Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Thursday, 10 July 2025

Committee on Defence and National Security

General Scheme of the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2025: Discussion (Resumed)

2:00 am

Mr. Conor King:

We thank the committee sincerely for the invitation to appear before it today and participate in the pre-legislative scrutiny process of the general scheme of the defence (amendment) Bill 2025. I am accompanied by the RACO deputy general secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Derek Priestley, and the RACO president, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Ryan.

RACO represents all commissioned officers and cadets across the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps on a wide range of topics, primarily focusing on remuneration, superannuation and conditions of military service, such as pay, promotion arrangements, working time and health and safety matters. Our members are the decision-makers and leaders of the Defence Forces. They are not just managers; they are commanders, junior and senior leaders, mentors, instructors, civil, mechanical, aeronautical, marine and electrical engineers, doctors and dentists, band conductors, pilots and ships captains, to name but a few.

While we acknowledge that discipline and disciplinary matters are not ordinarily encompassed in the scope of representation, amendments to the Defence Acts and Defence Forces regulations that affect the pay and conditions, welfare, physical and mental health of our members undoubtedly are. As a consequence, timely consultation through the conciliation and arbitration, C&A, scheme is something on which RACO places a very significant emphasis and value.

Turning to today's order of business, RACO would have legitimately expected that any changes to legislation impacting on the terms and conditions of members' service within the Defence Forces would have been the subject of timely and meaningful consultation through the conciliation and arbitration structures. However, despite the scheme being reviewed recently, it remains unproductive, suffering from a lack of resourcing, long delays in resolving issues, little accountability and, therefore, most regrettably, an inability to address the issues it was created to resolve. An effective, well-resourced and well-supported scheme would most likely have avoided the necessity for us to appear before the committee today to participate in the pre-legislative scrutiny process.

We find it unacceptable that legislation is drafted by our employers and sent to Cabinet without any consultation with supposedly valued stakeholders. This is the second occasion on which RACO finds itself before this committee participating in a pre-legislative scrutiny process rather than in an early and timely consultation with our employer under the confidential veil of the scheme. The C&A scheme is entirely designed to bring issues and problems to a mutually satisfactory conclusion. A lack of consultation and exploitation of our employer's dominant position is something we continue to encounter on a regular basis, and we continue to be frustrated by our treatment under the scheme.

The matters coming before the committee today address some very salient and serious issues. To be clear, RACO is fully in favour of a robust and effective suspension policy that is grounded in the principles of natural justice and fair procedures but is concerned with aspects of the proposed primary legislation currently under scrutiny.

In July 2024, RACO wrote to our employer, the Department of Defence, seeking clarity and guidance regarding the de facto suspensions that were being implemented without any transparent policy or legal underpinning. This followed a series of incidents of members of the Defence Forces being posted away from their home station into non-existent appointments some distance from their parent units, or being placed on a form of special leave, all in the aftermath of a highly publicised and publicly commented upon criminal case involving a member of the Defence Forces. Regrettably, despite numerous follow-up attempts, this essential guidance and clarity has still not been provided.

As the committee will be aware, heads 1 to 20, inclusive, of the general scheme of the 2025 Bill cover deployment of military personnel and the triple lock, among other issues. RACO accepts that such matters are outside the scope of representation, notwithstanding the fact that deployment of Defence Forces personnel in sufficient numbers and with sufficient support to ensure their safety and mission success is undoubtedly a welfare matter, as much as it is operational. It is the Government's prerogative to legislate as it sees fit regarding the deployment of military personnel overseas and we assume that military advice has been sought and received on such matters. Therefore, it remains heads 21, 22 23 that RACO wishes to mainly focus on today.

Head 21 proposes the introduction of section 46A to the 1954 Act, granting a designated authority the power to suspend officers below the rank of major general under certain conditions, including where it appears that the public interest, national security or serious misconduct may be at stake. It also allows for regulations to govern procedure, pay and review during such suspensions.

As the recent Government-commissioned report from Mr. Peter Ward SC clearly sets out, there is a lacuna in the Defence Acts and an urgent need for an equitable and fair mechanism, in line with best HR practice, to suspend members of the Defence Forces. However, we remain very concerned by the loose, vague and subjective language in the current drafting, in particular where "it appears to the suspending authority that the public interest or national security might be prejudiced by allowing the officer to remain on duty" or "the suspension is, in the opinion of the suspending authority, required in the best interests of the Defence Forces". Another example is that the suspending authority may suspend if "it appears to the suspending authority that the officer has engaged in behaviour that may constitute grave misconduct or grave irregularity warranting disciplinary investigation". Such phrasing lacks the thoroughness and rigour needed to protect members' rights to the presumption of innocence and opens the door to interpretation without robust oversight or even an appeal mechanism.

We also highlight the welfare dimension. Suspension, particularly in advance of due process, carries real consequences for an individual's mental health and professional reputation. The principle of "innocent unless and until proven guilty" must be protected, not just legally but through fair process and proper supports. A balance must be struck between operational discipline and the dignity and safety of those who serve.

We note that suspension is an embedded feature of many other public sector organisations and are aware of a concerning reported trend of seemingly endless, elongated suspensions without regular review or due process, where the suspension in fact becomes the punishment. We can learn from these examples and introduce a robust but fair process that caters for the needs of the organisation without prejudice to any Defence Forces member.

Cognisant of the influence that the military chain of command can have on subordinate decision-making, this legislation and any subsequent Defence Forces regulation must tighten up procedures, providing strict checks and balances to include thresholds, with proper fit-for-purpose appeal mechanisms. Military personnel have become accustomed to being denied certain statutory employment protections, and we ask that this committee, when advising the Government, not allow this practice to reoccur here.