I therefore commend the Bill to the House.

Photo of Fergus O'DowdFergus O'Dowd (Louth, Fine Gael)
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We welcome the Bill and will support it on all Stages.

I will reflect on some of the issues involved, some mentioned by the Minister and some, surprisingly, not. First, we are all concerned about world peace and the continuing tension in the world, particularly between America and countries in the Middle East and, now, the Far East. America has traditionally acted as defender of the West and we have always supported that, but we have serious concerns about the war in Iraq. One of the key reasons the Americans and the British went to war against that country was weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or other. Dr. Hans Blix recently attended the Oireachtas and addressed the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. I read the report of the discussion with great interest. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in recent years, and which continues might not have happened had Dr. Hans Blix been allowed to continue his search for weapons of mass destruction, which we all know never existed in the first place. It is a traumatic fact for all those who have so tragically died in Iraq, be they Americans, Iraqis or of other races.

Since 9/11 the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for nuclear or biological warfare has concerned all of us and will continue to do so. I agree with the Minister that successive Irish Governments have taken the lead in the United Nations and elsewhere in making the case against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Irish Army has played an active part in bringing peace to many disturbed nations where there is civil and military conflict. We have made our mark internationally as a peacekeeping nation which, at the UN, the parliament of the world, has consistently supported peace and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

One of the airplanes which crashed or was shot down — we do not know exactly what happened — on 9/11 was heading towards a nuclear installation in America. If it had hit that installation there could have been a very traumatic event. Since 9/11 terrorism has been a threat to Ireland, particularly in the form of an attack on Sellafield. Successive Irish Governments have successfully taken a line with the British Government that we do not agree with what happens at Sellafield and are deeply concerned about it. We have had a united collective attitude to nuclear energy and the potential for harm, should anything go wrong. I will address those issues with particular reference to what happens at Sellafield.

The question of closing down Sellafield does not arise. We want to stop the reprocessing of waste there because, even if that activity ceases, the nuclear waste material will still have to be made safe and protected for perhaps hundreds of years. I am concerned at events in the British courts yesterday. The British Nuclear Group pleaded guilty to allowing the leakage of 86,000 litres of highly radioactive waste into a concrete bunker outside the THORP reprocessing plant. The liquid leaked for approximately eight months without anybody noticing it and the health and safety authority in the UK, to its credit, prosecuted the British Nuclear Group. The question arises of how the Irish Government was informed. More transparency and openness are required about what happened. We need to know what the Irish Government knew, when we were told, who said what and how long it took for the full facts to enter the public domain.

I will be happy to be corrected by the Minister on any of these issues but I understand that, initially, a spokesman for the British Nuclear Group said that, on a scale of zero to seven, the incident registered zero, meaning it was of no consequence. A representative — not a Minister but one from the Radiological Protection Institute or the Irish Government — was quoted in The Irish Times as saying it was not zero but one, meaning it was of no real consequence but was not absolutely inconsequential. It took 26 or 27 days for the fact to emerge that it registered approximately four on the scale, which is actually the highest that could occur or had occurred in any nuclear plant in the world since the 1950s. Therefore it was a serious incident and not an accident. I would like to know who informed the Irish Government and the Radiological Protection Institute.

I have been unable to find the facts because they relate to an issue of national security but it seems the Radiological Protection Institute and the Minister were informed separately. There may have been a parallel process but I am unclear as to the facts relating to that. It seems to me the Minister was informed two to three days later and I would like him to clarify that. The whole truth took 26 or 27 days to emerge but in the event of a very serious incident at Sellafield we will need transparency about how the Minister was informed and the facts to be made clear as soon as they are available, unlike in this case. The British Nuclear Group may claim it was not fully aware of the extent of what actually happened but the whole thing was played down and we were not told the truth. Neither the Minister nor the Radiological Protection Institute were told the truth and it took far too long to find it. In the context of this Bill and given the consequences for Ireland of a nuclear incident, be it from a terrorist act or an accident, we need to re-examine the information process and how we are informed. I am deeply unhappy with the whole process and will remain so, because we were not told the truth. If a more serious accident were to occur, what guarantee do we have of the transparency and openness of the process, or of the truth and the full facts when they are not in the public domain?

There have been significant and substantial improvements in the relationship between Britain and Ireland as a result of actions the Irish Government took through the courts following the pressure we, as a community, put on the British Government. However, I remain to be convinced we have an effective system for communicating the truth as known at the time of such an incident. I welcome the fact that the Minister now has real time information on the various access points. I also welcome the increasing involvement of the Radiological Protection Institute and the increasing access our scientists have to Sellafield but I remain deeply unhappy with the situation. The Government ought to assert itself more on these issues. Continuing internationalisation of the relationship between Britain and Ireland over Sellafield, involving other countries such as Norway, with whom we have worked very successfully, and the United Nations is very important.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, for which Hans Blix worked should have a more effective hands-on international mandate from the United Nations to deal with nuclear weapons, installations and reprocessing plants. If the British Government does not tell our Government what security issues have been addressed at Sellafield, the United Nations or a sub-committee of the IAEA should be the world police on this issue for us. I can accept that we should not necessarily be in a position to be told about this.

Shortly after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 the IAEA held an international conference on nuclear terrorism. That is the real threat to the world. North Korea is a separate issue. The nuclear residue left in the former USSR and the theft of nuclear material there are serious issues too. Although there is a greater international awareness and knowledge of what is happening there, the development of Al Qaeda and international terrorism necessitates a more hands-on approach. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, is represented on the board of the IAEA and no doubt makes our case there. I would like to be informed regularly about these issues if possible.

I have never had a problem supporting this Government's actions on Sellafield but I never get any information about it, apart from what I pick up through freedom of information requests or from the press. That is not good enough because we have never used the nuclear issue as a political one. I would be happy to accept an offer from the Minister of a full, comprehensive briefing on these issues. It is ridiculous to have to ask for it here. We do not want to know about any sensitive issues, only the generalities such as the thrust of policy. The briefing papers the Minister receives from the RPII would be very helpful too, provided this would not threaten national security as some of its e-mails apparently do. I laughed when I was told that an e-mail from the RPII to some of the Minister's staff, perhaps some of those here today, could not be released to me because it would be a "breach of national security". That does not make sense.

This Bill attempts to place this small country as an honest broker in the world and to improve awareness of and involvement in these issues. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT, seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The NPT constitutes an agreement between non-nuclear states to forgo nuclear weapons, put peaceful nuclear facilities under the international safeguards of the IAEA, and to provide rights to technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition for states holding nuclear weapons the treaty is an undertaking to end the arms race and pursue nuclear disarmament.

The arms race, however, continues. North Korea is now threatening world security having exploded a second device recently. This is ridiculous although there is some doubt about whether the first one was a nuclear explosion. There is a proliferation of nuclear weapons and increasing instability, exacerbated by some of the foreign policies of the present American Administration which I find unattractive, and about which many Irish people are deeply concerned.

We must see how we can address the issue. Present threats to the treaty come from several sources, including the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by countries not signed up to the NPT; the exiting of countries which have signed the agreement in order to acquire weapons, for example, North Korea; the nuclear powers which are signatories but have reneged on their commitment; the desire to retain an element of retaliation including pre-emptive retaliation on the part of the United States because of the increased threats of terrorism from non-state bodies.

Several non-signatories have gained nuclear weapons so the treaty is seen as powerless in the face of determined efforts by some countries. One determined scientist from Pakistan, Mr. Khan, spread the technology to non-nuclear countries which highlights how easy it has been for some countries to gain the technology. It is questionable how successful Mr. Khan would have been without the implicit support of Pakistan. The NPT is seen as toothless in the face of determined non-state actors. Some signatories, including Iraq, Iran and Libya, have been suspected of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Without adequate inspections and an effective inspectorate it is difficult to establish the truth of these claims. As we have seen in the case of Iraq it is easy to be misled one way or the other without an effective inspectorate that is given the time and resources to do its work. In the US literature these states are referred to as cheats and dealing with them is seen as rewarding bad behaviour.

North Korea was a signatory to the treaty but inspectors from the IAEA discovered discrepancies in its position. Pressure was put on it to comply but instead it withdrew from the treaty to pursue nuclear weapons, the result of which we have seen recently. There is no impediment to leaving the treaty but is has also been argued that a ban on leaving it would impinge on national sovereignty and make it difficult to get countries to sign up the treaty.

Article 6 of the treaty obliges the states holding nuclear weapons to pursue in good faith measures related to nuclear disarmament and to ending the nuclear arms race. Since the end of the Cold War significant progress has been made towards this goal. For instance, 2,000 warheads from an entire class of weapons have been eliminated under the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty.

The ending of the Cold War has not, however, had the desired effect on reducing the total number of weapons that the political situation would warrant. A new generation of nuclear weapons is being designed in the United States and the United Kingdom. This programme will run to 2020. It has therefore been argued that the five nuclear-weapon NPT signatories tricked the non-nuclear weapon signatories, promising arms reduction in exchange for non-proliferation but never delivering on the non-proliferation. In particular in the 1995 treaty the big five made several commitments in the sphere of disarmament such as making the comprehensive test ban treaty a reality and negotiating a verified ban on the production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons use. Failure to meet these commitments is one of the main reasons that the 2005 review conference on the NPT ended in bitterness without any declaration.

Deputy Michael Higgins, said of the meeting with Hans Blix that President Chirac's declaration that France would use any measure to counter terrorism lifted it out of the treaty. The United States, however, poses a more serious threat. Although the Bush Administration is continuing with the 13 year old US nuclear test moratorium, it has made clear its opposition to this and it is possible that it will resume nuclear test explosions.

Debate adjourned.