Ms Fiona Crowley:

Amnesty International welcomes the consultation process undertaken by the committee on the legislation relating to oversight of An Garda Síochána. We are grateful for the invitation to address the committee today to raise some of the points in our submission.

Recent events have undermined public confidence in An Garda Síochána and in the structures to provide external oversight of the service. The Guerin inquiry has shone an important light on how one Garda whistleblower and his complaints were treated and we welcome the commitment of the Minister for Justice and Equality to establish a commission of investigation as the inquiry has recommended. I note and echo what Mr. Mark Kelly has set out regarding the role of the inspectorate in the process as proposed by the Minister.

While we welcome the committee reviewing the legislation on Garda oversight we urge that the internal accountability and human rights promotion mechanisms within the police service not be overlooked in the debate. Amnesty International participated in the Garda human rights working group, established in 1999, and has been a member of its strategic human rights advisory committee along with others, such as the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, since it was established in 2005. We have thus seen several high-level projects undertaken internally to further the service's human rights compliance, including the 2005 human rights audit and its implementation of the action plan for the implementation of that audit. Gardaí need to be supported and resourced to move these initiatives forward and they must be prioritised within the service.

I will highlight our main areas of priority and refer the committee to our submission for further explanation on each. The Garda Síochána Act 2995 adopts too narrow a definition of cases under the automatic and mandatory jurisdiction of the Garda Síochána. Where complaints are related to acts not resulting in death or serious harm, GSOC may refer such complaints to the Garda Commissioner for investigation. GSOC may decide to supervise such investigations but it is under no legal obligation to do so.

We have suggested that the Act should provide an explicit presumption in favour of investigation by GSOC of all complaints with any referred for investigation by the Garda expressly confined to minor complaints. However, I note the interventions by the ICCL and the Irish Human Rights Commission today suggesting that all complains be mandatorily investigated by GSOC and, therefore, we concur. The involvement of GSOC in a supervisory function should be mandatory rather than discretionary in all cases and the exclusion of the Garda Commissioner and complaints of serving members from GSOC's jurisdiction should be removed.

Under section 102 of the Act the Garda Commissioner is obliged to refer to GSOC any matter that appears to indicate the conduct of a Garda member may have resulted death or serious harm. Again, this is too narrow a range to be automatically referred to GSOC.

GSOC should be empowered to conduction an inquiry under sections 62(2)(f) and 106 into any practice, policy or procedure of the Garda of its own volition rather than at the request or consent of the Minister.

International human rights law demands that police accountability mechanisms be institutionally completely independent of government and free from political influence. GSOC needs far more functional independence from the Department of Justice and Equality, especially in terms of its budget. Ideally, the Act should also provide an independent selection and appointment process for members of GSOC involving representatives of civil society, especially those representing the interests of marginalised groups. This is no aspersion on the current members of GSOC, rather a generic recommendation Amnesty International makes in all jurisdictions. Should the Government process its commitment to establish an independent policing authority, that body should be given a key role in this regard.

Another matter is the live issue of whistleblowers and the flawed confidential recipient process. The confidence of gardaí to report concerns confidentially and to have those concerns addressed is of critical importance to ensure that individual or systemic weaknesses in the service can be revealed. Whistleblowers serve a significant public interest function and should be encouraged rather than dissuaded from disclosing information.

The degree of ministerial influence over An Garda Síochána committed to under the Act undermines its actual or perceived independence. Amnesty International wholeheartedly supports the establishment of an independent and representative agency with responsibility for Garda oversight and appointment. We recommended this measure in 2004 and we look forward to seeing the details of what is proposed.

The Act or other relevant legislation must provide robust oversight of Garda covert surveillance functions and operations as well as its national security and intelligence functions. We echo what Mr. Kelly said with regard to urging the committee to press for Ireland finally to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the expeditious establishment of a national preventive mechanism required thereunder.

The manner in which police reform and accountability happens can be as important as the content of the reforms. The Government must be pressed to thoroughly consult with the Irish Human Rights Commission, NGOs and other members of civil society in deciding and implementing its reforms. It is especially important that members of An Garda Síochána of all ranks are engaged. They must feel that accountable policing based on human rights is in their interests too and that they are being supported to fulfil their duties accordingly.