Mr. Derek Priestley:

Head 22 proposes an amendment to section 50 of the 1954 Act, thereby allowing for the dismissal of an officer by the President "for any prescribed reason." This marks a shift towards a more open-ended basis for dismissal, with the criteria to be set out in future regulations rather than clearly defined in primary legislation.

While we recognise and accept the need for the Defence Forces to maintain high standards and the capacity to address serious misconduct, the phrase "any prescribed reason" is too broad even for primary legislation and again lacks the clarity and safeguards necessary to protect members from arbitrary or disproportionate action. It risks undermining the principle of natural justice, especially in a military context where members already have limited access to industrial relations mechanisms or an ability to go to the courts to exercise normal employment rights. We urge the committee to ensure that any grounds for dismissal are more clearly defined, transparent, and subject to procedural fairness, including appeals, possibly outside of the chain of command. Our members deserve to know the standards by which they will both be judged and be required to judge others. They must have confidence that those standards will be applied consistently, with due regard for their rights, welfare, and service.

Head 23 proposes the insertion of a new section 52A into the 1954 Act, requiring officers to inform their commanding officer, CO, if they are under investigation by An Garda Síochána or if they are charged with a criminal offence. It also places an ongoing duty on the officer to keep their commander informed of any significant developments, including court dates. Speaking from experience as a former military police officer, Defence Forces members already have an obligation to inform their CO of a criminal civil court appearance.

While we acknowledge the importance of accountability and transparency, especially where serious allegations are involved, this head places significant obligations on the individual member who, depending on the nature of an alleged offence or An Garda Síochána sensitivities about the operation of a criminal investigation, may or may not be even aware of such allegations or investigations. Furthermore, there is no formal or informal data-sharing mechanism between An Garda Síochána and the provost marshal regarding such investigations. Again, from experience, investigations may progress to a certain point before a suspect may be informed, either formally or informally, by An Garda Síochána that the investigation has commenced. There is no obligation on the investigating garda to keep the Defence Forces member updated or to indicate a likely court date or timeline for conclusion. It is submitted that a definitive occurrence such as a member being detained or arrested, interviewed under caution, or even charged is a more appropriate decision point for when the member must inform the commander. Also, Garda procedures dictate that An Garda Síochána will inform the local assistant provost marshal and this should be followed through. Following any of the above occurrences, a fair and balanced suspension could follow which is not simply as a result of "the commencement" of an investigation. To not amend the legislation in this manner could see a significant and unnecessary increase in total suspensions of members where lesser or more considered action would be appropriate. Such action could include a relocation within a barracks, re-tasking to a different unit or branch within the same location, remote working or restricting certain operational duties, but with certain built-in deadlines and commitments to prioritise the conclusion of investigations so that members who are ultimately exonerated can remain positive and committed members of the Defence Forces. All of these measures should naturally consider the rights of potential victims or other members of the organisation.