Jerry Cowley (Mayo, Independent)
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I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this important matter on the Adjournment. I received representation from constituents in the Rossport area who are concerned about the onshore pipe bringing the gas from the Atlantic Ocean to a terminal which has yet to be constructed. These people are concerned about their health and safety. On their behalf, I am demanding more answers from Government as to whether it should take more steps to ensure the health and safety concerns of residents are adequately addressed. I do not believe that is the case at present.

Serious questions need to be answered before I am satisfied that residents are being taken seriously. When I sought answers from the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, I was told a quantified risk assessment had been carried out. I refer to the Andrew Johnson report of 28 March 2002. I was also informed that the Department had employed an independent UK consultant to examine the study and independently assess it. I was further informed the Department was happy with the situation. I met the Shell company today. I had been anxious that the company would meet with the residents of the area but because a judicial review is pending, Shell stated it was not in a position to meet them.

I tabled a parliamentary question to the Minister, Deputy Noel Dempsey, and I am less than happy with the reply I received. The reply states that a QRA was carried out but does not provide any details. It also made great play of the fact that nobody would be closer than 70 m to the pipeline, in other words that they would be safe in their homes. However, that begs the question of how safe would be a person working on his or her farm at a distance closer than 70 m to the pipeline, or a passer-by or car driver. The Minister stated the risk is very small but it is my contention that a risk exists.

Residents are also concerned about pressure in the pipes. The Minister stated the design is up to 345 bar and that the pressure in the pipeline would be initially 150 bar, reducing over the life of the gas field to less than that. However, that is cold comfort to the local people who are concerned about pressure in the pipeline.

The Andrew Johnson report gives rise to questions. I have serious doubts that this is a QRA because it refers to recommendations that should be included in a QRA and identifies shortcomings that still need to be addressed such as an adequate leakage system. To date no information has come forward relating to a leakage detection system which would be essential. All design recommendations must be included, and if they are not included, which according to the report is the case, then safety cannot be guaranteed.

The report is quite confusing. It refers to a separate QRA which implies that the report in question is not a QRA. The report states that the risk is acceptable provided that certain design recommendations are implemented, but page 19 of the report states that the majority of the design recommendations have been incorporated which implies that some recommendations have not been incorporated. How can this be taken as a complete resolution of the matter? The Government has not addressed the issue properly. Local people deserve to have their fears properly allayed. I question if a QRA has been carried out. I do not accept that the Andrew Johnson report is a QRA. I hope the Minister will answer this question for me.

Conor Lenihan (Dublin South West, Fianna Fail)
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I am addressing this matter this evening on behalf of my colleague, the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Deputy Noel Dempsey. On the question of the quantified risk assessment referred to by the Minister in a reply to a parliamentary question raised by Deputy Cowley and answered on 9 February last, the assessment to which he was referring was not the Johnson report which the Deputy understood it to be. It was a quantified risk assessment report commissioned by the then developers in 2001, namely, Enterprise Energy Ireland Limited, on the onshore pipeline.

A risk is an expression which combines the probability of an event and the consequences of that event. The qualified risk assessment looks at the specifics of the pipeline and of the area the pipeline goes through using statistical data to determine the risks associated with failure. The quantified risk assessment addresses the risks present during the operational phase of the onshore section of the pipeline, that is, the section of the pipeline between the mean low water mark and the first isolation valve upstream of the pig trap in the onshore terminal.

As regards the Minister being satisfied that a quantified risk assessment has been carried out on the onshore sections of the Corrib gas pipeline, that is the case and a copy has been made available to the Department. The quantified risk assessment undertaken for the onshore section of the pipeline, which was intended to identify and assess all risks associated with the operation of the onshore section of the pipeline, included a detailed analysis of the risk of damage to the pipeline and consequences of any such damage.

The report makes recommendations for risk reduction where appropriate and will seek to demonstrate that the residual risks associated with the operation of the onshore pipeline have been reduced to tolerable levels. It showed that even in the worst case of the pipeline being ruptured and the gas being ignited, the occupants of a building 70 m away would be safe. The design of the pipeline means that the risk of such an event or any other type of gas escape is infinitesimally small.

Following receipt of the developers' pipeline consent to construct application, the Minister's predecessor commissioned a pipeline expert, Mr. Andrew Johnson, to carry out a further independent technical evaluation on the information supplied by the developers. Mr. Johnson's report suggested certain updating of the company's quantified risk assessment and the developers duly agreed to carry this out.

Mr. Johnson's report was entitled Report on the Evaluation of the On-shore Pipeline Design Code, and makes a number of recommendations for risk reduction where appropriate. Mr. Johnson's study addressed design, methodology, operating conditions, pipeline commission, public safety, welding and testing, pipeline material and quality and protection from interference. He stated that the onshore pipeline design code had been selected in accordance with best public safety considerations and is appropriate for the pipeline operating conditions.

He further advised that subject to the developer undertaking to comply with a number of conditions to be laid down in approvals and consents granted, the design is generally in accordance with best international industry practice and that the pipeline is considered to meet public safety requirements. In addition, Mr. Johnson recommended that the pipeline should be laid a minimum of 70 m away from houses and this was included as part of the conditions of the pipeline consent given.

Consent to construct gives the developers the assurance that the pipe can be designed and manufactured to the codes and standards agreed and for the specific route agreed. However, the subsequent installation and commissioning operation for the flow of first gas will be subject to separate approval by the Minister. This will ensure that specific installation operations will be subject to whatever logistical conditions are considered appropriate by the relevant regulatory bodies, in accordance with national and international statutory and other requirements and regulations. The operation of the lines will only be approved — consent for first gas — when the Minister has assurances that the lines, as constructed and installed, are fit for the purpose and have complied with the verification process included in the plan of development approval.

I hope this answers some of the issues raised by the Deputy.