Michael McNamara (Clare, Independent) | Oireachtas source

-----for example, but I am very cognisant of the fact that this is taking place, and China is not in a position to provide enough components because of this dispute between China and America and access to semiconductors and such. Who would be in a position to give that information to the Minister of State other than An Garda Síochána? I find it difficult to know what information An Garda Síochána or, indeed, any part of our national security apparatus would have on the state of play of semiconductor manufacture in China or how much it is or is not suffering as a result of American measures. Surely, the only ones who could tell the Minister of State that would be the American security apparatus. Perhaps the Chinese might want to volunteer that they are actually suffering from this, although I doubt it. They might want to volunteer that information, however.

This whole idea that people will not have the definition and whether it endangers national security is not just about the information itself, but the source of that information. My concern is for the information the Minister of State might receive, although maybe not him personally because he might have a very critical mind. There is always the danger that successors will be less inquisitive and critical. The Minister of State might get lots of information from the American, Chinese, Russian or Israeli Embassies, for example, which might suggest that a vendor's components are sloppy or that a vendor will not be in a position to provide enough of them. The Minister of State might decide to label somebody a high-risk vendor on the basis of that information. The vendor then appeals that and goes to the High Court, where the Minister of State says he cannot give the vendor the information he received. That is not because of what that information is.

It is no particular threat to the security of this State what the state of play of the semi-conductor manufacturing sector in China is. Rather, a Minister will say that he or she cannot share the information because he or she got it from the British Embassy, the US Embassy or wherever as part of an exchange of information in which confidentiality was assured. The Minister could give the information to the judge but could not give it to the vendor. The idea is that we will differentiate between what is and is not national security, yet all of the information the Government is going to rely on is going to come from external sources. Let us be real, in that we do not have a sufficiently large international intelligence service. Most of the espionage networks operating in this country are not here because they are worried about what the Minister for Defence, Deputy Coveney, plans to do with the Army any time soon. They are here to figure out what companies are doing. A great deal of espionage is based around companies and competition, including competition between states. There is a distinct possibility that someone in the Minister of State's shoes could in future fall prey to that and make decisions that could not be challenged in an open court. It is unusual for High Court sittings to be held in private, although they are held in private in family law cases. For all of the flaws in the process, a case to convict someone of terrorist offences, even terrorist offences in the Middle East, is open and transparent.