Dáil debates

Tuesday, 17 February 2004

7:00 pm

Photo of Enda KennyEnda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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I move:

That Dáil Éireann, noting the Government's failure to:

—consult with, or seek the agreement of, the other parties in Dáil Éireann for the fundamental change in our electoral system involved in the extension of the use of electronic voting to all constituencies and electoral areas for the European and local elections;

—establish an independent electoral commission to oversee the implementation of electronic voting in a fair and transparent manner which has the trust of all political parties and the general public;

—include the provision of a voter-verified paper audit trail as part of the electronic voting process, in order to be able to confirm the accuracy required of the counting system;

—adequately address the technical concerns of experts raised in December 2003 in the Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government;

and bearing in mind the considerable legal uncertainty regarding the legislative basis for the implementation of electronic voting in the local and European elections in June of this year, calls on the Government to immediately defer plans for the use of electronic voting in the European and local elections and to suspend any further expenditure on, and preparations for, the introduction of electronic voting until an independent electoral commission has been established and has addressed the legitimate concerns of political parties and the public on this issue.

I wish to share my time with Deputies Rabbitte and Sargent.

Séamus Pattison (Carlow-Kilkenny, Labour)
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Is that agreed? Agreed.

Photo of Enda KennyEnda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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We are moving this motion collectively because of the urgency and gravity of the matter in hand. This is not a matter of mere technology. We are debating the quintessence of democracy — how we, as democrats, elect those who govern us. We are addressing the power, significance and value of the individual vote. We are examining a development that can affect the security and accuracy of the electoral process and possibly even the validity of elections and the legitimacy of the Government in this country. That is why we need an electoral commission to oversee the implementation of electronic voting in a fair and transparent manner which has the trust of the political parties and the public alike.

It would be fatally damaging to democracy if we introduced a system of voting whose configuration meant that the public could have neither ownership nor faith. At a time when a third of the citizens of this Republic claim to have no interest in politics, we should attempt to cultivate public confidence and participation in the political process instead of kill it. However, with its gung-ho attitude, the Government intends to carry on regardless. Owing to what we hope is merely political vanity, it is intent on railroading through a system of electronic voting about which many expert warnings have been and continue to be issued and about which serious political and public concerns have been raised.

There is the further matter of whether the introduction is constitutional. On 5 February 2004, the Tánaiste confirmed to this House that to implement electronic voting, legislative change would be required, and that the change would be by way of secondary legislation under section 48 of the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001. The advice which Fine Gael has had for many weeks is that the making of an order which amends primary legislation in a way as substantive as that suggested by the Tánaiste is unconstitutional. By making an order under section 48, the Minister would effectively assume the role of the Legislature, something that would be contrary to Article 15.2.1° of the Constitution, which states:

The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State.

Today the Government has announced that it is to introduce primary legislation to facilitate the application of electronic voting to all Dáil elections. That last-minute acknowledgement that new legislation is necessary simply highlights the incompetent way in which the entire process has been handled. However, this is about more than law. It concerns public trust, a precious commodity on which elections and Governments must be based. We have a coalition Government that treats the national Parliament as something between a tedious annoyance and a private political playground. We have an Administration that bought its re-election with the people's money and has commandeered the public finances as a private political electioneering fund. Today in the House we heard the Minister for Finance, Deputy McCreevy, say with equanimity that the timing of his decentralisation plans was driven solely by the political needs of his party.

Then there is the matter for the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Deputy Cullen. He is the person overseeing the introduction of electronic voting. He was forced to withdraw a public information document devised by a public relations company appointed by him and run by a former Fianna Fáil general secretary such was the poor and skewed quality of the information that it contained. The Minister, Deputy Cullen, just happens to be the Fianna Fáil director of elections. When it comes to elections, the same Government tells us that there is no problem, that it knows what it is doing, and that it is the Government and should be trusted. There are several political reasons trust and the Government are mutually exclusive.

When one examines the practicality of the system that it proposes to foist on the country, there are other reasons that we cannot have trust, not least that the electoral process in this country could become the property of a privileged technological elite. First, there is the matter of suppression. The Government deliberately suppressed the 2002 report by the experts, Zerflow Holdings, which showed that the machines to be used in e-voting are not tamper-proof.

That brings us to the second reason not to have trust — vulnerability. Apart from rigging and sabotage, there are such politically benign yet critical difficulties as computer failure. Computer systems fail regularly. However, under the proposed system, in the event of failure, there will be no paper trail and no secondary system to verify the voting and counting process. Numerous experts, all of them technocrats and all of them professional, have warned that more tests need to be carried out before implementing the widespread use of electronic voting. In 2002, even the Comptroller and Auditor General warned the Government in the strongest terms on what it was about to do. He issued his independent validation warning on the grounds that: "the integrity and security of the voting system is fundamental to the exercise of democracy".

The third reason is the matter of public ownership of the electoral system — actual and perceived. At present, the public has ownership of that process. When a person casts his or her vote or puts it in the ballot box, that person knows that he or she has voted and for whom and can leave the polling station secure in that knowledge. It is both accountable and verifiable at every stage. Now, however, the Government wants the public to have electoral faith in a system of voting which cannot be properly scrutinised because of commercial sensitivity. It is wrong that the electorate or those running for election should have to accept, on no basis other than good faith and blind trust, the technological code that enabled the electoral process to take place. That technological code is held as a proprietary secret by a private Dutch company rather than in the public domain. The wider community of computer experts must be able to examine the source code. An open source code held for the public in the public domain is required rather than an entity with commercial sensitivity attached. The people of this country are entitled to believe that their democracy is worth more than the competitive advantage or future profits of any private company.

We will have no paper trail. If one books one's holiday on-line and anything goes wrong, one will have a paper trail. If one takes cash from an ATM, one gets a receipt showing the transaction and how little one has left in one's account. If one pays for one's groceries in the supermarket, one gets a chit of paper indicating the transaction. However, if one casts one's vote into the black hole that is the Government's version of electronic voting, one simply hopes for the best. Under the Government's proposals, when one has pressed the button, whatever colour it is, one leaves the polling station without knowing what one has done. The machine does not tell one what one has done. One walks out of that polling station insecure in the knowledge that one's vote has been registered in the way that one cast it. If we do not have a system in this country in which the voting electorate can have trust and faith, we are not doing our business, and the Government is wrong on this.

The Labour Party, the Fine Gael Party and the Green Party, to mention but three, have, for what it is worth, majority support in public opinion polls, and the Government, in the words of Bobby Molloy when he spoke in the Seanad as Minister of State, should not attempt to introduce something such as this unless it has all-party and cross-party support. The Government's belated anxiety, conversion and ability to listen a little to people's concerns leave much to be desired.

If we do not have a verifiable paper system and a paper trail with which people can be happy, how can people have faith and trust in the election system? Every Deputy in the Chamber, with the exception of a few, has probably stood outside polling stations, large and small, in wet weather and in fine. When electors passed us on their way in and smiled benignly or otherwise, at least they cast their vote. When they passed us on their way out, they knew what they had done while we did not.

In the case of electronic voting one cannot spoil one's vote. If a person informs a presiding officer that he or she wants to vote and decides, on seeing the ballot on the machine, that he or she does not like any of the candidates, he or she will not be able to register that choice. In addition, when the presiding officer switches off the machine, he or she will know that the person in question has not voted, which infringes the secrecy of the ballot box. It is a person's right to have an opportunity to vote against all candidates or to vote for one or another of them. If there is no such scrutiny, how can we possibly maintain the legitimacy of elections, never mind justify the legitimacy of government and public confidence in it?

This system is at its most vulnerable at the point at which the programme reading units — PRUs — come into use. This occurs when the returning officer feeds all the disks into the central machine which then reads them for local and European elections. The system is technologically highly vulnerable at this point. Changes would not need to be made in every constituency as just a few alterations would result in matters going radically wrong.

The Government is proposing a fig leaf of an independent panel, while at the same time expressing its intention to press ahead with the full implementation of electronic voting in the local and European elections. If the Government was serious about the views of independent experts and the concerns of ordinary people and those who intend to vote, it would have produced a Green Paper and a White Paper and would now suspend its plans for electronic voting in June. Its belated amendment is an admission that it has failed to convince the political parties and the public that its chosen system of electronic voting can be relied on. Instead of facing up to its failure, it is trying to fudge its way out of the mess in which it has landed itself.

Last December, Margaret McGaley, a respected academic and authority on electronic voting told the Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government:

The introduction of electronic voting in Ireland, in its current form, threatens the integrity of our democracy. As demonstrated in the report before us, this is an issue that has been incompetently addressed by the Government. The cost of the development of a suitable system, and whether the potential advantages would justify that cost, remain undiscussed.

The Government will argue that the electronic voting machine will produce a paper trail, which is the case, but only on foot of a High Court petition. One can work this backwards. It is pointless having the machine produce 1,000 paper trails on foot of High Court petitions if the system has been tampered with or is not tamper proof in the first instance because it will produce the wrong kind of paper trail in all cases. At least with the current system, one can store the ballot boxes in a hayshed, whereas with the new system they must be stored in electronically controlled, humidified conditions. As well as the cost involved, the machines must be checked for security, public liability and much else on an ongoing basis.

The Taoiseach stated yesterday that he knows about software, this country knows about it as it is one of its leading producers and it is important that things are checked. It is a long time since the by-election when the late, lamented Willie O'Brien arrived at a school in north Mayo to find the presiding officer with his Wellingtons covered in whitewash, having painted the slogan "Vote Fianna Fáil" on the roof of the polling station. It is important that things are checked and are trusted.

If the Government tampers with the voting system without acquiring the trust of the political parties and the people, it will not be allowed to forget it. It would be political sacrilege to proceed and I urge the Ministers of State to carry the message to their senior Ministers that the proposals be deferred, expenditure on them cease, and an independent commission and a verifiable audit trail established. The technological questions which were asked should also be answered and we should have a full-scale discussion of the issue.

The Government must stop this nonsense and address the issue of sustaining the integrity of and the credibility in a system which has stood the country well, through thick and thin, tension and controversy and public debate. At least the current process was verifiable throughout, for good or ill; the Government's plan is not.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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I am glad Deputy Kenny tabled this motion, which my party is happy to support. It has already succeeded in flushing out the division and unease within and between the Government parties and has forced a climbdown by the Government. It is, however, only a partial climbdown when the critical issue of the verifiable vote audit trail remains unresolved. When I referred to my support for the motion, I must be honest and state that, if left to my own devices, I would probably go a good deal further than the motion proposes.

It is not fashionable to declare oneself hostile to any aspect of new technology but, at the risk of being unfashionable, I consider this project one of the greatest wastes of money this Government has undertaken, which is to say something. We are in the process of spending €40 million to fix something which is not broken, based on no demand for change, no evaluation of flaws within the current system and no indication that the current system has ever produced anything but fair results. We need to spend a considerable sum of money on encouraging people to vote in the numbers to which we were accustomed. We need to engage in educational programmes to re-instil the value of a vote in citizens who have become disillusioned and alienated from electoral politics.

All of this has come about without the House ever being permitted to focus on the issues thrown up by the electronic voting and counting system. Far more importantly, we need to fix politics. The deceit and broken promises that are the great legacy of this Government from the last election, coupled with the venality, corruption and fraud that have been the enduring legacy of some politicians, have done more than the voting system could ever do to alienate voters.

If we cannot take the steps necessary to restore trust in the political process, all the glossy high-tech machines and all the advertising campaigns in the world will not lure voters back into the polling booths. Instead of becoming serious about the need to restore trust, the Government decides to install a system of counting votes that people simply do not trust. It is hard to imagine a more hapless response to the increasing malaise in the practice of politics at every level.

The Government has now essentially admitted that its entire proposal is in a shambles. For weeks I have been asking the Taoiseach to set out the legal underpinning for electronic voting and counting. Every time I have asked the question I have received a different answer. He has written to me on occasion to say he was wrong. Statutory instruments were necessary, then they were not and then they were again. It has been a little like the Fianna Fáil Party version of Lanigan's Ball. Now at the last minute, the Government states that primary legislation is needed. One must wonder if it ever obtained legal advice on this matter before settling on the current legal fiasco.

What is the legislation for? According to the Government amendment, its purpose, among other matters, is to set up an independent body to oversee the system of electronic voting but not, critically, the electronic counting. The amendment carefully refers to electronic voting and counting in several places but omits any reference to counting where the remit of the so-called independent commissioner is concerned. One can only assume it remains the Government's intention that the Fianna Fáil Party's director of elections, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Deputy Cullen, will remain in charge of the counting.

Whatever reason we had to be suspicious before, we have twice the reason now. I said earlier that the Government had done only one thing but in fact it has done two. A substantial part of the €40 million will be spent on an advertising campaign run and co-ordinated by people who have been and remain very close to Fianna Fáil. That in itself raises serious issues of propriety. There is no proposal in the amendment that the independent commission will take responsibility for the advertising and public relations campaign now under way. It can be guaranteed that the vast bulk of that money will be well spent and the enormous fees invoiced and paid long before the independent commission is up and running.

If this matter were handled in this fashion by any other party in this House and if the crony contracts were disbursed in this fashion, Fianna Fáil in Opposition would create uproar. From what I have seen of the advertising campaign so far, it seems to rely on the basic assumption that all of us are technological illiterates who need to be reassured that the machines will not bite us when we enter the polling station. If we can flick on a light switch we will apparently find the machines user-friendly. I do not know how many times I have heard it said over the years that this is the most sophisticated electorate in the world. We are used to using a relatively complex system of single transferable voting to express often elaborate and far-reaching preferences. Our economy is sold all over the world as the one with the most highly educated and adaptable workforce, computer literate and skilled in every aspect of production but we have to be told in a campaign that will cost millions that we should not be afraid to touch a computer screen. In short, the public relations campaign on which the Government is content to spend all this money is an insult to the intelligence of the people.

If the so-called independent commission is established with enough independence to venture a recommendation — I do not know if Mr. P. J. Mara and others are available to serve — especially a recommendation that not enough has been done to generate public trust, what will the Government do then? By the time the commission is established, we will be a few weeks away from the local and European elections. How can any such body undertake the necessary task of restoring trust in a process that has been so damaged by the activities of the Government in so short a time? This is especially the case when the Government excludes from any consideration the possibility of ensuring that there is a paper trail, a proper basis on which dubious outcomes can be challenged. How can the commission function as anything other than a fig leaf for Government?

The Government's PR campaign is an insult to the intelligence of the people but there is a deeper insult. Last week the courts were left with no choice but to send a brain-damaged, deeply disturbed boy to jail, the worst possible environment for him, because we cannot afford the commitment of resources to build a better environment. Yet, without thinking twice about it, €40 million can be poured down the drain to put electronic voting in place.

Tonight the Minister will repeat the mantra that the Oireachtas decided to implement electronic voting. The Oireachtas decided no such thing. In 2001, this House discussed a Bill that would enable electronic voting to be introduced by ministerial order. The Labour Party and the other Opposition parties voted against the Bill, although it should be recorded that our focus was the spending limits in the same Bill. As so frequently happens, the House was not afforded time on Committee Stage to deal with the electronic voting enabling provision. However, as the Bill passed was an enabling one, no fair-minded person could conclude that it confers authority on the Government to put electronic voting in place without any further consultation. As Deputy Kenny has noted, only yesterday, the Taoiseach defended the Government's proposals on electronic voting and said that it must be all right as he stated, "After all, Ireland is one of the largest exporters of software in the world". The implication is, therefore, that this software must be a good thing.

Of all the defences of electronic voting I have heard, this was the most puzzling. There is no connection whatever between the subject of electronic voting and the export of software and what is more, despite being the largest exporter of software in the world, we are importing all the software necessary for this project. Not only are we importing it, but as I understand, the entire basis of the software will remain a commercial, proprietary secret.

Article 45 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 guarantees to every citizen the right and opportunity "to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors". The requirement that the elections be genuine means that the entire electoral process, as Deputy Kenny has said, should be open, transparent and trustworthy.

The declaration of the council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the criteria for free and fair elections, dated 26 March 1994, also states, "Furthermore, state authorities should ensure that the ballot is conducted so as to avoid fraud or other illegality, that the security and the integrity is maintained and that ballot counting is undertaken by trained personnel, subject to monitoring and-or impartial verification." It further states, "States should take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure the transparency of the entire electoral process including, for example, through the presence of party agents and duly accredited observers."

It is the Government's task to reassure the people that all these criteria are met under its proposed electronic voting system. The more it blusters, the more I am convinced that it has something to hide. Frankly, when it comes to counting the votes, I do not trust Fianna Fáil.

Photo of Michael RingMichael Ring (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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That is for sure.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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The Labour Party has studied the proposed electronic voting system in depth. We published a detailed report on the Government's proposed system last November. Since then a wide variety of technical experts have all expressed the same doubts about the system. Most of them have focused on the one salient fact on which the Government is silent in the amendment published today, namely, the fact that under the system proposed by the Government, the voter has no way of being certain that the vote which he or she casts is accurately recorded by the voting machine and that software is thereafter not over-ridden by a corruption of the count centre software. The voter is expected to have blind trust in the technology.

Who can have blind trust in this Government? It has broken every promise it made before the election. It has emasculated the freedom of information legislation; it has constantly sought to do away with spending limits in elections and the need to account for spending and it is seeking to put structures in place that will facilitate the politicisation and break-up of the Civil Service. The last thing this Government should be trusted with is counting votes. I commend the motion to the House.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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I thank Deputy Kenny for sharing Fine Gael time on this joint Opposition motion. It is constructive that the issue of electronic voting which applies to every voter regardless of political view be dealt with on a cross-party basis. The former Minister of State at the then Department of the Environment and Local Government, Mr. Bobby Molloy, made it clear in the Seanad that a consensus was required if this system of electronic voting was to be agreed upon and was to enjoy the confidence of the public.

There are a number of technical issues relating to the Nedap-Powervote system which has been imported by the Government. Many IT professionals in Ireland and abroad have expressed concern about the system. These issues can be discussed later but I believe it would be more productive for the House to focus on the single solution to many of the problems and which has been adopted recently by the State of California.

The Nedap-Powervote system as proposed does not provide verifiability as the voter has no way of knowing whether the machine has recorded the vote as the voter intended. This is an important point as the voter must have complete faith in the accuracy of the vote recording and counting. Voters must have no doubts about the system and they must know that the system is foolproof.

The system used in the United States of America is not the same as the proposed system, but the example of the American presidential election in 2000 provides a lesson in what can happen and what could be the remedy. The electronic voting system in Precinct 216 in Velusia County in Florida, recorded that Al Gore had received minus 16,022 votes. Some 412 of the 583 registered voters had cast their votes but the computer system was showing 2,813 votes for George W. Bush, minus 16,022 for Al Gore and an even bigger negative vote for the Green candidate, Ralph Nader. The system used in Precinct 216 is similar to the system we use for the national lottery. The canvassing board was able to use a manual record of the votes cast for the recount. Such a recount, based on an original record of the voter's intention, is not possible under the Nedap-Powervote system. The Nedap-Powervote manual recount procedures are based on what the computer has recorded as the voter's intention, which is not the same thing.

The secretary of state in California, Mr. Kevin Shelley, announced recently that from 1 July 2005 counties will be unable to purchase voting machines that do not produce a paper trail. From July 2006, all voting machines will have to offer a voter verifiable paper audit trail, regardless of when they were purchased. California, which all Members will agree is the home of high technology, has been using automated voting systems for many years. It is incumbent on us, surely, to learn from its experiences, to avoid making the mistakes made there and to use state-of-the-art technology from the outset. Such technology will not be used in full in California until July 2006.

I would like to quote from the relevant comments of Mr. Warren Slocum, the elections chief of San Mateo county, after Mr. Shelley's announcement was made. He said that "election integrity is absolutely a fundamental requirement of our democracy" and that the voter verifiable paper audit trail "is one step toward strengthening that and giving voters confidence that their vote was handled by the computer in the way they wanted it to be handled". In response to other state election officials who said that providing paper receipts would increase the county's costs, Mr. Slocum replied:

Democracy ain't cheap. It's true we have a fiscal crisis and it's going to cost money, but what is the cost of blowing an election? What's the cost to the community to have a candidate who believes they lost an election because they believe the computer didn't count the votes correctly?

I am sure the Minister is aware that we know of 400 instances of votes not being counted correctly by the electronic system used in certain places in the second referendum on the Nice treaty. The electoral authority personnel in California, which is the home of Silicon Valley, have years of practical experience of using voting machines. When such people tell us that the system has flaws and that a manual record verified by the voter is a necessity, we should listen closely to them.

I accept that some minor issues will need to be resolved if the system I propose is to work. The argument that voter privacy will be compromised is a red herring and a bogus excuse. The handling of manual votes will be as private and as secure as the existing manual system that has served us well for decades. Given that other jurisdictions have succeeded in implementing voter verified e-voting systems, it is a fudge to say that it cannot be done. To say that it will mean a loss of privacy is a red herring and to say that there is no need for it is plain arrogance. When one speaks about privacy, it is important to remember that the paper system was never private for blind people, who had to bring somebody with them to the polling station to vote on their behalf. Despite the improved technology being used in the proposed e-voting system, it will not provide any additional privacy for blind people.

Photo of Michael D HigginsMichael D Higgins (Galway West, Labour)
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Hear, hear.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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There will be no Braille and there is no proposal to make changes in that regard.

I would like to make some points about the technical issues. It has been mentioned that the Nedap-Powervote software is proprietary and that the source code is not available for public scrutiny. There is a possibility that there are flaws somewhere in the 200,000 lines of code, or that the code could be open to manipulation. These instances have occurred in the USA and came to light only when internal e-mails from within the software company were inadvertently made public.

A different approach has been taken in the Australian system, which was introduced in six months, rather than over four years. On a pro rata basis, it cost 10 million Australian dollars, rather than the €35 million we have spent here, a figure which increases to €40 million when one includes the cost of publicity contracts. The system designed in Australia two years ago addressed and eased most of the common concerns. Those running the Australian system chose to make their software completely open to public scrutiny. Although a private Australian company designed the system, it was based on specifications set by independent election officials, who posted the code on the Internet for all to see and evaluate. It was accomplished from concept to product in six months and it went through a trial run in a state election in 2001. The public was able to download the software and to proof it for problems, bugs or backdoors. A number of people found problems, including an academic at the Australian National University who found the most serious problem.

The Australian system is based on open source software, as opposed to the Nedap-Powervote system and the American system mentioned previously, both of which use Microsoft Access. I discussed this issue with an IT professional recently and I outlined the Nedap-Powervote system to him in layman's terms. When I told him that the system uses Microsoft Access he laughed and told me that I was wrong. He was adamant that nobody in their right mind would use Microsoft Access for such a critical application, but when I assured him that I was correct, his reply was unrepeatable. I understand that a number of people have made this point to the Department, although I expect that their point was more eloquently put. The IT professional told me that the EU is actively promoting the use of open source software for mission critical applications. It is the preferred development environment for governmental applications across the EU, primarily for reasons of cost, suitability and security. I suggest that we bear this in mind in Ireland if we have to go back to the drawing board on this project.

Like justice, the democratic and electoral processes must be conducted in public. Before the public can have confidence in the voting system, it is critical that the IT community has confidence in it. The Nedap-Powervote system relies on secret software, secret processes and a general lack of transparency. The history of such systems in other jurisdictions proves that it is not acceptable to proceed without a voter verifiable paper audit trail. We should learn from the experience of other people, by developing a state-of-the-art e-voting system. I would prefer if this could be done in Ireland, as we should try to keep jobs in Ireland. We should learn from the experience of other countries and thereby avoid the problems they had with their first generation systems. We should take the best-in-class systems from Australia and California and make our system the best in the world, based on their experience. We have spent a considerable sum of money on this project — many people would say that we have wasted it. We should ensure that we get it right first time.

The Minister for Finance will be familiar with the business magazine Fortune, which recently declared that paperless voting was the worst technology of 2003. It is important to stress that such a system is not used nationwide in any other European state, contrary to the claims of many people. When the Taoiseach offers an independent body, he is simply offering the equivalent of a cup of cocoa. When one compares his offer to the action taken in the US state of Maryland, where people were hired to see if they could break the e-voting system by hacking into it, it is by no means an assurance. People in this country need such reassurance, especially if the new system is to be spearheaded by Fianna Fáil. If the Government was convinced of the merits of its technology, there is no doubt that it would copy the Maryland example and provide for a voter verifiable audit trail, rather than trying to hide behind weak arguments that have no basis in science.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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I move amendment No. 1:

To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:

"— recalling the approval by the Oireachtas of the legislative provisions for electronic voting and counting set out in the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001;

— recognising the recent endorsement of the introduction of electronic voting and counting at the June 2004 polls by the Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government;

— noting that the electronic voting and counting system has been comprehensively tested and validated by a range of independent test institutes and companies;

— acknowledging the proven track record of the system throughout the Netherlands and in the German cities of Cologne and Dusseldorf,

— noting the more recent approval for the use of the system in France in a number of locations at the European Parliament elections in June;

— recognising the earlier successful use of the system in Ireland in three constituencies at the 2002 general election and in a further four constituencies at the Nice 2 referendum;

— bearing in mind the high level of customer satisfaction expressed by Irish voters with the new system in a survey carried out following the use of the system in the seven pilot constituencies;

— recalling the Government's open declaration in October 2002 of their intention to roll out electronic voting countrywide for the European and local elections in June 2004; and

— considering the deficiencies in the manual system with regard to spoilt votes, lengthy counts and recounts;

supports the continued preparations being made for the full implementation of electronic voting and counting to improve and modernise the electoral system in Ireland; and

notes the intention of the Government, out of respect for the significance of the electoral process, and for the avoidance of doubt, to introduce legislation providing for:

— the establishment of an independent panel to verify the secrecy and accuracy of arrangements proposed for electronic voting (this panel to be appointed in advance of the enactment of the legislation);

— the application by primary legislation of electronic voting to non-Dáil elections;

— more explicit arrangements regarding abstention from voting; and

— conditions under which tally data may be made available from the electronic counting system to interested parties."

I wish to share my time with Deputy Nolan.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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Is that agreed? Agreed.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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I am responding to this debate on behalf of my colleague, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Deputy Cullen. The Minister is abroad on EU Presidency duties at the conference of the parties to the biodiversity convention, but he has been in communication with the Cabinet about this debate.

Much has been written and said about electronic voting and counting in the last few weeks by politicians, computer experts, media commentators and opinion columnists. Comments have ranged from the well-informed and well-intentioned to the actively mischievous and misleading. Ill-informed comment is not unusual in public debate on reforms in this country. Certain Members on the other side of the House have jealously guarded their position at the forefront in this regard. Hardly a week goes by without them announcing loudly that they have discovered another dark conspiracy against the people. The leader of the Labour Party is normally the accepted champion in this field, but this debate has brought out the claims of a number of other Deputies. It is clear from this evening's contribution by Deputy Rabbitte that the Labour Party is not interested in seeking safeguards for electronic voting. The Labour Party's approach is that Fianna Fáil cannot be trusted. This is an insidious, unworthy, diabolical and appalling attempt to create doubt where there is no doubt.

Photo of Paul KehoePaul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)
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Diabolical?

Photo of Enda KennyEnda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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The Minister should ask the public.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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It is purely a cynical political exercise. The Labour Party used to be in favour of electronic voting, but now it continually raises doubts about it. This is not about security but is pure political point scoring and is damaging to the credibility of politics.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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That is no way for the Minister to refer to the Tánaiste.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Having heard the opening attacks of the Opposition, there is no doubt that the Fine Gael Party's motion has nothing to do with genuine concerns that our electoral system is in danger. The Opposition parties know that this system has already been used without complaint 70 million times. The Opposition knows that the system has been independently verified and that it will continue to be run by the same people who have always run it.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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As usual, half-truths.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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We cannot have interruptions this early in the Minister's contribution.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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He has not long to go anyway.

Dan Wallace (Cork North Central, Fianna Fail)
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The Deputies should leave off with the interruptions.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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This will be the most accurate and, therefore, the most democratic system we have ever had. However, the Opposition parties are committed to an era of total opposition in that everything the Government does is to be opposed in a shrill and hysterical way. Tonight, the Opposition parties have united in support of the Fine Gael Party's motion in yet another example of their united cynicism and opportunism.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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Fianna Fáil knows all about that.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The Opposition is correct that changes in the electoral system are best when they are based on political consensus. However, it has demonstrated how it will withdraw that consensus for short-term tactical advantage. This was not always the case.

When the Dáil first passed the enabling legislation for this improved system, many Opposition Deputies said that the Government was not going far enough in that a move to Internet voting should be examined too. In the midst of this diversionary fog thrown up by the Opposition, some basic points must be made clear. The introduction of the system has not been rushed. Instead, it has taken place in easy steps over a number of years. The system has been independently verified as safe and reliable.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Not true.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The system has proven its reliability when used 70 million times internationally and 400,000 times in this country.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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How does the Minister know?

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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The Minister without interruption.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The system will be the most accurate and, therefore, the most democratic we have ever had.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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How does the Minister know?

Photo of Enda KennyEnda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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I have never heard such mush.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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I ask the Deputies to allow the Minister to speak without interruption.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The electronic voting and counting project is not about change for the sake of change or technology for the sake of technology. Its fundamental purpose is to improve the efficiency, speed, accuracy and user-friendliness of elections and to eliminate the democratic wastage associated with spoilt votes. There were more than 20,000 in the 2002 general election, equivalent to 1.1% of all votes. It is more than just improving the technology. By modernising and transforming elections in a visible way, it creates the opportunity for tackling voter apathy and improving the image of elections, especially for an increasingly younger electorate.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Next, they will be giving out lollipops at elections.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Many of us may reminisce nostalgically about sealing wax, twine and stubby pencils, three million ballot papers and the long counts we have all had to endure.

Photo of Enda KennyEnda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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Yes, and outside the polling station with the whitewash brushes.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Is any Member suggesting that we should not critically examine how elections in the 21st century are managed? Is any Member suggesting that, now when Government and citizen interface electronically in so many ways, voting and vote counting should remain immune from such interaction?

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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Trying to improve it?

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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That is not the argument.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Electronic voting will deliver to voters and political practitioners a higher level of service and a high class, modernised voting and counting system. The Government believes that, subject to rigorous testing and due diligence, these benefits should be delivered as quickly as possible to the people. This progress should not be delayed to the public and certainly not on account of conspiracy theories or ideological opposition to electronic voting.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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That is no way for the Minister to refer to the Tánaiste.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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For the first time in our history, three million electors will have the opportunity of voting on electronic voting machines. Upwards of 15,000 election staff will manage the elections electronically from election set-up, to voting and to vote counting. The arrangements for the these polls have been subject to intense parliamentary, media and public scrutiny.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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There is no paper trail.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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This system is secure, reliable and can be trusted by the people. It has been in use for over ten years in the Netherlands, for some years in a number of German cities, in pilot polls in the UK and at two polls in this country. It has also been approved for use in a number of constituencies in France in the forthcoming European Parliament elections. The governments, opposition parties and peoples of these countries do not operate an electoral system which is insecure or unreliable.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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How does the Minister know?

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Their democracies are not damaged or diminished in any way because of the use of electronic voting and counting. What is so peculiar to this country that a similar system cannot operate satisfactorily here?

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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They do not have Fianna Fáil.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Unfortunately, the political Opposition in this country is more willing to indulge in wild conspiracies and the tactics of total opposition. We have heard much from the Opposition about trustworthiness and the need for security, but we have not been given a full and balanced picture.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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What about the Tánaiste's comments?

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The voting machine hardware and software have been rigorously tested on two separate occasions. The first time was before the pilot use of the system in 2002 while the second was last year, following some modifications to the voting machine to make it easier for voters to use and the addition of extra security features. The German science and technology institute, Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt, has specifically stated in its report that the software accurately records the votes cast. Would that institute certify, in writing, the adequacy of the software, if it was not satisfied with its structure and accuracy?

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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How does it know this?

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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Allow the Minister to speak without interruption.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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I demand that the Minister gives way.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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Does the Minister want to give way?

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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No.

(Interruptions).

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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The Minister has only come to read a speech. It is all blather.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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He needs to be verified too.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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There is a time limit on the debate. Deputies will allow the Minister to continue.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Other tests on the voting machine hardware have been run by the Dutch electronic products and services company, TNO and KEMA Quality B.V. accredited by the Dutch Council for Accreditation. These companies have examined and certified the physical voting machine components and also subjected the voting machine and the supporting equipment to compliance tests in line with international standards and best practice for a range of environmental conditions, such as temperature, humidity, power supply voltage interruptions, electromagnetic compatibility, insulation, energy consumption and transportation.

Photo of Pat RabbittePat Rabbitte (Dublin South West, Labour)
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He might as well be talking about headage payments.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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With regard to the election management software an independent Irish software firm, Nathean Technologies, has undertaken a comprehensive architectural code review of the election software. It has concluded that the code does not contain elements which can corrupt the correct running of the software. As a further precaution, all the computers to be used in the election will be stand-alone machines and, therefore, will not be accessible by the Internet or networks.

The computers will be "hardened" to remove or deactivate any software that is superfluous to the running of the election and will only be accessed and activated by use of a security smart card, held by the returning officer, and an individual PIN number. In addition, the Electoral Reform Services in the UK has tested the PR single transferable vote count rules against its database of more than 400 STV elections to ensure that the rules have been precisely applied.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Yet the UK has refused to introduce the system.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Regarding the security of the voting machines and the protocols surrounding the election, the Department has introduced rigorous procedures for secure storage and maintenance throughout polling.

On foot of a comprehensive security assessment, which was undertaken on behalf of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government by Zerflow Information Security, several additional measures were introduced following the initial pilot elections to address any concerns regarding access to the system. Seals will be placed over the ballot modules in the voting machines and the ballot papers will be locked in the display with access only by the returning officer. Once the voting machines are formally tested to ensure that the correct data has been loaded onto it and that all the buttons work, the voting machine will be sealed to ensure that no unauthorised access is permitted. Following these improvements, Zerflow has confirmed that its concerns have all been satisfactorily addressed. The Opposition loves to quote the first Zerflow report, but lacks the good grace to acknowledge that these concerns have been addressed.

In addition to the six independent companies which carried out the broad range of tests on the voting hardware and software and all security procedures and aspects of the system, the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is working closely with returning officers to ensure stringent security and procedural safeguards.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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The Minister has said nothing about the counting software.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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While our present system has worked well, one does not hear the same alarm stories about the security of the paper ballot and the possibilities that exist to interfere with such a box. It would be much easier for votes to be compromised or lost with a paper ballot. The electronic system has proved to be totally dependable through its record over the years in other countries and in our pilot polls. That is the acid test: successful use at a real election.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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We do not know that.

Photo of David StantonDavid Stanton (Cork East, Fine Gael)
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How do we know?

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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It is a fundamentally false premise of the Opposition and other critics that we are somehow losing a perfect system. Anyone who attends counts knows that this is not the case. By far the most important part of this is that thousands of people go to the polls and cast a ballot which they think is valid but which is ruled out because of an inadvertent error.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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The Minister should not be hard on himself.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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This is not some hypothetical possibility, it is what happens every time we use the traditional system which almost certainly impacts on the results of elections. In the last local elections 24,000 people had their votes disallowed, overwhelmingly because of inadvertent errors such as indistinct numerals or a failure to properly stamp the ballot. Meanwhile 40 councillors were returned by less than 50 votes. In the Borris-in-Ossory area there was a tie for the final seat but at the same time ballots had been ruled out because of simple human errors. On the same day, over 45,000 votes were ruled out in the European elections, mainly because voters had mistakenly continued numbering between the different ballot papers. Anyone who has been at a close recount has seen ballots held up to the light to check if the perforation has gone through. In the 21st century. there must be a better way of doing things.

Photo of Trevor SargentTrevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)
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There is.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Of course there is. That is stating the obvious.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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If there is a proven case available to us which will end this flaw in our democratic system, adopting it is not an option, it is essential for all true democrats. Every vote should be accurately counted and every mandate should reflect the exact intent of those who have taken the time to participate. This is exactly what the new system will achieve. By the way, the manner in which we transfer surpluses to subsequent counts is not correct and does not give a true reflection of the vote but the computer system will do that.

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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It will not.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Yes it will.

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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It will not. It is replicating the random system. The Minister is wrong.

Photo of Rory O'HanlonRory O'Hanlon (Cavan-Monaghan, Ceann Comhairle)
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Please allow the Minister to speak without interruption. There is no provision for an interruption at this stage. The Deputy will have an opportunity to contribute when he will be able to make his point.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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At the last election when only a certain number of constituencies used this system and the others used the traditional system that was how it worked. Under the new system, however, it will be possible for the ballot to be counted throughout the country in the same way and the correct way.

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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It will not.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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Returning officers will apply rigid access security procedures at all stages of the election so that only authorised staff will have access to the stand-alone voting machines and the PCs used at the election. Some security concerns have been raised about the use of PCs. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has had the arrangements for the PCs checked with experts from two leading companies in the PC and software industry and they expressed satisfaction with arrangements. The new election-specific PCs to be supplied to returning officers will have been specially security hardened with only the software necessary for the election loaded on them. This means that it will not be possible to load other software on the PCs during the election period. Only staff authorised by the returning officer will have access to a PC and there will be specific security access procedures to log in to the PCs. The PCs will also be under the control and direction of the returning officers at all times. Neither the voting machines nor PCs will be linked to any network, internally or externally, so that hacking and virus attack will not be possible.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Like the Dáil system

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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I wish to deal specifically with the two issues raised by some opponents of the system. The first issue is that of adding on a voter verifiable paper audit trail, or VVPAT. I have observed an increasing chorus for what has become a media catchword but I wonder do its proponents understand the system we are using or are they just accepting, uncritically, the information made available by some individuals? The proponents of a VVPAT come mostly from the US and their concerns arise in the context of the voting machines used in that country. However, it is important to understand that there are many different types of voting machines in use in the US, some good, some not so good. The Nedap machine is not of the same type as those in the US. We need to be realistic and compare like with like. People should not accept everything that is put before them on this issue without regard to the facts.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Hear, hear. We should not.

8:00 pm

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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We should be guided by the voting machine's past use and reliability both here and in other countries and its testing by internationally accredited testing agencies. The following matters are relevant: the US voting machines in question are generally PC-based; the Nedap voting machine is a proprietary product manufactured specifically for voting. Our counting system alone will be PC-based. The Nedap machine has been used for many years in other countries without any uncertainty as to its reliability. The machine, including software for storing votes, has been tested and certified as accurately storing votes as cast by the voter. The ballot paper is visible on the voting machine screen. The voter sees the preference number beside the candidate's details and the preference details are visible on the bottom line of the voting machine display screen as the voter records preferences on the machine. Details are confirmed or may be amended before the "Cast Vote" button is pressed. Printers are unreliable, especially in a high volume situation. Must voting be suspended if a printer breaks down during polling day? If some of the voters do not have a paper copy the rechecking objective is negated.

In California a task force which considered this matter and included representatives of the electronic industry and election officials could not reach a consensus on the use of a VVPAT and highlighted technical problems with the use of printers as a major obstacle. The control unit operator can confirm that a vote is stored and the number of votes stored can be checked on the control unit screen. Ballot papers printed at the time of voting and used in a manual count later would not give the same precise result as the electronic count due to the "mixing" of ballot papers. This would negate one of the main reasons for a VVPAT, a point acknowledged by the Labour Party in its report on electronic voting. While there has been much debate about the use of VVPAT in the US, no such system is in use. This is certainly true of California where the debate has been hottest.

There is a formal legal audit trail if such is needed. If there is an election petition the High Court, or the Circuit Court in the case of a local election, can require the system to print a ballot paper for each vote cast, after the mixing of the ballot, thus enabling a manual count to be conducted. It is reasonable to rely on the proven record of the system in other countries and the certification by international testing institutes, rather than over-reacting to some doubts raised about entirely different types of PC-based voting machines used in the US. Trying to compare the two systems is like comparing apples and oranges but this is exactly what the Opposition is asking us to do.

The Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has indicated that he will review the question of making the source code available to the public, having regard to the security of the system and secrecy of the ballot. Very few countries make election source code publicly available because of security concerns. We have adopted a sensible and phased approach to introducing electronic voting. The proposal has been in the public domain since 1999 so we can hardly be accused of rushing it. We have successfully piloted the system at real polls. It is now time to move on having secured a trustworthy system and validated and verified its ability to store and count votes securely. In rolling it out the approach was to use an electronic voting system of proven and robust performance. We have procured a system that comes with its own proprietary hardware and software and enjoyed the proven advantage of wide-scale and successful use in other democracies. Its use in some of the most sophisticated societies in the world is the most worthwhile possible test of reliability.

In introducing electronic voting, the Government is conscious of the need to make continuous service improvements to the operation of the system. For example, since the successful pilots we have increased the visibility and legibility of the voting machines. Similarly, where other issues arise which may cause concern the Government is happy to deal with these as far as possible. The Government accepts the need to ensure that there is utmost confidence in our electoral systems. Therefore, in response to the concerns raised, on the proposal of my colleague, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, the Government has decided to establish an independent panel to verify the secrecy and accuracy of the arrangements proposed for electronic voting. This panel will be established on a statutory basis but it is proposed to appoint on a non-statutory basis in advance of the necessary legislation.

Questions have been raised about the validity of using an order under the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001 to apply electronic voting for local and European elections. A reading of Part 3 of the Act clearly shows that it was the intention of the Oireachtas to provide for the application of electronic voting to other than Dáil elections. Part 3 has already been used without challenge to provide for electronic voting in the second Nice treaty referendum. In addition, in drafting the legislation, the Government was conscious of previous court rulings on the use of secondary legislation. However, as promised, the Government has further consulted the Attorney General on the matter and has decided to introduce primary legislation to eliminate any legal doubts regarding the application of electronic voting in the forthcoming local and European elections. The legislation will be brought forward by my colleague, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, in the near future.

In bringing forward this legislation, the opportunity will also be taken to develop more explicit provisions regarding abstention from voting and to specify conditions under which tally data may be made available from the electronic counting system to interested parties. These last provisions will further enhance the transparency of the system and build confidence in it. It could, for example, allow a specific percentage of votes from any given unit, for example, the electoral area or polling station. It would also be proposed to retain an overriding discretion for the presiding officer to prohibit the disclosure of votes in a given unit where there would be a risk that individual voters could be identified.

The move to electronic voting and counting demonstrates a progressive and modern Ireland. Increasingly, people use electronic means for conducting their lives and electronic interfaces between Government and citizen are becoming more commonplace. Change is part of the human condition and change in the way we vote is an inevitable part of our ever-changing world. The majority of people understand and react well to change. In a different context, the smooth introduction of the euro is a recent positive experience. Those voters who have had an electronic voting experience in Ireland have had a good one and I am confident that voters in the European and local elections will do likewise on 11 June next.

Photo of Bernard AllenBernard Allen (Cork North Central, Fine Gael)
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Consumers were also ripped off then.

Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)
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The new system will ensure that the elections this June are the most accurate and, therefore, the most democratic in our history. That is something all true democrats should welcome rather than try to undermine.

Photo of M J NolanM J Nolan (Carlow-Kilkenny, Fianna Fail)
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Members on all sides of the House welcomed the introduction of the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001, the provisions of which allowed for the introduction of electronic voting. However, there has been a sea change in the past few weeks with the main Opposition parties now casting some doubts on the safety and security of electronic voting.

The fundamental purpose of this proposal is to improve the efficiency, speed, accuracy and user-friendliness of elections and to eliminate the waste associated with spoiled votes. It is not just about improving technology. By modernising and transforming elections in a visible way, the opportunity is created to tackle voter apathy and to improve the image of elections, particularly among young voters who are staying away in droves from casting their votes.

In introducing electronic voting, the Government has brought in a system of proven performance. The system chosen has enjoyed the advantage of widescale and successful use at national and local elections in the Netherlands over many years. It was more recently employed in some German municipal elections and it is now being introduced in France. Surely if some of the most sophisticated societies in the world have confidence in this system, there is no reason we should not be confident to use it here.

I am sure you, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle, remember what happened in our constituency not too long ago when a complete ballot box was mislaid. Only for the fact that it was the third day of a recount, who knows if that box would have come to the notice of the public and, more importantly, the candidates. If we were proposing to change from electronic to manual voting, I can imagine the outcry from certain quarters. They would be talking about the volumes of paper which would have to be counted and transferred overnight from various locations and about the safety and integrity of counters in the counting halls and centres. The Government's proposal is correct and timely.

The new voting system was extensively piloted at the 2002 general election and in the last Nice treaty referendum. The reaction of users has been overwhelmingly positive. No significant complaints were made about it by the candidates or by those using it. All best technologies embrace the principle of continuous improvement. The Government is committed to the continuous improvement of the electronic voting system. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the Government are working on changes to the presentation of results. Some improvements are necessary in that area, given what we saw at the last general election. The Government has modified the voting machines to make them more user-friendly and accessible. It has also subjected and continues to subject the system's software and hardware to rigorous testing by a range of independent agencies.

I welcome the Government's initiative today to establish an independent panel to verify the secrecy and accuracy of the arrangements proposed for electronic voting. The Government completely understands and agrees with the need to ensure the utmost confidence in our electoral system. I hope the Opposition recognises that by doing that, the Government is going some way towards addressing many of the concerns raised by those people who expressed reservations about electronic voting. However, the approach seems to be one of political point-scoring and of deliberately undermining the widespread public acceptance which electronic voting has built up in seven constituencies where it has been piloted. Some doubts were expressed about the adoption of primary legislation by ministerial order. I, therefore, welcome the fact that the Government is introducing legislation to eliminate legal doubts about the application of electronic voting in the forthcoming local and European elections.

We cannot forget the considerable imperfections of the old ballot paper system, which typically wasted more than 1% of votes cast through spoiled votes. The feelings of assurance and validation, which some claim for the paper ballot process, were not, at least for some voters, justifiable. The manual count was also subject to errors and risks. Many colleagues in all parties in this House had to suffer long, nail-biting counts for results which often hinged on a small number of spoiled votes. I am sure many of us will be glad to see the end of those days. For those reasons, I am confident the electronic system will prove an easier, quicker and more accessible and accurate voting system for the people. I support the Government's amendment.

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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I wish to share my time with Deputies Gay Mitchell and Coveney.

Séamus Pattison (Carlow-Kilkenny, Labour)
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Is that agreed? Agreed.

Photo of Eamon GilmoreEamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)
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The Government's amendment invites us to recall the approval by the Oireachtas of the legislative provisions for electronic voting and counting set out in the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001. I accept that invitation and recall what happened in 2001 because since this debate went into the public domain the Government has been spinning a line to the effect that all this was agreed. It wants to know what the Opposition is complaining about because it agreed to it. It was repeated again in the speech by the Minister for Finance this evening that the opposition to electronic voting is politically motivated.

I want to demonstrate that we did not agree to it in 2001 and we do not agree to it now. The Second Stage debate on the Bill, which contained a number of other provisions, including the raising of spending limits by Fianna Fáil for the last election, began in the House on 22 June 2001. The Labour Party and the other Opposition parties which tabled this motion tonight opposed that Bill on Second Stage. In the course of my contribution, I stated: "The proposal for electronic voting in the Bill is a sham." I later stated: "It appears the process of voting will be more complicated and, ultimately, it will be open to error." All the Opposition parties voted against the Second Stage of that Bill on 26 June 2001. The Bill commenced Committee Stage on 28 June. It was a limited Committee Stage debate as the Government guillotined proceedings. Nevertheless, for a limited period we discussed electronic voting. Again we opposed the sections of the Bill proposing the introduction of electronic voting. During that debate I stated:

The introduction of electronic voting in the form proposed in this Bill is premature. We are creating a system which, with the best will in the world. will be open to error. It is not yet refined.

When the then Minister of State at the Department of the Environment and Local Government, former Deputy Molloy, told us that a Dutch and British company Nedap-Powervote had already been chosen the previous December to deliver an electronic system for Ireland, I went on to state:

I am greatly alarmed by the Government's identification of a supplier of equipment for electronic voting before the legislation permitting electronic voting has been enacted by the Oireachtas. Have any contractual arrangements been entered into or any costs incurred? If so, on what authority was this done as no legislation allowing electronic voting has been passed?

In conclusion I proposed that "no equipment should be approved until a full technical description of that equipment, and all information relating to it and to independent testing, is laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and a resolution approving the order is passed." It seems that in principle we are going ahead with electronic voting and the Minister kindly outlined the different phases and stages proposed. It should be applied only with the approval of the Houses of the Oireachtas. The introduction of this in individual constituencies or generally should not be left to ministerial order. We are talking here about major changes in the practice of voting and the Houses of the Oireachtas should give the approval.

When the Bill reached Report Stage on 5 July 2001, the Opposition voted against it on three occasions. We voted against a Government proposal to guillotine the debate. I proposed a motion that the entire Bill be recommitted to Committee because inadequate time had been provided for examining its details. Again the Government voted that down. Finally at 6 o'clock that evening we voted against the passage of the Bill.

It is difficult to regard that as having given some kind of tacit approval to the introduction of the primary legislation for electronic voting. However, we agreed that trials could take place in a number of constituencies in the general election and subsequently in the second referendum on the Nice treaty. However, when concerns began to be raised particularly by IT experts, we again raised the matter in the House. On 17 June 2003, I raised with the Minister of State, Deputy Gallagher, the study conducted in NUI Maynooth by Margaret McGaley and others. I asked him about the implications of that study for electronic voting. In the course of my contribution I asked the Minister:

How can he say to these people [those whose children have disabilities] that there is no funding for these services, yet the Government is prepared to spend €45 million on a system of electronic voting which has been established as being unsafe, insecure, with no traceability, no transparency and which frankly is unnecessary?

Following that the Labour Party published a report produced for us by a number of IT experts in which we identified a number of serious concerns with electronic voting, in particular the absence of a paper trail that could be audited. We stated that while individual components had been tested, the entire system had not been tested end to end. We made the case for the introduction of electronic voting to be given to an independent body and we suggested the Public Offices Commission might be the appropriate body.

I joined Deputy Allen in having the matter examined by the Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government. However the Government amendment to tonight's motion calls on us to recognise "the recent endorsement of the introduction of electronic voting and counting at the June 2004 polls by the Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government". I will relate what happened at that committee meeting.

A number of experts, Joe McCarthy, Margaret McGaley, Shane Hogan and Robert Cochran, gave evidence before the committee, in which they raised serious questions about the operation of electronic voting. That committee did not get time to fully examine and tease out those questions because the Government members of the committee proposed a motion, which effectively shut down the discussion and debate. Amazingly, two days later the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government signed its contract with the companies providing the equipment.

In the Government amendment, we are asked to recall "the Government's open declaration in October 2002 of their intention to roll out electronic voting countrywide for the European and local elections in June 2004". Governing by declaration is what dictators do. Governing by consensus, seeking agreement and approval in a parliamentary assembly is what one expects in a democracy. While the Government may indeed have declared its intention in 2002 to use electronic voting in the local and European elections, it never got approval from this House for it. At the very least it was required to put regulations before the House for its approval. That was not done. The Government now accepts and acknowledges that it is required to put not only regulations before the House, but also primary legislation. That has not yet been done. On what basis has the Government proceeded to spend more than €40 million of taxpayers' money on a system for the introduction of which it had no approval from this House?

The Government first committed itself to the companies to provide this system in September 2000 before the legislation enabling the introduction of electronic voting was even published, much less debated in the House or given approval. The Government has spent €40 million of taxpayers' money illegally and it is a subject to which this House will have to return at a later stage.

It is now proposed to establish what is called "an independent panel" to verify the secrecy, etc. of the voting system. That is not an adequate response to what we seek. It does not deal with the critical issue of the establishment of a paper trail to give confidence to the individual voter that his or her voting intention in the election is accurately recorded in the system. It does not address the question of the use of this electronic system in the forthcoming local and European elections. If we are now in an area of doubt legally, financially and technically over the system, it is prudent that this system not be used universally in the European and local elections in June. While there may be a case for some kind of extended trial, it should certainly not be used in this way.

We are in this situation because the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and his Government colleagues would not listen to what the Opposition has been saying over the past three years and, specifically, would not listen to the valid and serious criticisms raised about this system by IT experts in recent months. Even at this late stage the Government should think again, put off the universal extension of this in June and introduce the paper trail we seek.

Gay Mitchell (Dublin South Central, Fine Gael)
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This legislation is the product of the insolence of office. The Dáil has become a rubber stamp and now the Government, which has been in office far too long, expects the people to become a rubber stamp. I am disturbed to hear Government spokespersons and backbenchers talk about the Opposition raising issues about this matter. What do they think our job is if it is not to raise issues? This is probably one of the most important pieces of legislation to come before this House in my time as a Member. It is extremely important legislation. If former Deputy Des O'Malley were in the House, he would stand by the Republic in decrying how this legislation has been rammed through this House.

A Green Paper should have been published setting out the alternatives available followed by a White Paper after a consultation process into which the public had an opportunity for input. At the very least, there should have been cross-party agreement in the House about the necessity of changing the way people register their votes. Is there anything more important in a democracy? Did people die in the GPO, giving their lives towards building up this democracy, so that some Minister could get together with a few people who told him this was a great idea and pass legislation binding the House by summoning a majority through the Whips? How is this an acceptable way of dealing with such important legislation?

The way in which we make legislation has changed. Either a few civil servants persuade the Minister or the Minister persuades his civil servants that legislation is required and the Minister brings an item to Cabinet. All he needs is for the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste to give it the nod; a majority will be mustered in the House to put it through. That is no way to behave in a parliamentary democracy even for a Bill dealing with traffic tickets, but for legislation as important as this it is a scandal of the highest order. Not only the Opposition should be speaking out about this. Government backbenchers would have more to say about this if they were worth their salt.

It is possible that this is the most secure system in the world, but it could also be a Trojan horse. I do not know. I do know, however, that I am a Member of Dáil Éireann, sent here by 115,000 people in the city of Dublin, and I am not happy or reassured about this legislation and nor are the people I represent. "Where is the fire?" they ask. They want to know what is the hurry with this legislation. If it works, why not do exactly as Deputy Gilmore said and try it in a few more constituencies and let people have their say? Why is there such a rush to bring this in? Who is demanding it? The answer is that nobody is demanding it. It is typical of the way this House is treated. It has become a rubber stamp for the Government.

Last summer I read a book called The Assassination of Robert Maxwell, written by two distinguished journalists, Martin Dillon and Gordon Thomas, the latter of whom has written extensively and authoritatively on issues concerning Ireland. The central thesis of the book is that Robert Maxwell was assassinated by Mossad. It contends that Mossad stole from the CIA a computer software system called Promis, which put a secret microchip into Chinese computers, enabling it to steal state secrets from China and Canada as well as from many business people. This is not in the slightest bit far-fetched; in fact, it has the ring of truth about it. I do not know much about computers. I do not need to, but I know much about people, this Republic and the values of democracy. I have the right to be convinced by anyone advocating such a dramatic change that there is a case for it. Nobody has convinced me in this instance.

Deputy Gilmore mentioned that the legislation was rammed through the committee, but it should never have been sent to the committee in the first place. Such an important Bill should have been dealt with on the floor of the House. This has implications for the way in which we sustain our democracy. It is not a far-fetched idea that somebody could in the future devise a microchip or an infra-red system, which could operate from a distance, to send our computer system into viral decline. All this might be completely wrong; it could be impossible to do any of this. Of the 166 Members of the House, however, only two or three are convinced that this is not possible. The rest, if they were telling the truth, would admit they did not really know but they obtained assurances from the Minister. If the Minister, in turn, was telling the truth he would say he did not really know, but he obtained assurances from a few so-called experts.

This is vitally important legislation. Bringing in amended legislation to take care of the views of the Opposition is not the way to deal with it. This legislation is so important that if the Government does not listen to the Opposition we should walk out in protest. I have been in this House for 23 years and nobody has ever heard me say this before. This legislation should not proceed until the genuine questions raised by the Opposition are addressed. It should be put on hold until there is real cross-party support and until people's fears and concerns about the implications of such a system for democracy, particularly in light of the absence of a paper trail, are addressed.

Photo of Simon CoveneySimon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael)
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This evening, for the first time, three Opposition parties have united on a Private Members' motion — three parties representing more than 40% of the electorate. We are not playing politics with this issue, as has been said by a number of Government Deputies. We have put down a motion to express our serious reservations about the proposed introduction of electronic voting and the approach the Minister has taken on this issue. We have done so because there is a genuine concern that mistakes are being made in the matter of a fundamental democratic procedure — voting. The right to cast one's vote in secrecy and to expect it to be registered and properly counted is fundamental to any democracy.

Why did the Government not approach the issue of electronic voting on an all-party basis? Do we have a Government that is so arrogant it thinks it is all-knowing? This is about fundamentally changing the way in which people vote. Should a Government be spending €40 million of taxpayers' money rushing in a new system against the wishes of Opposition spokespersons, who must sit there as they are told the system is foolproof? Are we as Opposition politicians supposed to sit on our hands and refrain from raising valid concerns about the system? Changing a voting system should not be a party political issue, but Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats have made it so. It should be decided on by the House collectively. Unfortunately, that has not happened.

Why has the Government waited until today to decide to establish an independent panel to verify the secrecy and accuracy of arrangements proposed for electronic voting? Surely this panel should have been set up before the money was committed and the system approved, and before a PR consultant was handed the contract for promoting and informing people about the system. The machines and the system have already been launched, but we are only now setting up an independent panel to verify accuracy. If ever there was a case of putting the cart before the horse, this was it. The Government knows this but it is too stubborn and arrogant to admit it and change tack. When is this independent panel supposed to report on the secrecy and accuracy of the system? How can the panel allay concerns about the much talked-about absence of a paper trail, should there be a problem that requires a recount?

Why have we not insisted on the introduction of a system that has a voter-verified paper audit trail? Why are we being asked to put all our trust in a system that cannot be checked and checked again, if necessary, with a physical paper trail? In various parts of the world there are models that use paper trails so that in the unlikely event — I accept it is extremely unlikely — of a problem arising, a proper back-up is available. No system is entirely flawless or entirely predictable. We were told that the electronic voting system in the House was flawless, but it got a virus which necessitated its being turned off for a number of weeks until it was fixed. What is the downside to a paper trail? I do not see one. We have been told by the makers of the machines we are planning to introduce that it is possible to introduce a paper trail alongside the voting system they have outlined. Why is the Government not insisting on that? I am not opposed to the introduction of electronic voting, nor in my view is the majority on this side of the House, although some Members have genuine reservations. However, we are opposed to the Government introducing a system that has been questioned by many and about which we have genuine concerns. If the Government is to bring forward an e-voting system, it should be done properly and the genuine concerns of Members should be allayed.

Debate adjourned.