Charles Flanagan (Laois-Offaly, Fine Gael)
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I will go to Senator Joe O'Reilly next but I am conscious that Professor Laffan has indicated she may need to leave in the next 15 minutes. If Senator O'Reilly does not mind, I have three brief questions of an EU political nature. We do not often have the opportunity of Professor Laffan sharing her expertise and experience with us. I ask Senator O'Reilly and Deputy Stanton to forgive me briefly.

Professor Laffan spoke about the centrality of EU security and her work over a long number of years on the international stage. I will hazard a question about Ireland in that context because while she was working abroad, she nevertheless had two keen eyes on the situation here in Ireland. Where has the centrality of security fallen off the agenda here? I am old enough to remember the EU referendum back in 1972 and the debate at that time. Some 50 years later we speak about the sacred nature of Irish neutrality as though it has been a hands-off arrangement for the last 100 years. I recall the White Paper, for example, for the referendum produced by the Government. There were strong references in that to security and obligations on the part of any member state. I recall reading statements from the 1960s, in particular from the Taoiseach Seán Lemass, where the security of Europe and Ireland's participation in such security was certainly referenced if not detailed. There were also statements from Jack Lynch, again in the context of the European campaign. From my own party perspective there were statements from then Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave and from Garret FitzGerald as foreign Minister in the 1970s and Taoiseach in the 1980s. He often spoke about the EU security architecture and the fact that Ireland, being a member, may well have roles to play. During the 1990s and the 2000s, and particularly in the context of the Nice and Lisbon referendums, this aspect of matters appeared to take a defensive role. The Government and policymakers appeared to be on the back foot in the context of the vociferous but nevertheless minority groups that participated in those campaigns. What has happened over the years in Ireland that we have seen such a change? In that regard, I ask Professor Laffan to address the questions she is leaving us with, both of which are fundamental to Irish policy. They are not necessarily issues for the future but for the immediate deliberation and decision-making.

Second, would she care to comment on something of a shift in focus across the European Union? It could be said that the centre of activity in the European Union has shifted from Brussels, Paris and Berlin to the east and the north. The Baltics are vociferous now in terms of European security and defence. One could be forgiven for saying that European policy is actually being driven by the Baltics and the Poles, who have emerged as strong players in the context of European security and defence. That is something that was off the radar before the unlawful invasion, when the focus of Europe on Poland was very much on domestic issues within Poland, issues that were not very favourable towards the European Union. All that has changed completely. Does Professor Laffan see a shift in the centre of gravity as being apparent rather than real?

Finally, I refer again to the high Arctic, which has been mentioned. We have not discussed that here in terms of Irish foreign policy to any great extent.

There is the Nordic strategy, a recent development in Irish foreign policy and Ireland also applied to join the Arctic Council. That was probably a consequence of Brexit as much anything else, when we sought a refocus in Ireland's foreign policy, given that our nearest neighbour had left the European Union. As a result, we were then an island behind an island that was not a member of the Union and the consequential challenges of that. There was a shift in Ireland's foreign policy towards smaller states, with which we probably had more in common than we admitted or realised, such as Sweden and Finland in particular and also Denmark. The Arctic Council encompasses states like Norway, with which we did not really have an intense bilateral relationship. Our membership was blocked by Russia. Will this always be the case? Are there any means by which we can play a greater role in our relationship with the Nordics in the context of the Arctic and, for example, maritime and marine policy or climate change and the ever-increasing threat it poses to the northern countries? We cannot be oblivious to that. It is also relevant to shipping lanes and the shift in focus on the High Arctic, for example, hunting and mining. There is a lack of a legal framework and co-ordination in terms of the big powers vying against each other for pretty important rights and privileges in the High Arctic. There is also the politicisation of indigenous people, who for many years were treated with an absence of any human rights by the European Union as much as the Americans, the Chinese and the Russians. I see a place for Ireland in that but I bow to the expertise of the witnesses in that regard. Do they see it? If so, how?