Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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The purpose of today's meeting is to consider Committee Stage of the Communications Regulation Bill 2022. I welcome the Minister of State at the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Deputy Ossian Smyth, and his officials to the meeting.

Witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in respect of an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I remind members of the constitutional requirement that members must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex in order to participate in the meeting. Reluctantly, I will not permit a member to participate if he or she does not adhere to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, any member who attempts from outside the precincts of Leinster House will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask any member participating via MS Teams to confirm that he or she is on the grounds of the Leinster House campus prior to making his or her contribution to the meeting.

If attending in the committee room, they are asked to exercise personal responsibility to protect themselves and others from the risk of contracting Covid-19.

On the arrangements for taking the Bill, I remind all members that should a vote be called, they must be physically present in the committee room to vote. We will now proceed to the consideration of the Bill.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I wish to raise a point of order. Standing Order 183 of the Standing Orders of the Houses provides:

Where Bills are to be substantially amended at Committee or Report Stage the Ceann Comhairle or Cathaoirleach of the Committee as the case may be shall have discretion to direct that the member in charge of the Bill must provide a revised explanatory memorandum to assist members in considering the amendments.

That means the explanatory memorandum must be provided at the time the amendments are being considered. The amendments the Minister of State will introduce substantially amend the Bill, by any stretch. In particular, a whole new Part 3 will be introduced, which has not been flagged previously. Part 3 is a substantial change; I do not think anybody could argue otherwise. I refer, in particular, to all the provisions around high-risk vendors. The committee needs to be furnished with an explanatory memorandum to consider that. From where is the impetus for that change coming? How is it being considered? What fair procedures and natural justice will apply in these determinations? None of that is covered in the Bill and certainly no notice was given on Second Stage. We need an explanatory memorandum, although I appreciate that is at the Chair's discretion.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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While Deputy McNamara is not a member of the committee, he is nonetheless a Member of the House and we welcome his presence. The Minister of State will appreciate that we received the amendments very late and we received the briefing this morning. I am conscious that we have a three-hour meeting scheduled today and time is precious in these meetings. In the interest of fair process, I will not restrict time on any amendment or section. I will allow members complete latitude to treat this as a briefing session and, dare I say it, an opportunity to receive a verbal explanatory memorandum.

The committee completed the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill and our views on it are well known. The committee's time is precious and we need to use the three hours as effectively as possible. It should be noted that this cannot happen again. The committee must receive briefings and amendments on time so that we can give the legislation proper consideration. It is unfair to the members and the process they must stand over. I take the point Deputy McNamara has made but, in the circumstances, we have three hours of valuable committee time available. We ask that the Minister of State and his officials accommodate us by providing the most detailed explanations possible. I will facilitate any questions members have so that we can gain a full understanding of the Bill. If we do not come to conclusion within the three hours, we will sit on another date.

I am trying to strike a balance here and that is how I see the matter. Is that approach agreed? Agreed. I ask the Minister of State and his officials to provide us with a detailed explanation on each section and amendment as we go through the Bill and during exchanges with the members.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendment No. 1 cannot be moved because it requires a motion of instruction to committee. I understand the Oireachtas has determined that this amendment, along with amendments Nos. 2, 35 and 37, are outside the scope of the Bill and therefore will not be moved at this time. It is the Minister's intention to move these amendments on Report Stage. Does the Minister of State wish to comment on amendment No. 1? I think it is important that we consider each amendment.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The first amendments we were going to discuss provide for the new Part 3. This group consists of amendments Nos. 3 to 16, inclusive, and amendment No. 36. Are we discussing those amendments now?

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does the Minister of State have an opening statement?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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We were not aware of that. He should proceed with his opening statement. That makes much more sense.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I will come back to the question the Chair asked previously about the amendment of the Digital Hub Development Agency Act.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Once again, with due respect, we have just been handed these documents. Procedurally, for us as a committee, it is very unsatisfactory. However, we are where we are. I ask the Minister of State to make his opening remarks.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I thank the committee for facilitating Committee Stage today. I also thank members for their general support for the Bill during pre-legislative scrutiny and on Second Stage in the Dáil. As members are aware, this is a long and technical Bill. As well as transposing the enforcement and security provisions of the European electronic communications code, the Bill provides the Commission for Communications Regulation, ComReg, with a new civil enforcement regime and an updated criminal enforcement procedure for the electronic communications sector. The Bill give the enforcement of the electronic communication security measures a legislative basis. It also provides for additional consumer protections and makes a number of amendments to the Communications Regulation Act 2002. The Bill represents the biggest update to the regulation of the electronic communications sector since ComReg's establishment in 2002. It will provide ComReg with the tools it needs to effectively regulate the sector today, and it will bring its powers further in line with comparable regulators in the State and elsewhere in Europe. In doing so, it will fulfil a programme for Government commitment.

I indicated on Second Stage that I would bring forward an amendment in relation to the Digital Hub Development Agency Act 2003 that would confer a function on the board to dispose of its land and property assets on foot of a directive by the Minister pursuant to the 2003 Act. I am also bringing forward a number of amendments that are focused on the security of electronic communications networks, specifically dealing with the issue of high-risk vendors, HRVs. These amendments will set out how a risk assessment will be conducted in alignment with the principles of the EU 5G security toolbox. Recognising the functions exercised by certain Departments and agencies in respect of national security, the risk assessment will be conducted in consultation with relevant stakeholders across government. The amendment will also set out how HRVs will be designated, and will provide for ministerial notices to restrict or ban designated vendors on networks as a whole or on specific parts of networks. ComReg should be tasked with the supervision and enforcement of orders relating to HRVs. Similar legislation has been implemented in 19 EU member states, with a further five indicating that they are at an advanced stage of preparation. Likewise, the UK enacted similar provisions recently.

I also mentioned on Second Stage the possibility that the Government will bring forward a short amendment to the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983 in order to provide for payments to be made to or via An Post, particularly in the context of the provision of support to postmasters. This amendment is the subject of ongoing engagement with the Office of the Attorney General.

Two other short amendments will be brought forward in relation to the alternative dispute resolution, ADR, process outlined in the Bill. The first is a minor amendment that will broaden the scope of disputes that can be subject to ADR to align with current practice and to better reflect the text of the code. The second will adjust the scope of the code of practice for complaints to align it with the scope for ADR.

Aside from some further examination and possible modification of the definitions and structure of the Bill as a result of these amendments, some consideration has also been given to whether further amendments are required to the appeals provisions found in Parts 2 and 3. Legal advice is being sought on this matter. As these amendments require further development, I put the committee on notice that I hope to bring them forward on Report Stage.

With regard to the Government amendments put forward today, I will give more explanation for the reasons behind each of them when we reach them. That concludes my opening remarks.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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We will now move to our consideration of the amendments.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendment No. 1 cannot be moved as it requires a motion of instruction to committee. Does the Minister of State wish to comment on the amendment?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We will table this amendment on Report Stage.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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What is the amendment about?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is about the DHDA. The Bills Office contacted the Department on Tuesday, 25 October to communicate that the Oireachtas has raised some issues with the DHDA amendments scheduled for today. The Department was advised that although there is a Government decision to make the amendments, they fall outside the existing Standing Order and therefore, on procedural grounds, could not be moved. To proceed with them today, a motion on an instruction to the committee would have to be introduced and debated, which could result in a vote after Committee Stage. As this would be after when we are scheduled to have completed Committee Stage, these amendments cannot be taken at this time. If we can re-enter them-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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What does that mean in layman's terms?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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If the Chairman is asking me about the substance of the amendment-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Both.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The effect of the amendment was to reduce the membership of the agency from 14 to eight. Since the nature and focus of the work of the agency will necessarily narrow in the period of dissolution, there is a lower requirement for a board of the size originally provided for in the DHDA Act.

The other amendment is to reduce the number required for a quorum from six to four. This will permit the continuation of a functioning board throughout the dissolution process. It will also mitigate the risk of the board becoming inquorate during the wind-down and dissolution period. There are currently eight members on the board of the DHDA, and membership currently comprises six men and two women. This represents a breakdown of 75% male and 25% of female. Departments are required, in line with the Government decision of 23 July 2014, to achieve the target of at least 40% representation for each gender on State boards. I propose that we not move the amendment today and do so on Report Stage.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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If it is outside the scope of the Bill, how can it come inside the scope of the Bill on Report Stage?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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My understanding is that if I signal I would like to take it on Report Stage and that we are not ready to take it on Committee Stage today, it can be taken on Report Stage, presumably with the permission of the Chairman.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I ask the Minister of State to clarify that. It is a very straightforward point. If the amendment is outside the scope of the Bill on Committee Stage, surely it will be outside its scope on Report Stage. We ask the Minister of State-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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In other words, we would have to reassess it and make sure it was within the scope of the Bill before resubmitting it on Report Stage.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendment No. 2 cannot be moved. It requires an instruction to committee motion.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The position on this is the same as for amendment No. 1.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does it relate to the same-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Does it relate to the same topic? They concern two aspects of the same issue.

Darren O'Rourke (Meath East, Sinn Fein)
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The issue of commencement has been raised. From reading the legislation, I believe the Minister has, as usual, discretion regarding the commencement of various sections. Is there ongoing engagement with telecommunications companies? Obviously, a whole new regime will be brought into play. Will there be advance notice? I presume there will be significant new regulatory and administrative responsibilities for the organisations. I refer to considerations concerning IT capacity, personnel and recruitment. Could the Minister of State give me a sense of the ongoing engagement and the notice the organisations will be given before the new regime kicks in? I realise they stated publicly that they were looking for 90 days' grace or notice. Could the Minister of State address that issue in the interest of the regime being implemented as efficiently and smoothly as possible?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I can confirm that there has been ongoing engagement between the industry and my Department, and also between the chief executives of the companies and me directly. We meet regularly. Before I commence any section, we will of course engage with the industry and make sure it is ready. We want things to have the effect we expect them to have in practice. We are not going to delay forever but will engage with the industry before we commence a new section. The Deputy is right to ask about it.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 3 to 16, inclusive, and 36 are related and are to be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 3:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"PART 3

SECURITY MEASURES IN RESPECT OF HIGH-RISK VENDORS

Interpretation (Part 3)

19.In this Part—

"component" includes any function, technology, equipment, hardware, software, facility, good or service used in the provision of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services;

"critical component" means a critical component prescribed by the Minister under section 20;

"high-risk vendor" means a vendor, in respect of which the Minister has made an assessment under section 22;

"third country" means a country other than a Member State of the European Union, an EEA state, Switzerland and the United Kingdom;

"provider" means a provider of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services;

"vendor" means a person who, normally for remuneration, provides components, functions, technology, equipment, hardware, software, facilities or services to providers of electronic communications networks to build or operate the network.".

The purpose of this amendment is to insert a new Part 3 entitled "SECURITY MEASURES IN RESPECT OF HIGH-RISK VENDORS". Section 19 provides key definitions. I am also introducing a number of amendments focused on the security of electronic communications networks, specifically dealing with the issue of high-risk vendors.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Maybe not on the definitions but on the procedure for making a notice, I have observations. Will I raise them now?

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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If the Deputy speaks to the amendments, I will allow latitude. We are not speaking about the section yet.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I do not have a problem with section 19 per se.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Procedurally, the Deputy should speak to the amendments and then broaden his discussion.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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How is it to be determined that a vendor is a high-risk vendor? What procedures are in place to challenge such a determination? I noticed that one can take an appeal to the High Court. I may be misreading this but it seems the Minister can offer information to the High Court to justify his or her decision and require that this information not be provided to a party to the appeal. Although the Minister can tell a judge the reasons for determining a vendor is high risk and give information to back up that assertion, can the Minister ask the judge not to give the information to the other side in the appeal to allow it to challenge it?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There are many security and confidentiality considerations associated with all these provisions-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I get all that, but is what I have outlined what is proposed?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The Deputy is asking me whether the notice party would not get a copy of the reasons for the refusal of his or her-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The information that the Minister has which supports that assertion is provided to the court but is unavailable to the other party. Is that really being proposed?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The legislation states that would only happen if the information is highly sensitive or classified and, as such, would not be appropriate to disclose to the public for reasons of national security.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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That information will not be provided to the person who is appealing the decision.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That is the case only in those circumstances.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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It is an extraordinary proposition in law that we are going to legislate to the effect that the Minister can make such a decision. Someone from the American Embassy could call, for example. Is there anyone here wearing a trench coat who I might offend? Perhaps someone from the Russian Embassy, if we are friends again, or the Chinese Embassy might call. Let us be honest that this is really about China. Such a person can visit. The Minister can take information he or she is given into account and give that information to the court to justify a decision but that information is unavailable for the other side to test. If that is the case, it flies in the face of how justice is carried out. Audi alteram partemshould apply. This does not only have civil consequences. A failure to adhere to this notice has criminal consequences. If I am accused of something, I have the right to test the information that supports the accusation. The Minister of State is saying that information given to the High Court will not be provided to the other party to the appeal. If we are seeking to subvert the interference of nefarious states in communications in this State, the way to do it is not to adopt facets of their criminal justice systems. I will use a word that is bandied about but it is positively Kafkaesque that a Minister will give information to a High Court judge to justify a decision but the other side will be unable to test that information, call it a complete load of codswallop and explain why that is the case. The other side will never even see that information. A High Court judge is supposed to act independently of a Minister. We have separation of powers in this State, which has been pretty well respected since the its foundation. A judge is supposed to look at the information but cannot hear the opinion of the other side. In fact, a judge cannot even tell the other side that he or she has the information. The other side cannot even test the Minister's opinion and assertion that the relevant information goes to matters of security. It is an extraordinary proposition that the Minister of State is suggesting this committee should legislate for such a position. The introduction of such a measure in law would have ramifications far beyond the remit of this Bill.

There is a high-profile trial going on at the moment. It was determined appropriate to be heard in the Special Criminal Court. People alleged to be a part of international terrorist networks and who pose a threat to this State have been tried in the past. People are, by and large, entitled to test information against them. As a result of this Bill, nothing is put to a judge to justify the Minister's decision. It is not put to the other side in such a case.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I thank the Deputy. The structure we are working with is based on the investment screening Bill, which we have discussed with the Attorney General. The Deputy said that people who are accused of crimes should be shown the information relating to the accusation. Nobody is being accused of a crime here.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I was referring to the section of the Bill which outlines that failure to respond to the notice has criminal consequences.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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What we are discussing here is not failure to adhere to a notice. We are discussing designation as a high-risk vendor and how that process works. That is not a criminal accusation. It is not something that an individual will face. It is a matter of a body corporate being designated by the State as a high-risk vendor. The State will say it is uncomfortable with such a vendor's equipment being used in its critical infrastructure networks. The information provided will not always be suitable for publication. It will be subject to judicial oversight and the judges will decide whether there is a national security implication whereby the information would not be published and would be kept within the oversight of the judges. That is the situation. The Deputy has opened an appalling vista where people are, in a Kafkaesque way, dragged before judges and not shown the evidence against them. We are talking about the designation of a supplier of high-tech equipment. That supplier will be a corporate body located outside the EU that is considered a high-risk vendor. It is as much as that. Naturally, one must comply with an order of a court and not to do so may be a criminal offence.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Will the Minister of State go through the process by which that would happen? Perhaps he would give an example of the process whereby that would happen. Does ComReg start that process? How will it operate?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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In the normal course of events and following the procedure laid out in the legislation, the Minister will decide whether to designate a vendor-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Will that be on foot of a recommendation from ComReg?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It will not. It will be a matter for the Minister on foot of the recommendation of the Department and other Ministers.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Where would the information come from to justify that?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It would come from the security services.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The security services of which State?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The Irish State. The national security-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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We have an extensive security service in China, have we?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Will the Deputy repeat that?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Let us be honest, we are talking about Chinese components here.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I ask the Deputy to be careful.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We are talking about any state outside the EU.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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The legislation will have a general application.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It will apply generally to any country that is not an EU country.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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From where are we going to get the information? I do not think we have a security service that operates outside of our State. Where would we get the information to suggest that components being manufactured in another state pose a threat?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The national security analysis centre in the Department of the Taoiseach would advise.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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From where will that centre get the information?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It would get that information from the security apparatus of the State, including the Garda and the Department of Defence.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Those bodies do not operate outside the State. From where are they going to get that information?

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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A Minister and his or her Department officials might decide that a particular vendor's equipment, or whatever, is a security risk.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That might happen in certain circumstances. A decision may be made that a certain type of equipment cannot be used in a certain part of the network.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Before we get to that point, are there any other jurisdictions in Europe in which this legislation is already in operation?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Similar legislation is in place in 19 EU states.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Have we taken their outline legislation?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We certainly have. This is delicate, technical and sensitive.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Will the Minister of State go through the process? What happens when a vendor is designated high risk?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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A high-risk vendor notice is issued to the relevant providers. For example, in the case of mobile networks, the notice will go to mobile network operators. In the case of fibre cable, the notice will issue to fibre cable operators. They are issued with a notice that specific companies or corporate entities are designated high-risk vendors and that particular types of equipment cannot be used in particular parts of their network. That is the function of the Minister.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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The Minister writes-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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ComReg's involvement is to monitor that.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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A notice issues to a broadband provider. How would the matter end up in court?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That would happen if such a notice were to be challenged. A challenge can be taken by the operator or the supplier.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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A challenge can be taken by the high-risk vendor.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Naturally, vendors may say they do not consider themselves high risk and can challenge that in the courts.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Would that go to the High Court?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That is how it would end up in the High Court.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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If it ends up in the High Court, the court will make a ruling. Are we talking specifically about equipment that is physically based in Ireland?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is software or hardware that is in use on the network. If I could have a moment, I will confer with my officials. It is not physically restricted to Ireland; it could be a cloud-based service.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Do we have jurisdiction over a cloud-based service of an operator? How does that work legally?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We have jurisdiction over the providers in this State so we can issue an order to a provider that is operating here regarding how it operates.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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At this time, does the Minister of State believe we have any high-risk vendors on the horizon?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It would be wrong of me to make a comment on that. In order to designate a provider as a high-risk vendor, we would have to go through due process. At this stage, no such assessment has been carried out, so I will not guess whether an entity is going to be a high-risk vendor.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is it fair to say this ultimately involves the security of the State?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes, it is the security of the State. It is to avoid a situation where the critical infrastructure of the State presents a risk. For example, in the remote scenario that Ireland were to find itself at war with another country and that country had effective control over parts of our critical infrastructure, we might think twice about allowing vendors from that country to deploy remotely controllable software.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does the Minister of State know if similar legislation has been tested in any other countries where such notice has been issued or a high-risk vendor has been taken to court? Is he aware of any precedent for this measure being operated?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There has been a challenge in Sweden. I understand the Swedish state was successful in that challenge.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is the legislation there similar to this?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is similar because Sweden is also in the EU. The measure is in line with the EU toolbox, which is our guiding principle. It makes sense that European countries take a unified approach to this problem and that individual countries do not stick out with different approaches.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does this relate to 4G and 5G?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is wider than that. It relates to any communications infrastructure - fibre and fibreoptic cables. It need not just be wireless. An obvious area is 5G, as there are particular characteristics to 5G, more so than 4G, that make it especially vulnerable to attack. We will carry out an assessment of all communications infrastructure in Ireland and designate which parts of the network are at risk.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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When will that be done? That is a necessary precursor to this legislation becoming robust.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We cannot start doing it until the legislation is complete and has been passed. We expect that it will be some months before it is completed.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Who would carry out the inspections of all these networks and the vendors on the networks?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The role of oversight, monitoring and enforcement is for ComReg.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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ComReg will produce a report for the Minister of State once it has carried out due diligence of the network and that will then become the working document thereafter, in effect a database of the entire network.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That is correct.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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How long will it take ComReg to do the work?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The first piece of work is to carry out the risk assessment. The high-risk vendors will then be designated and the notices to the operators sent out. ComReg will then be responsible for monitoring the position thereafter. Those are the steps.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I am talking about going out and doing the survey or physical inspection of the entire network.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It need not be a physical inspection; it is more likely that it will be a remote inspection which will assess the structure of the network and what is being used. It will be an ongoing job. It is not the case that ComReg only has to go out once and check the equipment.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Has that been done yet?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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As part of the EU 5G toolbox process, a once-over was done across the entire network by ComReg.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Was it done recently?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It was done in 2020.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

Did that identify any high-risk vendors operating on the Irish networks?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The assessment was not done to identify who is a high-risk vendor. It was done to assess what are the high-risk parts of the network that are susceptible to being hacked and would have a high impact as a result of being compromised.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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A substantial amount of the required work has been done and it is a question of building on it.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes, and then there is ongoing monitoring afterwards.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I want to focus on two issues. In terms of appalling vistas, a judge once dismissed the whole idea of an appalling vista. He was a very good judge, one of the better ones on the Bench in England and Wales at the time. Unfortunately, the appalling vista came to pass, so they do happen. The idea is not to provide powers that enable them to happen. I see one of the officials finds this entertaining, but I have concerns about the amount of power that this measure gives, not to the Irish security services but to foreign security services. In Ireland, we have a national security service that barely operates. We do not have a large international security apparatus. Some states that do are present in Ireland. When it suits us, we like to think we are the 51st state of one such state and when it does not suit us, we like to portray the polar opposite.

The Minister of State is very much not a stooge for the American, Chinese or Russian embassies, but there is a possibility that, down the line, there will be Ministers who may be stooges for other powers. Business and money come into this in a very big way. A very high-profile trade stand-off is taking place between China and the United States on the development of computer components. Is it beyond the realms of possibility that national security apparatuses are used, abused and manipulated to further the financial interests of a state? I believe it is not beyond the realms of possibility. It is quite likely that that would happen, in particular in western economies when we find ourselves with no resources whatsoever or in a time of a shortage of resources. The United States less so because the dollar is the fiat currency and the US is not in decline in the way that Europe is. I am digressing, however.

I am saying that there is a strong possibility for abuse. What the Minister of State is saying is that an order can be made by him or his successors. The legal person could be Jimmy Browne or an international corporation but let us not pretend that a criminal sanction against a corporation is less of a criminal sanction than one against an individual, unless of course we think corporations are not entitled to fair procedures and natural justice. If that is the position, we should say it out loud but we must tell IDA Ireland in advance that is the case.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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If I could add to that, how would a risk to the security of the State be defined? What are the parameters in which such a decision would be made? That is the key issue.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It would be up to the State to make the case for that and then up to the judge to decide. They are the parameters.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is it physical? I accept what is involved is the risk to the State and its people, as distinct from-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There is one section in the amendment-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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What control mechanisms are there? Is there a default system to ensure this cannot be used other than for its intended purpose?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The amendment specifies the criteria under which we decide whether an entity is a high-risk vendor. Part of that is the type of governmental system that is in place in the country where the vendor is located and the type of relationship between the vendor and the government of that country.

In other words, for example, is this country a democracy or not? Does it have an independent judiciary? Is the vendor controlled by an entity that is a central part of that State? Those are the kinds of criteria that are laid out in the legislation. If the State wishes to designate somebody as a high-risk vendor, they would have to show under those criteria, how they came to the conclusion, and then present this to the judge. The judge would then use that as a criteria to make an assessment.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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That is on the basis that the operator being served notice does not comply with the request from the Government or the Minister.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No, it is not. That is on the basis that the operator on whom we serve notice challenges it in the courts. If they do not comply then they have to comply. They are subject to-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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If they comply and get the equipment removed, or whatever, that will not end up in court then. It only goes to court if-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Exactly, only if it is challenged. It is only if the vendor or the operator challenges it.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Do I understand correctly that it is ComReg that enforces this?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The supervision regime is ComReg but the courts enforce it.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Yes, but the courts can only enforce something in Ireland, obviously. The Minister of State said the supervision regime is by ComReg. Is the Minister of State saying that it can be enforced against a multinational operating in Ireland even if the component itself is located in Israel, for example?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Exactly. We would order-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Japan, China, Israel and so on are all countries with very advanced high-tech sectors. What did the Minister of State say ComReg was going to do?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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ComReg will be the supervisor for the-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Okay. So ComReg will go to Israel or Japan to supervise this?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No. ComReg is the supervisor of the regime and of the operators and the vendors.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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ComReg has great difficulty in supervising mobile phone access in rural County Clare much less giving them powers or requiring them to supervise something in Israel or the Xinjiang province in China, or take your pick of locations around the world.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Obviously, we are not going to attempt to enter a premises in a foreign country but we do have supervisory control or jurisdiction over the operators that are physically located in or licensed to operate in Ireland. We can issue orders to them to configure their equipment or to provide us with information about their equipment, regardless of where it is located. If we do not want them to use particular software in their network, no matter where it is located, we can order the operator to do that.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Once Ireland makes that order one must take their word for it that they have complied, if it is outside of Ireland-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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ComReg will-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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-----or will these people in trench coats who gave the information in the first place be in a position to give the information that the orders are not being complied with?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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ComReg will have power of inspection, power of entry, and the power to acquire network passwords.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Is it an extraterritorial power of entry?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No. With the networks, if the operator is physically located in ireland or if it is operating from Ireland and is licensed here, it has control. That is the very nature of what an operator is. It has control of its operations wherever they are located around the world. It can see them and inspect them from its central base. If it is being regulated and inspected by ComReg, which has powers of inspection and is allowed to see what the operator can see or compel the operator to provide ComReg with any information they require, then they can see what they have in their network or in their system.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The physical presence of components is something they will not be able to see from Ireland.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Of course they can. Take for example a mobile operator that has a collection of equipment that is physical and virtual, and which is located in different locations around the country-----

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Around the world outside of Ireland.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Okay, let us say it is in the cloud and is located in a data centre in another country. ComReg can come into that operator and can require them to show ComReg any part of their network, and can compel them to provide any information required, and the operator will have to comply with that direction.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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As regards-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The data being located in another country does not make it harder to inspect. It is under the effective control of the operator.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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It is, but surely with regard to verification, one can ask them for information but they are not in a position to verify its veracity, or are they, if it is outside of Ireland?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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They can carry out an inspection, just as they could regardless of where the data is located. It is absolutely irrelevant where the actual, physical location of the machines are that are storing the software that is operating the network.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Can I just ask a couple of questions?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Within this new section, is there a provision to review the operation within a number of years? In terms of good practice, is this something the Minister of State has looked at to review the operation?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There is nothing on that in the legislation but the Minister of the day will keep it under review.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I think we should consider this for Report Stage. As it currently stands, do the Minister or ComReg have powers to insist on an operator getting high-risk vendor equipment removed from the system at the moment?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Is the Chairman asking whether there is existing legislation to do that under what is in force at the moment? There is not, and this is why we are bringing forward this legislation.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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There is a major lacuna in that, as it stands.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Exactly.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I ask that when it comes to Report Stage that we would provide for a review of the operation of this legislation; I believe it should be within a period of two years. They must give time for an inspection. This is of such a magnitude that a review would allow everyone that bit of - dare I say it - security that it is being looked at to see how it is operating. It is quite significant. The Minister of State will appreciate that I am just looking at it as a layperson but it appears that this is quite a significant new extension coming into this legislation.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I will certainly consider bringing forward an amendment on Report Stage. We will see to that.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is it agreed this new section will be inserted?

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Well not really, but I am not in a position to call a vote on it.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 4:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

“Critical components

20.(1) The Minister may prescribe any component or any class of components as a critical component or critical components.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), in prescribing a component or class of components, the Minister may have regard to:

(a) the impact a compromise of a component referred to in subsection (1) would have on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those networks and services;

(b) the likelihood of a compromise of such a component;

(c) the extent of the impact a compromise of such a component would have on national security, public order, economic or societal activities;

(d) the number of users likely affected by a compromise of such a component.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No 5:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

“Minister to assess likelihood of vendor being subjected to interference by third country

21.(1) The Minister may assess at any time, and on an ongoing basis, the likelihood of a vendor being subjected to interference by a third country.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the matters that the Minister may consider for the purposes of subsection (1), the Minister shall have regard to the following matters when making an assessment under that subsection:

(a) whether or not a strong link exists between the vendor and the government of any third country;

(b) the status of the rule of law and the political situation within the third country in question, in particular whether or not there is democratic or legislative oversight, including an independent judiciary, in place, and whether or not data protection or security agreements exist between the European Union and the third country in question;

(c) the characteristics of the vendor’s business ownership and practices, in particular whether the ownership structure is transparent and whether the vendor’s sources of finance are transparent;

(d) the ability of the third country in question to exert any form of pressure upon the vendor, including in relation to influencing where equipment is to be manufactured;

(e) whether or not the third country, from which the vendor originates, conducts or is associated with an offensive cyber policy.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 6:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following: “Assessment as high-risk vendor

22.(1) Where the Minister makes an assessment -

(a) in accordance with section 21, that there is a likelihood of a vendor being subjected to interference by a third country,

(b) that there is a significant risk that a vendor will not be able to secure supply of critical components,

(c) that the overall quality of critical components supplied by a vendor is inadequate, or

(d) that the cybersecurity practices of a vendor are inadequate, the Minister may take measures in accordance with section 25.

(2)The Minister may conduct an assessment under subsection (1) at any time and on an ongoing basis.”.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I would like some clarification on this.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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We are dealing with amendment No. 6.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Yes, this whole-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

The Deputy is speaking to amendment No. 6.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

Am I correct that amendment No. 6 introduces the-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

Amendment No. 6 is about the assessment as a high-risk vendor. It is on page 3 of the amendments.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Do I understand correctly that any manufacturer that is headquartered in or based in a country that is determined to be undemocratic, and where the manufacturer could be under the control of that undemocratic regime, and that they could come under the influence of that government, can be determined a high-risk vendor? I am struggling to see that this is sufficient to have them determined as a high-risk vendor without their necessarily being any link to the threat to the security of this State arising.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We are discussing amendment No. 6.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Yes, the assessment of a high-risk vendor.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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For the assessment as a high-risk vendor, where the Minister makes an assessment in accordance with section 21 that there is a likelihood of a vendor being subjected to interference by a third country, that there is a significant risk that a vendor will not be able to secure supply of critical components, that the overall quality of critical components provided by a vendor is inadequate, or that the cybersecurity practices of a vendor are inadequate, the Minister may take measures in accordance with section 25.

The idea is that much of this relates to quality and whether we want to allow a vendor whose equipment is substandard to put equipment onto a network that could lead to a failure across critical infrastructure. It is, therefore, to ensure that somebody does not go cheap and endanger the critical infrastructure of the country.

The Deputy was really asking about things that relate to amendment No. 5, which we already agreed. I am happy to discuss anything, however. I think his question was that if a vendor is located in a particular country, does that mean all vendors in that country are automatically-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I do not think that was quite the question. I will let the Deputy clarify it himself.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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My point was that any vendor in that country can be deemed to be a high-risk vendor. The vendor does not necessarily have to pose any particular risk to the security of this State. The Minister of State moved from risk to the security of the State to shoddy components very quickly. That would indicate that this Bill is very broad in its scope and has significant capability to impact upon competition. We have built a success story internationally around being a place with fair competition, access to the courts and, above all else, transparency. My central concern for this is the lack of transparency. The lack of transparency by which these amendments were introduced to this House has not really helped to instill any confidence in me in how it will be operated.

The Minister of State was invited by the Chair to point out why there is a particular urgency to ban some manufacturers and he could not do that. Why is it being introduced in this measure? The whole lack of transparency concerns me, including the way this House is being acquainted with this Bill and particularly the impact it will have on our justice system if it becomes law. It contains many very novel propositions. As far as I can see, they are extremely novel in how we deal with competition between competing entities in Ireland and the extent to which we provide a transparent and level playing field, which is what attracts an awful lot of investment into the State. I have many worries about this Bill, to be frank.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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How can the Minister of State give reassurance that this particular section of the Bill will not in any way interfere with competition? What is the rationale in terms of moving that forward and its impact? How does he define that? What is the basic principle in terms of security of the State? The Minister of State said there may not be a supply of critical components. We could have a network out there that is supplying purely to private sectors and not doing anything with the State. How does he ensure this will not be wrongly perceived or that this legislation is not used in a way that could be deemed to interfere in competition?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There are a few issues. Deputy McNamara was asking about the general transparency provisions around this. I was talking about how in one section of the Bill, we discussed the nature of the judicial system and the democratic system, or lack of, in the country of the vendor and, in another section, we are discussing the quality of the components and so on. Therefore, if a vendor is put on the high-risk vendor list and that vendor challenges that designation and goes to court, the evidence presented that is sensitive to national security is the only part of the evidence that is not published. The rest of it is provided to the vendor. If it is the case that shoddy components or whatever else are provided, whatever other information that is not relevant to national security is openly-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does it have to be underlined by being a threat to the national security of the State in all circumstances?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Only information that is a threat to national security is withheld. That is decided by judicial oversight.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is that the only basis on which someone can be deemed to be a high-risk vendor?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No. Somebody can be deemed to be a high-risk vendor even if they have no national security problems at all because their equipment, for example, is poor quality. In that situation, there is no confidentiality about the-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Could the low quality or poor quality of the equipment give rise to a potential threat to the security of the State?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We are talking about critical infrastructure. Any threat to critical infrastructure is, therefore, a threat to the security of the State.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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The Minister of State might define "critical infrastructure".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Critical infrastructure is defined in the network and information security directive as anything upon which the State relies. That includes, for example, energy networks, transport networks, airlines, gas, water, electricity and communications. The underpinning legislation for that is the NIS directive.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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What directive?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The network and information systems directive.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Ultimately, in many cases, we would be going into networks that are privately owned.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes. It is not the case that this only relates to State-owned networks.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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It is private networks as well.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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In this legislation, we are just looking at the communications aspects of critical infrastructure. If we think about who the operators in Ireland are and so on, they are the people who own the fibre and mobile networks.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Only communications networks.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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In communications, they tend to be private operators. They are almost entirely private operators. Therefore, private operators are running our critical infrastructure and private suppliers are supplying them with components. We have a situation where a private company is designated as an operator of essential services or a critical infrastructure provider.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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The powers in this legislation are vested in the Minister, however, not in ComReg.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes, the powers are vested in the Minister.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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The Minister of State sought to differentiate between what poses a threat to the security of the State, which would not be made available to an appellant, and what is not a threat to the State, like sloppy manufacturing processes or lack of components. Who would be in a position to tell the Minister of State there is a firm based in China - I am sorry; I keep mentioning China-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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For example.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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-----for example, but I am very cognisant of the fact that this is taking place, and China is not in a position to provide enough components because of this dispute between China and America and access to semiconductors and such. Who would be in a position to give that information to the Minister of State other than An Garda Síochána? I find it difficult to know what information An Garda Síochána or, indeed, any part of our national security apparatus would have on the state of play of semiconductor manufacture in China or how much it is or is not suffering as a result of American measures. Surely, the only ones who could tell the Minister of State that would be the American security apparatus. Perhaps the Chinese might want to volunteer that they are actually suffering from this, although I doubt it. They might want to volunteer that information, however.

This whole idea that people will not have the definition and whether it endangers national security is not just about the information itself, but the source of that information. My concern is for the information the Minister of State might receive, although maybe not him personally because he might have a very critical mind. There is always the danger that successors will be less inquisitive and critical. The Minister of State might get lots of information from the American, Chinese, Russian or Israeli Embassies, for example, which might suggest that a vendor's components are sloppy or that a vendor will not be in a position to provide enough of them. The Minister of State might decide to label somebody a high-risk vendor on the basis of that information. The vendor then appeals that and goes to the High Court, where the Minister of State says he cannot give the vendor the information he received. That is not because of what that information is.

It is no particular threat to the security of this State what the state of play of the semi-conductor manufacturing sector in China is. Rather, a Minister will say that he or she cannot share the information because he or she got it from the British Embassy, the US Embassy or wherever as part of an exchange of information in which confidentiality was assured. The Minister could give the information to the judge but could not give it to the vendor. The idea is that we will differentiate between what is and is not national security, yet all of the information the Government is going to rely on is going to come from external sources. Let us be real, in that we do not have a sufficiently large international intelligence service. Most of the espionage networks operating in this country are not here because they are worried about what the Minister for Defence, Deputy Coveney, plans to do with the Army any time soon. They are here to figure out what companies are doing. A great deal of espionage is based around companies and competition, including competition between states. There is a distinct possibility that someone in the Minister of State's shoes could in future fall prey to that and make decisions that could not be challenged in an open court. It is unusual for High Court sittings to be held in private, although they are held in private in family law cases. For all of the flaws in the process, a case to convict someone of terrorist offences, even terrorist offences in the Middle East, is open and transparent.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The Minister can use information from third-party sources. For example, he can commission research to make a decision on whether to designate someone as a high-risk vendor. It is only information that has a national security implication that he is allowed to redact, and the decision to redact is made by a judge. The Minister would have to go to the judge and make the case for redaction. That is judicial oversight. There has to be a line somewhere. What the legislation does is take that decision away from the Minister and give it to the Judiciary.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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That will presumably be appealed.

I will return to a few other points. The Minister of State mentioned that there was similar legislation in other EU member states. Is there specific legislation on high-risk vendors and that concept-----

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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"High-risk vendor" is the terminology and concept. It is based on the recommendations of the EU toolbox for dealing with high-risk vendors, which was agreed at the Council of Ministers.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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What other EU member states have enshrined this concept in domestic law? The Minister of State's officials will have access to this information, but we would like to know so that we can look at those states by way of comparison.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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In Germany, for example, the classification of "high-risk vendor" is indirectly based on a comprehensive risk assessment on a case-by-vase basis. Germany also has a similar provision to our amendment in regard to critical components.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Will the Minister of State say which law that is so that we can dig it out?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I will-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Is that provision in legislation in Germany?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Yes. I do not have the specific name of the law with me, but I will provide it to the committee. There are also examples in the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and the UK. While the UK is not an EU country, we have designated in our legislation that the UK is to be treated the same as EU countries or is not to be considered a third country. I can provide the committee with the specific laws that apply in those jurisdictions.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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That would be helpful.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Presuming that the departmental officials have looked at those legislative measures in English or Irish, the Minister of State might also provide the translations they have examined. It would be easier for us, as I could not read legislation in German, Spanish or Dutch.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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We will provide them in English.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I thank the Minister of State.

The Minister of State mentioned that the high-risk vendor concept was enshrined in those laws, and I look forward to receiving them. Is there equally a provision in law that an appellant shall not be provided with-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Security-related information.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Yes. Any information can be security related because, by definition, most of the information will come from national security sources.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There is a similar set of laws in the UK, but their designation of "national security" is done in the political system and not by a judge. We have made the decision to move it towards the Judiciary and away from the political system.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Is there not also the idea of a special advocate who is appointed by the court to represent someone's interests and who has access to all of the information?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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There is no appeals mechanism in the British legislation.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Which British legislation are we discussing?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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To be of assistance, the Minister of State might provide us with the background to the relevant legislative measures within the EU. That would allow members to consider the matter in advance of Report Stage.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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When is Report Stage planned?

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I do not believe it has been flagged yet, so we will have plenty of time.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I thank the Chairman.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 7:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Minister may consult for the purposes of assessments under this Part 23.The Minister may consult with such persons as the Minister considers appropriate for the purposes of sections 21and 22.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 8:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Obligation to provide information for the purposes of assessments under this Part 24.(1) The Minister may request any person to provide information that the Minister reasonably believes he or she requires for the purpose of section 21or 22.

(2) A person who fails to make all reasonable efforts to comply with a request under subsection (1)commits an offence and is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both, or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine not exceeding €250,000, or both.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 9:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"High-risk vendor measures 25.(1) Subject to section 22, the Minister may, if he or she considers it necessary to control risks to the security of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services which may affect national security or public order, by notice in writing (referred to in this Part as a "high-risk vendor notice"), take any of the following measures (referred to in this Part as a "high-risk vendor measure"):

(a) prohibit the installation by a provider of critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor;

(b) prohibit or restrict the use by a provider of critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor;

(c) place conditions on the installation or use by a provider of critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor;

(d) prohibit the installation or use by a provider at a specified location of critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor;

(e) require a provider to remove, disable or modify critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor;

(f) place a restriction, expressed as a percentage of the total quantity of critical components used by the provider on their network or any part of their network, on the quantity of critical components made by a high-risk vendor that a provider may use;

(g) where critical components made or supplied by a high-risk vendor are in use by a provider, require the provider to use these critical components in a specified manner or at a specified location.

(2) A high-risk vendor notice shall specify—

(a) the provider or providers to which it applies,

(b) the reasons for the issuing of the notice, and

(c) the time at which the notice comes into operation.

(3) Paragraph (b)of subsection (2)shall not apply where the Minister considers that specifying the reasons for the issuing of the notice in the notice would be contrary to the interests of national security or public order.

(4) The Minister may at any time, by further notice in writing, revoke or vary a high-risk vendor measure.

(5) Where the Minister makes, varies or revokes a high-risk vendor notice he or she shall give the notice, in accordance with section 60 of the Principal Act, to any provider to which the notice applies.

(6) Where the Minister gives notice to a provider in accordance with subsection (5), the Minister shall take all reasonable steps to give a copy of the notice to the high-risk vendor specified in the notice.

(7) The requirement in subsection (6)shall not apply to the giving of a high-risk vendor notice if the Minister considers that giving a copy of the notice to the high-risk vendor would be contrary to the interests of national security or public order.

(8) A provider that fails to comply with a high-risk vendor measure or a notice varying such a measure given to such provider or made under subsection (1)commits an offence and is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both, or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine not exceeding €250,000, or both.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 10:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Confidentiality of high-risk vendor notice 26.(1) The Minister may require a provider to which a high-risk vendor measure applies to treat as confidential the existence or contents of the measure and of the high-risk vendor notice in circumstances where the Minister considers that disclosure of the measures imposed by the notice or of the contents of the notice would be contrary to the interests of national security or public order.

(2) A provider that fails to comply with a requirement made under subsection (1)commits an offence and is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both, or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine not exceeding €250,000, or both.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 11:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Consultation before taking measures under section 25 27.(1) The Minister before taking any measures under section 25, shall—

(a) consult with the provider or providers which would be subject to the proposed measures, and

(b) make reasonable efforts to consult with the high-risk vendor in respect of which the measures are proposed to be taken.

(2) The requirement in subsection (1) shall not apply if the Minister considers that such consultation would be contrary to the interests of national security or public order.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 12:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Appeal of high-risk vendor measure 28.(1) A person affected by a high-risk vendor measure or a variation of such measure may, not later than 28 days after the person receives notice of the measure or variation, appeal the measure or variation to the High Court.

(2) Pending the outcome of an appeal, the measure taken by the Minister, shall stand, unless on application to the High Court, the Court suspends the application of the measure until the determination of an appeal or its withdrawal.

(3) A person that brings an appeal under this section shall, on the same date as it makes such appeal, notify the Minister of the fact that it has made the appeal and of the grounds on which it has made the appeal.

(4) The High Court may, for the purpose of ensuring the efficient, fair and timely determination of an appeal, give directions in respect of the conduct of the appeal.

(5) An appellant shall, when making an appeal, precisely state all of the grounds in law and fact upon which the appeal is made and shall provide to the Court all of the documents and evidence which it is alleged support the granting of the appeal or upon

which the appellant intends to rely to support those grounds.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), a party to an appeal shall not be entitled during the course of an appeal to make submissions to the Court other than submissions related to the grounds stated or documents and evidence provided under subsection (5).

(7) The Court may, upon application and where it considers it necessary for the fair and proper determination of an appeal, require or permit a party to an appeal to—

(a) make submissions to the Court other than submissions related to the grounds stated or documents and evidence provided under subsection (5), and

(b) provide documents or evidence to the Court other than documents or evidence provided under subsection (5).

(8) Notwithstanding subsection (7), the Court shall refuse to consider submissions, documents or evidence where it considers that—

(a) the submissions, documents or evidence are not relevant to the appeal, or

(b) it is appropriate to do so in order to avoid undue repetition of submissions.

(9) Where the Court has granted leave to deliver additional submissions, documents or evidence on an application under subsection (7), the Court shall give directions as to the scope, form and time-frame for delivery of such additional submissions, documents or evidence.

(10) The Court may receive evidence by oral examination in court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an examiner or commissioner.

(11) The Court, on hearing an appeal against a decision, may consider—

(a) whether the jurisdiction existed to make the decision,

(b) whether the law was correctly applied in reaching the decision, or

(c) whether the decision is supported by the evidence including evidence admitted in accordance with subsection (7).

(12) In considering an appeal, the Court shall have regard to—

(a) the record of the decision the subject of the appeal,

(b) the grounds stated by the parties to the appeal, and documents and evidence relied upon by the parties to support those grounds, under subsection (5), and

(c) any submissions, documents or evidence admitted under subsection (7).

(13) The Court may, on the hearing of an appeal against a decision—

(a) confirm the decision, or

(b) where it is satisfied by reference to the grounds of appeal that a serious and significant error of law or fact, or a series of minor errors of law or fact which when taken together amount to a serious and significant error, was made in making the decision, or that the decision was made without complying with fair procedures, annul the decision in its totality or in part, and—

(i) remit the decision for reconsideration by the Minister subject to such directions as the Court considers appropriate, or

(ii) vary the decision and substitute such other decision as the Court considers appropriate.".

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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This is not agreed, although I will not call a vote. I could call one but then I could not vote.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Duly noted.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 13:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Material not publicly available that relates to security or public order of the State 29.(1) Where an appeal of a high-risk vendor measure or a variation in such measure relates to or involves any decision, evidence, document, material or any other matter that is not publicly available and relates to the security or public order of the State, (referred to in this Part as "relevant material"), the High Court may—

(a) where it is satisfied by information on oath or affirmation of the Minister, or of an officer of the Minister appointed by the Minister to provide such information, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the disclosure to an appellant of relevant material would create a risk to the security or public order of the State—

(i) where satisfied that the relevant material can be redacted in a way that removes that risk, direct the Minister to provide the relevant material to the appellant subject to such redactions, or

(ii) where satisfied that the relevant material or part thereof can be summarised or described in a way that removes that risk, direct the Minister to provide the appellant with such a summary or description,

(b) where it is not satisfied by the information on oath or affirmation referred to in paragraph (a)that the disclosure to a party of relevant material would create a risk to the security or public order of the State, direct that the relevant material or such part of that material as the High Court may direct, be provided to the party.

(2) The Minister may take relevant material into account in making his or her decision in relation to the appeal regardless of the extent to which, or ways in which, the relevant material is provided to the appellant in accordance with subsection (1).

(3) The Minister shall comply with a direction of the High Court under subsection (1).

(4) The information on oath or affirmation provided to the High Court under subsection (1)shall not, without the express authorisation of the Minister, be disclosed by the Court, an officer or agent of the Court, or any other person, to any person other than a party to an appeal.

(5) When providing information on oath or affirmation under subsection (1), the Minister may apply to the High Court ex partefor an order that—

(a) the information shall not be provided to a party to the appeal, and

(b) a summary of the information, provided to the High Court with the application, shall be provided to the party.

(6) The High Court shall grant the order applied for under subsection (5)if it is satisfied that—

(a) the Minister has grounds for believing that providing the information on oath or affirmation under subsection (1)to a party would create a risk to the security or public order of the State, and

(b) the summary provided with the application for that order is sufficiently clear and detailed to allow the party effectively to challenge the basis on which, or way in which, the information on oath or affirmation is not being provided to it, or provided to it in part, as the case may be, and the Minister shall comply with such an order.

(7) A person, other than a judge, who contravenes subsection (4)commits an offence and shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both, or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine not exceeding €250,000, or both.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 14:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Hearing of appeal of high-risk vendor measure other than in public 30.(1) The High Court shall exclude, from the hearing of an appeal of a high-risk vendor measure or a variation in such measure before it, all persons except—

(a) a judge hearing the matter,

(b) a judicial assistant, or other court personnel, whose presence is necessary for the judge to hear the matter,

(c) the parties to the proceedings,

(d) the legal representatives of the parties to the proceedings, and

(e) a witness whose evidence is relevant to the proceedings, for as long as the witness's presence is required for the purpose of providing such evidence, unless it is satisfied that the interests of justice require any other person not to be so excluded.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 15:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Appeal to Court of Appeal from decision under section 28 31.The decision of the High Court under section 28shall be final and no appeal shall lie from the decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal in any case save with leave of the High Court, which leave shall only be granted where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be made to the Court of Appeal.".

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 16:

In page 18, between lines 25 and 26, to insert the following:

"Commission to ensure compliance with and report to Minister on this Part 32.(1) The Commission shall take reasonable steps to ensure that providers comply with any high-risk vendor measure or any variation in such measure.

(2) The Commission shall issue a report to the Minister on the operation of this Part annually or as requested by the Minister.".

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 17 to 20, inclusive, are related and will be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 17:

In page 23, line 35, to delete "2022)." and substitute "2022);".

The purpose of these amendments is to provide for new transitional provisions, specifically for the alternative dispute resolution procedure that was previously based on regulation No. 27 of the universal service regulations but will now be in Part 4 of the Bill. These provisions will provide that extant decisions relating to ComReg's current alternative dispute resolution process continue as appropriate under the new regime and that disputes that are pending at the time of the new provisions coming into operation are preserved. To do this, amendments Nos. 17 and 18 will insert a new definition of "Universal Service Regulations" into the interpretations section relating to Part 4 of the Bill. Section 39, inserted by amendment No. 19, will ensure that a dispute that is before ComReg or an independent person nominated by ComReg under regulation No. 27 can continue as if those regulations had not been repealed.

While the Bill will make worthy amendments to the current regime, it is also important to provide explicit transitional provisions to address extant disputes that are currently with ComReg, or an independent person, for resolution under that regulation to ensure no consumer's dispute inadvertently fell in the transition between the old dispute resolution regime and the new alternative dispute resolution regime established by the Bill.

A new section 40 inserted by amendment No. 20 will ensure that a measure enforced pursuant to regulation No. 27 can continue in force under Part 4. Under regulation No. 27, ComReg took a number of measures to better implement the regime, including specifying requirements concerning operators' codes of practice for complaint handling and specifying the procedures for dispute resolution, as any measure taken by ComReg requires consideration, consultation with stakeholders and finalisation. If these measures were allowed to lapse, it would take considerable time for replacement measures to be put in place. This would, in turn, delay the effectiveness of the regime for consumers. At present, without this transitional provision, there could be a potential query over whether these measures remain extant under the new regime established by the Bill after the universal service regulation has been repealed by the 2022 regulations.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 18:

In page 23, after line 35, to insert the following: “ “Universal Services Regulations” means the European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Universal Service and Users’ Rights) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 337 of 2011).”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 19:

In page 28, between lines 18 and 19, to insert the following:

“Application of Universal Service Regulations to certain disputes 39.Where on the coming into operation of this section, a dispute is before the Commission, or an independent person, for resolution in accordance with Regulation 27(4) of the Universal Service Regulations then, notwithstanding any repeal of the Universal Service Regulations, those Regulations shall continue to apply in respect of such a dispute.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 20:

In page 28, between lines 18 and 19, to insert the following:

“Continuation of measures under Universal Services Regulations 40.(1) Any measure that is in force under Regulation 27 of the Universal Services Regulations on the coming into operation of this section shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made under, and in accordance with, this Part.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), for the purposes of this section “measure” includes any decision, specification, requirement, direction, notification and notice, and any other act of an equivalent nature.”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The purpose of the deletions and amendments outlined in amendments Nos. 21 to 33 is to rectify an issue identified in the transitional provisions found in sections 99 to 102, inclusive, of the Bill. Sections 99 to 101, inclusive, will now be moved into the European Union electronic communications code regulations 2022. It is proposed that section 102 be retained in an amended form.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Will section 99 go through to a different Bill?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It will go through the secondary regulations. It will be done through the regulations.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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It will not be in primary legislation.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No, exactly.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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The section provides for notification given under section 17(1), or applications made under section 17(4), of the authorisation regulations, which notified undertakings that ComReg was suspending or withdrawing any rights of use for radio frequencies, or rights of use for numbers granted to the undertaking, and allowed ComReg to apply to the High Court for the payment of a financial penalty to continue as if those regulations remained extant and had not been repealed by section 99. As it is proposed to delete section 99 and move that section to the 2022 regulations, it is proposed to similarly delete this section and introduce an equivalent section into the 2022 regulations by way of amendment. Again, we are moving the section to secondary regulation.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Section 100 is obviously a sister section to section 99.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is related to that, yes.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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This section provides that where an application has been made to the High Court for the imposition of a financial sanction under regulation 37(4) of the framework regulations, regulation 19(4) of the access regulations, regulation 16(6) of the authorisation regulations or regulation 31(5) of the universal service regulations for a breach of those specific regulations by an undertaking, then those applications would continue as if those regulations had not been repealed under section 99. As it is proposed to delete section 99 and to instead repeal those specific regulations in the 2022 regulations, it is similarly proposed that it is more appropriate to move these provisions to the 2022 regulations by way of amendment.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendments Nos. 21 to 33, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 21:

In page 75, line 20, after “of” to insert “this section”.

We propose that this transitional provision be maintained in the Bill as it provides for an investigation that has commenced under the old regime. Where the undertaking has been given, there is an opportunity to state its views and remedy its non-compliance in accordance with the provisions of those specific regulations to be referred for adjudication under the Bill. These amendments are consequential to the deletion of sections 99 to 101.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 22:

In page 75, line 21, to delete “section 99(a),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 23:

In page 75, line 23, to delete “Framework Regulations” and substitute the following:

“European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Framework) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 333 of 2011)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 24:

In page 75, line 23, to delete “the Framework” and substitute “those”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 25:

In page 75, line 25, to delete “section 99(b),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 26:

In page 75, line 27, to delete “Access Regulations” and substitute the following:

“European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Access) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 334 of 2011)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 27:

In page 75, line 28, to delete “the Access” and substitute “those”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 28:

In page 75, line 29, to delete “section 99(c),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 29:

In page 75, line 31, to delete “Authorisation Regulations” and substitute the following:

“European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Authorisation) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 335 of 2011)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 30:

In page 75, lines 31 and 32, to delete “the Authorisation” and substitute “those”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 31:

In page 75, line 33, to delete “section 99(d),”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 32:

In page 75, line 35, to delete “Universal Service Regulations” and substitute the following:

“European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Universal Service and Users’ Rights) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 337 of 2011)”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 33:

In page 75, lines 35 and 36, to delete “the Universal Service” and substitute “those”.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 34:

In page 80, lines 38 and 39, to delete all words from and including “amended” in line 38, down to and including line 39 and substitute the following:

“amended—

(a) in subsection (1), by the substitution of “an offence under this Act or a related enactment that may be prosecuted summarily may only be prosecuted summarily” for “a summary offence under this Act or a related enactment may be prosecuted only”, and

(b) by the insertion of the following subsection after subsection (3):”.

The purpose of this amendment is to amend section 43 of the Communications Regulation Act 2002. That provides for ComReg's power to prosecute summary offences under the 2002 or related enactments.

The manner in which section 43 has been drafted created some ambiguity as to whether ComReg was empowered to prosecute offences summarily if those offences were capable of being prosecuted both summarily and on indictment. These offences are sometimes referred to as each-way offences.

It is our intention that ComReg should be able to summarily prosecute any offence capable of summary prosecution and the aim of the amendment is to put this beyond doubt. ComReg has the appropriate experience and expertise to carry out this role. The Director of Public Prosecutions will remain the sole entity capable of prosecuting offences on indictment.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendment No. 35 in the name of the Minister, a new section, cannot be moved. It requires an instruction to committee motion. Does the Minister of State wish to comment?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is consequential on the Digital Hub Development Agency, DHDA, amendment. In other words, it was amending the Title to take into account the DHDA amendment, which is not happening now.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I am correct that it relates to amendment No. 1?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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That is it.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I move amendment No. 36:

In page 7, line 10, after “services;” to insert the following: “to enable the Minister to take measures in respect of the supply of critical components by vendors considered high-risk in order to safeguard the security of supply of such components;”.

This is intended to amend the Title to take into account the amendment that brings in the high-risk vendor part to the legislation.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Does this in any way relate to ensuring that the Minister of State can get amendment No. 1 under Report Stage?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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No. This is simply a change to the Title to include reference to high-risk vendors so that the high-risk vendor section is taken.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Was it flagged on Second Stage that the Minister of State was bringing in the high-risk vendor?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It was.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Amendment No. 37 cannot be moved. It required an instruction to committee motion. Does the Minister of State wish to comment?

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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It is also to do with the Digital Hub Development Act 2003 and it is consequential on amendment No. 1.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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Before you conclude, Chairman-----

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I have concluded.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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To make explicit what I think was implicit in what I said, I will introduce amendments on Report Stage to remedy what I see as the problems in the Bill. I could not have introduced amendments to the Minister's amendments before seeing them. I would not accuse the Minister of State of trying to stymie that. That is not why it was late. It is important that it be possible to introduce amendments given the manner in which these were introduced.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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Deputy McNamara proposes to table amendments on Report Stage.

Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent)
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I will table amendments to sections 3 to 16, inclusive, which we discussed in detail and which I raised concerns about. The purpose of the amendments will be to address those concerns.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I ask the Minister of State to get us the information that we requested as quickly as possible to allow members due consideration.

Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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I thank the Chairman and Deputies McNamara and O'Rourke for their comments and for the stimulating discussion on Committee Stage. I look forward to Fourth Stage and the amendments that appear then.

Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael)
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I thank the Minister of State, Deputy Ossian Smyth, and his officials for attending and for engaging with the committee.