Charlie McCreevy (Kildare North, Fianna Fail)

We should be guided by the voting machine's past use and reliability both here and in other countries and its testing by internationally accredited testing agencies. The following matters are relevant: the US voting machines in question are generally PC-based; the Nedap voting machine is a proprietary product manufactured specifically for voting. Our counting system alone will be PC-based. The Nedap machine has been used for many years in other countries without any uncertainty as to its reliability. The machine, including software for storing votes, has been tested and certified as accurately storing votes as cast by the voter. The ballot paper is visible on the voting machine screen. The voter sees the preference number beside the candidate's details and the preference details are visible on the bottom line of the voting machine display screen as the voter records preferences on the machine. Details are confirmed or may be amended before the "Cast Vote" button is pressed. Printers are unreliable, especially in a high volume situation. Must voting be suspended if a printer breaks down during polling day? If some of the voters do not have a paper copy the rechecking objective is negated.

In California a task force which considered this matter and included representatives of the electronic industry and election officials could not reach a consensus on the use of a VVPAT and highlighted technical problems with the use of printers as a major obstacle. The control unit operator can confirm that a vote is stored and the number of votes stored can be checked on the control unit screen. Ballot papers printed at the time of voting and used in a manual count later would not give the same precise result as the electronic count due to the "mixing" of ballot papers. This would negate one of the main reasons for a VVPAT, a point acknowledged by the Labour Party in its report on electronic voting. While there has been much debate about the use of VVPAT in the US, no such system is in use. This is certainly true of California where the debate has been hottest.

There is a formal legal audit trail if such is needed. If there is an election petition the High Court, or the Circuit Court in the case of a local election, can require the system to print a ballot paper for each vote cast, after the mixing of the ballot, thus enabling a manual count to be conducted. It is reasonable to rely on the proven record of the system in other countries and the certification by international testing institutes, rather than over-reacting to some doubts raised about entirely different types of PC-based voting machines used in the US. Trying to compare the two systems is like comparing apples and oranges but this is exactly what the Opposition is asking us to do.

The Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has indicated that he will review the question of making the source code available to the public, having regard to the security of the system and secrecy of the ballot. Very few countries make election source code publicly available because of security concerns. We have adopted a sensible and phased approach to introducing electronic voting. The proposal has been in the public domain since 1999 so we can hardly be accused of rushing it. We have successfully piloted the system at real polls. It is now time to move on having secured a trustworthy system and validated and verified its ability to store and count votes securely. In rolling it out the approach was to use an electronic voting system of proven and robust performance. We have procured a system that comes with its own proprietary hardware and software and enjoyed the proven advantage of wide-scale and successful use in other democracies. Its use in some of the most sophisticated societies in the world is the most worthwhile possible test of reliability.

In introducing electronic voting, the Government is conscious of the need to make continuous service improvements to the operation of the system. For example, since the successful pilots we have increased the visibility and legibility of the voting machines. Similarly, where other issues arise which may cause concern the Government is happy to deal with these as far as possible. The Government accepts the need to ensure that there is utmost confidence in our electoral systems. Therefore, in response to the concerns raised, on the proposal of my colleague, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, the Government has decided to establish an independent panel to verify the secrecy and accuracy of the arrangements proposed for electronic voting. This panel will be established on a statutory basis but it is proposed to appoint on a non-statutory basis in advance of the necessary legislation.

Questions have been raised about the validity of using an order under the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2001 to apply electronic voting for local and European elections. A reading of Part 3 of the Act clearly shows that it was the intention of the Oireachtas to provide for the application of electronic voting to other than Dáil elections. Part 3 has already been used without challenge to provide for electronic voting in the second Nice treaty referendum. In addition, in drafting the legislation, the Government was conscious of previous court rulings on the use of secondary legislation. However, as promised, the Government has further consulted the Attorney General on the matter and has decided to introduce primary legislation to eliminate any legal doubts regarding the application of electronic voting in the forthcoming local and European elections. The legislation will be brought forward by my colleague, the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, in the near future.

In bringing forward this legislation, the opportunity will also be taken to develop more explicit provisions regarding abstention from voting and to specify conditions under which tally data may be made available from the electronic counting system to interested parties. These last provisions will further enhance the transparency of the system and build confidence in it. It could, for example, allow a specific percentage of votes from any given unit, for example, the electoral area or polling station. It would also be proposed to retain an overriding discretion for the presiding officer to prohibit the disclosure of votes in a given unit where there would be a risk that individual voters could be identified.

The move to electronic voting and counting demonstrates a progressive and modern Ireland. Increasingly, people use electronic means for conducting their lives and electronic interfaces between Government and citizen are becoming more commonplace. Change is part of the human condition and change in the way we vote is an inevitable part of our ever-changing world. The majority of people understand and react well to change. In a different context, the smooth introduction of the euro is a recent positive experience. Those voters who have had an electronic voting experience in Ireland have had a good one and I am confident that voters in the European and local elections will do likewise on 11 June next.

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