Alan Kelly (Tipperary North, Labour)
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I thank the sub-committee for its invitation. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention is an international agreement which committed certain parties to internationally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets during the period 2008 to 2012, inclusive. The EU and its member states, including Ireland, made reduction commitments in respect of this first commitment period which will be met. In December 2012 at the Doha climate change conference in Qatar, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol adopted the so-called Doha Amendment to the protocol.

The main feature of the Doha Amendment is that it created a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020, inclusive, in respect of greenhouse gas emission reductions for those parties which wished to enter into internationally binding emission reduction targets. In addition, the Doha Amendment made further amendments to the text of the original protocol to be implemented in this second commitment period. Most of these amendments simply enabled the implementation of new mitigation commitments but there are also some provisions that entail changes in substantive obligations.

First, the list of greenhouse gases covered by Kyoto Protocol is extended, with the addition of one gas, nitrogen trifluoride, NF3. Although the emissions of this gas are currently tiny, it is a potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential of 17,200. That means one tonne of NF3 emitted into the atmosphere is equivalent to 17,200 tonnes of CO2.

Second, the Doha Amendment provides for a simplified procedure that allows a party to adjust its commitment by increasing its ambition during a commitment period. Previously, such an adjustment would require consensus among all parties to the protocol for its adoption and ratification by three fourths of the parties for its entry into force. Following the Doha Amendment, an increase in ambition proposed by a party regarding its target is considered adopted unless more than three fourths of parties object, and it no longer requires ratification for its entry into force.

Third, and finally, the Doha Amendment automatically cancels the assigned amount units of a party if and to the extent that its assigned amount for the second commitment period exceeds its average emission in the first three years of the preceding commitment period, multiplied by eight, or the number of years in the second commitment period. This means the Doha Amendment automatically adjusts a party’s target to prevent an increase in its emissions for the period 2013 to 2020 beyond its average emissions for the years 2008 to 2010.

The European Union, its member states and Iceland, acting in a single bloc or in "joint fulfilment", agreed to be bound by reduction targets in the Doha Amendment’s second commitment period, specifically, to limit their average collective greenhouse gas emissions in the years 2013 to 2020 to 80% of their base-year emissions, where most base-year emissions are from 1990. This overall reduction commitment applies to the bloc of the EU, its member states and Iceland as a whole. Within that bloc commitment, each member state is committed to differing emission reduction targets, strictly reflecting by design those already agreed to under EU legislation, specifically, in the EU’s so-called effort-sharing decision of 2009. In other words, by approving the terms of the Doha Amendment, Ireland is not committing itself to any additional emission reductions beyond those already agreed as part of legally binding EU legislation in respect of the period 2013 to 2020.

Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments under the EU’s effort sharing decision is 20% below 2005 levels over the 2013 to 2020 period, with annual targets within that period.

Of course, those commitments in EU legislation are very challenging for Ireland, and there has been much discussion and deliberation on them at varying political and administrative levels. Nevertheless, those substantial challenges reflect the reality of EU legislation and not the Doha Amendment itself.

As mentioned previously, "joint fulfilment" means that several parties may agree to achieve their emission commitments jointly. Once the joint commitment has been achieved, all parties participating in the joint fulfilment are considered to be in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s emission obligations. Only if the joint commitment is not achieved does each party become responsible for its individual emissions levels. In other words, non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol by an individual EU member state can occur only if: the joint commitment between the EU, its member states and Iceland is not achieved; the individual member state does not comply with its national target; and the member state does not buy sufficient internationally valid Kyoto emission units to compensate for the shortfall in its domestic emission reductions. The compliance assessment for the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period will not take place until 2023.

In response to the challenges posed by EU legislation in this area and, by extension, the Doha Amendment, the Government decided the following last April. First, as members are well aware, it decided to adopt a national climate policy position which specifies: an aggregate reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of at least 80%, compared to 1990 levels, by 2050 across the electricity generation, built environment and transport sectors; and, in parallel, an approach to carbon neutrality in the agriculture and land-use sector, including forestry, which does not compromise capacity for sustainable food production.

Second, it decided to approve the drafting of the climate action and low carbon development Bill pursuant to a submitted general scheme.

Both initiatives underpin the iterative development of mitigation policy by means of five-yearly national low carbon transition and mitigation plans. Each such plan will specify the policy measures which will be required to manage greenhouse gas emissions and removals at a level commensurate with the national objective of transition to a low carbon, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable economy by 2050. It will also ensure, at a minimum, compliance with any existing mitigation obligation on the State under EU or international law, including the Doha Amendment.

The entry into force of the Doha Amendment also represents an important objective for Ireland and the EU, as part of negotiations with other UNFCCC parties as progress is made towards a new global, legally binding agreement to take effect from 2020. It is hoped to develop such a new international climate change agreement to cover all countries at the Paris climate change conference, scheduled to take place in 2015.

Ratification of the Doha Amendment is of critical importance in the international negotiations under the UNFCCC for a new global agreement on climate change. While the EU is already implementing the requirements of the amendment, its ratification by developed country parties, which are included in the second commitment period, is seen by many developing countries as a vital sign of good faith that commitments entered into will be implemented. It is noted that at the recent UNFCCC negotiating session in Bonn, from 20 to 25 October, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC called on all parties to speed up ratification.

Because the honouring by Ireland of its commitments in EU legislation and, thereby, those in the Doha Amendment, will likely impose a charge on public funds, the terms of the Doha Amendment require the prior approval of Dáil Éireann, in accordance with Article 29.5.2o of the Constitution. Hence, there is a need for a motion on this issue to be moved in the Dáil.

In summary, because of our progressive stance on the international stage in respect of climate change and as a corollary to our existing commitments under EU legislation, I believe that it is both right and appropriate that Ireland approves the terms of the Doha Amendment. I ask members to do so.