Fergus O'Dowd (Louth, Fine Gael)

We welcome the Bill and will support it on all Stages.

I will reflect on some of the issues involved, some mentioned by the Minister and some, surprisingly, not. First, we are all concerned about world peace and the continuing tension in the world, particularly between America and countries in the Middle East and, now, the Far East. America has traditionally acted as defender of the West and we have always supported that, but we have serious concerns about the war in Iraq. One of the key reasons the Americans and the British went to war against that country was weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or other. Dr. Hans Blix recently attended the Oireachtas and addressed the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. I read the report of the discussion with great interest. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in recent years, and which continues might not have happened had Dr. Hans Blix been allowed to continue his search for weapons of mass destruction, which we all know never existed in the first place. It is a traumatic fact for all those who have so tragically died in Iraq, be they Americans, Iraqis or of other races.

Since 9/11 the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for nuclear or biological warfare has concerned all of us and will continue to do so. I agree with the Minister that successive Irish Governments have taken the lead in the United Nations and elsewhere in making the case against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Irish Army has played an active part in bringing peace to many disturbed nations where there is civil and military conflict. We have made our mark internationally as a peacekeeping nation which, at the UN, the parliament of the world, has consistently supported peace and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

One of the airplanes which crashed or was shot down — we do not know exactly what happened — on 9/11 was heading towards a nuclear installation in America. If it had hit that installation there could have been a very traumatic event. Since 9/11 terrorism has been a threat to Ireland, particularly in the form of an attack on Sellafield. Successive Irish Governments have successfully taken a line with the British Government that we do not agree with what happens at Sellafield and are deeply concerned about it. We have had a united collective attitude to nuclear energy and the potential for harm, should anything go wrong. I will address those issues with particular reference to what happens at Sellafield.

The question of closing down Sellafield does not arise. We want to stop the reprocessing of waste there because, even if that activity ceases, the nuclear waste material will still have to be made safe and protected for perhaps hundreds of years. I am concerned at events in the British courts yesterday. The British Nuclear Group pleaded guilty to allowing the leakage of 86,000 litres of highly radioactive waste into a concrete bunker outside the THORP reprocessing plant. The liquid leaked for approximately eight months without anybody noticing it and the health and safety authority in the UK, to its credit, prosecuted the British Nuclear Group. The question arises of how the Irish Government was informed. More transparency and openness are required about what happened. We need to know what the Irish Government knew, when we were told, who said what and how long it took for the full facts to enter the public domain.

I will be happy to be corrected by the Minister on any of these issues but I understand that, initially, a spokesman for the British Nuclear Group said that, on a scale of zero to seven, the incident registered zero, meaning it was of no consequence. A representative — not a Minister but one from the Radiological Protection Institute or the Irish Government — was quoted in The Irish Times as saying it was not zero but one, meaning it was of no real consequence but was not absolutely inconsequential. It took 26 or 27 days for the fact to emerge that it registered approximately four on the scale, which is actually the highest that could occur or had occurred in any nuclear plant in the world since the 1950s. Therefore it was a serious incident and not an accident. I would like to know who informed the Irish Government and the Radiological Protection Institute.

I have been unable to find the facts because they relate to an issue of national security but it seems the Radiological Protection Institute and the Minister were informed separately. There may have been a parallel process but I am unclear as to the facts relating to that. It seems to me the Minister was informed two to three days later and I would like him to clarify that. The whole truth took 26 or 27 days to emerge but in the event of a very serious incident at Sellafield we will need transparency about how the Minister was informed and the facts to be made clear as soon as they are available, unlike in this case. The British Nuclear Group may claim it was not fully aware of the extent of what actually happened but the whole thing was played down and we were not told the truth. Neither the Minister nor the Radiological Protection Institute were told the truth and it took far too long to find it. In the context of this Bill and given the consequences for Ireland of a nuclear incident, be it from a terrorist act or an accident, we need to re-examine the information process and how we are informed. I am deeply unhappy with the whole process and will remain so, because we were not told the truth. If a more serious accident were to occur, what guarantee do we have of the transparency and openness of the process, or of the truth and the full facts when they are not in the public domain?

There have been significant and substantial improvements in the relationship between Britain and Ireland as a result of actions the Irish Government took through the courts following the pressure we, as a community, put on the British Government. However, I remain to be convinced we have an effective system for communicating the truth as known at the time of such an incident. I welcome the fact that the Minister now has real time information on the various access points. I also welcome the increasing involvement of the Radiological Protection Institute and the increasing access our scientists have to Sellafield but I remain deeply unhappy with the situation. The Government ought to assert itself more on these issues. Continuing internationalisation of the relationship between Britain and Ireland over Sellafield, involving other countries such as Norway, with whom we have worked very successfully, and the United Nations is very important.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, for which Hans Blix worked should have a more effective hands-on international mandate from the United Nations to deal with nuclear weapons, installations and reprocessing plants. If the British Government does not tell our Government what security issues have been addressed at Sellafield, the United Nations or a sub-committee of the IAEA should be the world police on this issue for us. I can accept that we should not necessarily be in a position to be told about this.

Shortly after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 the IAEA held an international conference on nuclear terrorism. That is the real threat to the world. North Korea is a separate issue. The nuclear residue left in the former USSR and the theft of nuclear material there are serious issues too. Although there is a greater international awareness and knowledge of what is happening there, the development of Al Qaeda and international terrorism necessitates a more hands-on approach. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, is represented on the board of the IAEA and no doubt makes our case there. I would like to be informed regularly about these issues if possible.

I have never had a problem supporting this Government's actions on Sellafield but I never get any information about it, apart from what I pick up through freedom of information requests or from the press. That is not good enough because we have never used the nuclear issue as a political one. I would be happy to accept an offer from the Minister of a full, comprehensive briefing on these issues. It is ridiculous to have to ask for it here. We do not want to know about any sensitive issues, only the generalities such as the thrust of policy. The briefing papers the Minister receives from the RPII would be very helpful too, provided this would not threaten national security as some of its e-mails apparently do. I laughed when I was told that an e-mail from the RPII to some of the Minister's staff, perhaps some of those here today, could not be released to me because it would be a "breach of national security". That does not make sense.

This Bill attempts to place this small country as an honest broker in the world and to improve awareness of and involvement in these issues. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT, seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The NPT constitutes an agreement between non-nuclear states to forgo nuclear weapons, put peaceful nuclear facilities under the international safeguards of the IAEA, and to provide rights to technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition for states holding nuclear weapons the treaty is an undertaking to end the arms race and pursue nuclear disarmament.

The arms race, however, continues. North Korea is now threatening world security having exploded a second device recently. This is ridiculous although there is some doubt about whether the first one was a nuclear explosion. There is a proliferation of nuclear weapons and increasing instability, exacerbated by some of the foreign policies of the present American Administration which I find unattractive, and about which many Irish people are deeply concerned.

We must see how we can address the issue. Present threats to the treaty come from several sources, including the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by countries not signed up to the NPT; the exiting of countries which have signed the agreement in order to acquire weapons, for example, North Korea; the nuclear powers which are signatories but have reneged on their commitment; the desire to retain an element of retaliation including pre-emptive retaliation on the part of the United States because of the increased threats of terrorism from non-state bodies.

Several non-signatories have gained nuclear weapons so the treaty is seen as powerless in the face of determined efforts by some countries. One determined scientist from Pakistan, Mr. Khan, spread the technology to non-nuclear countries which highlights how easy it has been for some countries to gain the technology. It is questionable how successful Mr. Khan would have been without the implicit support of Pakistan. The NPT is seen as toothless in the face of determined non-state actors. Some signatories, including Iraq, Iran and Libya, have been suspected of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Without adequate inspections and an effective inspectorate it is difficult to establish the truth of these claims. As we have seen in the case of Iraq it is easy to be misled one way or the other without an effective inspectorate that is given the time and resources to do its work. In the US literature these states are referred to as cheats and dealing with them is seen as rewarding bad behaviour.

North Korea was a signatory to the treaty but inspectors from the IAEA discovered discrepancies in its position. Pressure was put on it to comply but instead it withdrew from the treaty to pursue nuclear weapons, the result of which we have seen recently. There is no impediment to leaving the treaty but is has also been argued that a ban on leaving it would impinge on national sovereignty and make it difficult to get countries to sign up the treaty.

Article 6 of the treaty obliges the states holding nuclear weapons to pursue in good faith measures related to nuclear disarmament and to ending the nuclear arms race. Since the end of the Cold War significant progress has been made towards this goal. For instance, 2,000 warheads from an entire class of weapons have been eliminated under the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty.

The ending of the Cold War has not, however, had the desired effect on reducing the total number of weapons that the political situation would warrant. A new generation of nuclear weapons is being designed in the United States and the United Kingdom. This programme will run to 2020. It has therefore been argued that the five nuclear-weapon NPT signatories tricked the non-nuclear weapon signatories, promising arms reduction in exchange for non-proliferation but never delivering on the non-proliferation. In particular in the 1995 treaty the big five made several commitments in the sphere of disarmament such as making the comprehensive test ban treaty a reality and negotiating a verified ban on the production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons use. Failure to meet these commitments is one of the main reasons that the 2005 review conference on the NPT ended in bitterness without any declaration.

Deputy Michael Higgins, said of the meeting with Hans Blix that President Chirac's declaration that France would use any measure to counter terrorism lifted it out of the treaty. The United States, however, poses a more serious threat. Although the Bush Administration is continuing with the 13 year old US nuclear test moratorium, it has made clear its opposition to this and it is possible that it will resume nuclear test explosions.

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