Mr. Simon O'Brien:

I am joined by the other commissioners, Ms Foley and Mr. FitzGerald. I thank the committee for the invitation to assist with its work on improving the effectiveness of legislation relating to oversight of the Garda Síochána. The 12 proposals in our submission received by the committee represent the 12 ways that amendments to the Garda Síochána Act 2005 would most affect our ability to do our job effectively. The proposals in the submission focus on improving the capacity of GSOC to effectively achieve resolution of issues on strengthening GSOC's independence - a crucial characteristic of any oversight agency - which has been perceived as compromised under current legislation, not least by the United Nations. I will set out the key recommendations made in the submission.

We recommend new approaches to dealing with minor complaints to facilitate effective resolution. Many complaints to GSOC do not allege serious misconduct or criminal behaviour but breaches of discipline, for example, discourtesy or the poor response of a garda to an incident. The current system favours these being dealt with via a lengthy, bureaucratic, disciplinary investigation. In addition to the cost to the taxpayer, this approach does not necessarily always address the fundamental issue of complaint. GSOC has proposed new approaches to dealing with these kinds of relatively minor complaints to decrease cost and increase efficiency and satisfaction. These include removing legislative barriers to informal resolution in order that more than the current 1% of complaints can be resolved informally, i.e. allowing GSOC to decide when it is appropriate for this route to be taken. It also includes creating new protocols for dealing with issues relating to customer service.

We have also proposed new approaches to dealing with more serious complaints. Currently, for serious disciplinary issues, the Garda Síochána may undertake investigations into complaints following referral from GSOC. GSOC believes that the concept of gardaí conducting investigations on our behalf is questionable in terms of independence and effectiveness and the commission proposes the discontinuation of this arrangement. By the way, undertaking all investigations by itself would have considerable resource implications for GSOC and these would have to be taken into account were this recommendation seen favourably by the committee. In the event the practice is retained we recommend that all investigation reports should come back to GSOC for decision on appropriate next steps. Furthermore, we are asking for adherence to protocols around investigations to be put on a statutory footing.

We would like to see the Garda Commissioner becoming subject to oversight. Currently the Act states that a member of the Garda Síochána does not include the Garda Commissioner. Therefore, that officeholder is outside the remit of GSOC. GSOC believes that effective oversight of policing, and public confidence therein, favours the Garda Commissioner being subject to independent oversight and that legislation should be changed to allow for that.

We believe the definition of serious harm should be expanded. The Act provides for investigation by GSOC, following referral by the Garda Commissioner, of any matter appearing to indicate that the conduct of a member of the Garda Síochána may have resulted in the death of, or serious harm to, a person.

The definition of "serious harm" does not encompass, for example, sexual offences of a serious nature; therefore, such offences allegedly committed by members of An Garda Síochána do not merit referral to GSOC for independent investigation and can be investigated internally, which we do not believe is fair to any party involved. GSOC believes there should be flexibility introduced by the Legislature in order that, as society’s definition of "serious harm" evolves, the definition and thus the types of offence which merit independent investigation may be expanded.

We recommend removing limitations on GSOC in conducting and publishing examinations of policy, practice and procedures within An Garda Síochána. The Act provides for such examinations, but, in reality, the defined circumstances are so narrow that this has only been done once to date.

While there are several other matters covered in our submission, the last specific proposal to which I will refer concerns the nomination of GSOC as confidential recipient. Recent events have suggested the existing system for the raising of issues by Garda members requires significant overhaul. While provisions would need to be made to ensure GSOC would not become a mediator in HR disputes within the organisation, it could be nominated as an external confidential recipient, with the capacity to receive complaints from serving Garda members about serious corruption, malpractice or systemic issues.

It is important to highlight again that an overarching recommendation is that the objectives of GSOC, as set down by the Act, be fundamentally reset in order that, rather than favouring a system of seeking to apportion blame on gardaí for specific actions, the legislation will enable us to actively seek a resolution of issues and provide feedback for An Garda Síochána to help to bring about long-term change.

GSOC looks forward to having an opportunity to work with the committee, the Legislature, An Garda Síochána and other parties in the next few months to assist in the practical application of these and other recommendations. We want to build a robust, effective, workable system of oversight in Ireland.