Paudge Connolly (Cavan-Monaghan, Independent)
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Question 1366: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if his attention has been drawn to the recent findings in the UK Office for Nuclear Public Safety's report on the preparedness of a plant (details supplied) to cope with a major terrorist attack; and the inadequacy of the plant's security and emergency measures to deal with such an eventually as detailed in the report; if he proposes to convey concerns to the UK authorities in this regard; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1677/05]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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I assume the question relates to the final report of the security working group of the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. national stakeholder dialogue. This report was published in December 2004 and is available on the UK Environment Council website, www.the-environment-council.org.uk. While the Office of Civil Nuclear Security, the body specifically responsible for the security of civil nuclear sites in the UK, participated in the dialogue, that office reports separately on an annual basis to the Secretary of Trade and Industry in the UK. The most recent report of the office is available atwww.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/safety/dcns_report3.pdf and covers the period April 2003 to March 2004.

The stakeholder report represents a wide range of views including those who advocate the safe cessation of operations at Sellafield as well as those who support the continuation of nuclear activities. It was compiled for the national stakeholder dialogue to inform the decision-making process of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. regarding the improvement of its overall environmental performance. The report reached numerous conclusions across a range of topics and made recommendations. With regard to national resources to deal with a major emergency, it recommended that resources should be put into emergency planning and post incident response by the UK Government and the NDA.

The report is not focused on the threat to Ireland but many of the issues raised are relevant to Irish concerns. These issues are repeatedly raised at ministerial level and also at official level in meetings between officials of my Department and their UK counterparts. Security related issues formed part of the international legal proceedings brought by the Government against the UK in respect of the Sellafield MOX plant under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS.

In response to the security concerns raised by the Irish Government, the UK authorities have given assurances that they are satisfied that arrangements for ensuring security in the UK's civil nuclear industry are robust, that additional measures put in place since September 2001 to reinforce security are appropriate and that these security arrangements are subject to continual review. The UK has also indicated that the Royal Air Force maintains a high state of readiness in the air defence of the UK, including the defence of particularly sensitive targets and its state of readiness is kept under constant review.

The assurances and information on nuclear security issues from the UK authorities are received by the Irish Government in good faith. Ireland understands that sensitive security information must be guarded and that dissemination of such information must be contained in a highly secure manner. This point has been emphasised in exchanges with the UK. Discussions are ongoing to put in place an improved mechanism for security information exchange between the UK and Ireland. Any matters raised in this report which have relevance to the security and safety interests of Ireland in respect of Sellafield will be included in these discussions.

I was particularly pleased to sign, on behalf of Ireland, an agreement on notification and exchange of information arrangements regarding nuclear matters with the UK on 10 December 2004. Both Governments used this occasion to announce a package of measures designed to address a wide range of issues related to nuclear safety. The package includes, inter alia, the facilitating of visits to Sellafield by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and the Garda Síochána, provision of access for the Institute to the UK's radiation monitoring system and a series of initiatives to develop and improve existing co-operation arrangements between both Governments. These initiatives serve to ensure that the concerns of the Government in respect of Sellafield are conveyed to the UK and articulated at the highest levels. This, in turn, will ensure that effective procedures and systems are in place to address these concerns, assist the Irish authorities in assessing the risk posed by Sellafield to Ireland in an informed manner and facilitate continuing ongoing development of existing emergency plans for Ireland in accordance with international best practice.