Written answers
Thursday, 6 February 2025
Department of Finance
Tax Avoidance
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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46. To ask the Minister for Finance to provide a full list of all specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) in Irish tax law, in tabular form; the number of actions taken under each of the SAAR rules; the total revenue recovered since 2015; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3620/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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47. To ask the Minister for Finance the total number of cases of potential tax avoidance opened for assessment by the Revenue Commissioners each year since 2015 under the general anti-avoidance rule, in tabular form; the total potential value of this tax advantage arising through these tax avoidance transactions each year since 2015; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3621/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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48. To ask the Minister for Finance the total number of cases of tax avoidance transactions determined to have taken place, both individual taxpayers and promoters of schemes, each year since 2015, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3622/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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49. To ask the Minister for Finance the total interest charged each year since 2015 as a result of tax avoidance transactions under the general anti-avoidance rule, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3623/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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50. To ask the Minister for Finance the total surcharge applied each year since 2015 for tax avoidance transactions; the average percentage surcharge applied, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3624/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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51. To ask the Minister for Finance the total number of protection notices/form PN1 submitted each year since 2015, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3625/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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52. To ask the Minister for Finance the total number of agreements entered into by the Revenue Commissioners to reduce the tax liability, interest, or surcharge resulting from tax avoidance transactions each year since 2015, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3626/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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53. To ask the Minister for Finance the number of court cases that have been required to determine the application of a surcharge, in tabular form; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3627/25]
Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein)
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54. To ask the Minister for Finance the number of cases ruled in the Revenue Commissioners favour, in tabular form; the average surcharge following a legal challenge; the average time taken to reach a court ruling; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [3628/25]
Paschal Donohoe (Dublin Central, Fine Gael)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 46 to 54, inclusive, together.
The specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) prohibit the misuse of certain losses, reliefs or exemptions when a particular type of transaction, or series of transactions, are undertaken. Revenue may use targeted anti-avoidance rules for more specific transactions than those to which the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) applies.
The following table sets out the 16 SAARs, as contained in Schedule 33 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, together with the full title of relevant section.
No | Rule | Section title |
---|---|---|
1 | Section 381B | Restriction of loss relief — passive trades |
2 | Section 381C | Restriction of loss relief — anti-avoidance |
3 | Section 546A | Restrictions on allowable losses |
4 | Section 590 | Attribution to participators of chargeable gains accruing to non-resident company |
5 | Section 806 | Charge to income tax on transfer of assets abroad |
6 | Section 807A | Liability of non-transferors |
7 | Section 811B | Tax treatment of loans from employee benefit schemes |
8 | Section 812 | Taxation of income deemed to arise from transfers of right to receive interest from securities |
9 | Section 813 | Taxation of transactions associated with loans or credit |
10 | Section 814 | Taxation of income deemed to arise from transactions in certificates of deposit and assignable deposits |
11 | Section 815 | Taxation of income deemed to arise on certain sales of securities |
12 | Section 816 | Taxation of shares issued in place of cash dividends |
13 | Section 817 | Schemes to avoid liability to tax under Schedule F |
14 | Section 817A | Restriction of relief for payments of interest |
15 | Section 817B | Treatment of interest in certain circumstances |
16 | Section 817C | Restriction on deductibility of certain interest |
The GAAR is contained in Chapter 2, Part 33 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. Section 811 applied for transactions commenced up to 23 October 2014 and section 811C applies to transactions commenced after 23 October 2014. The general principles as to what constitutes a tax avoidance transaction are broadly the same under both sets of provisions. Section 811 required Revenue to issue a Notice of Opinion for transactions considered to represent tax avoidance. Section 811C does not require Revenue to issue a Notice of Opinion, instead a Notice of Assessment is issued. The intention of the GAAR is to challenge tax avoidance transactions which have little or no commercial purpose and are primarily entered into to obtain a tax advantage.
A compliance intervention may not always be opened under GAAR or SAAR, the applicability of these issues may be identified as the case progresses. For this reason, it is not possible to accurately present the number of actions taken under each of the SAARs or the number of potential tax avoidance cases opened. However, in response to the Deputy's question, Revenue has advised me that as at 1 January 2025, it was challenging 228 tax avoidance cases, relating to 33 transactions.
Tax avoidance is applying tax legislation in a way that inappropriately obtains a tax advantage. Tax avoidance can involve the misuse of tax reliefs and allowances or the re-characterisation of a transaction. It involves transactions which are undertaken primarily to claim a tax advantage and not for genuine business reasons. Often, it involves contrived, artificial transactions that serve little or no purpose other than to gain a tax advantage.
Table 2 below sets out the number of tax avoidance cases closed from 2015 – 2024:
Year | No Avoidance cases closed | Yield (€m) |
---|---|---|
2015 | 160 | 42 |
2016 | 40 | 10 |
2017 | 1,352* | 3.8 |
2018 | 22 | 5.7 |
2019 | 127 | 29 |
2020 | 104 | 18.4 |
2021 | 125 | 11.7 |
2022 | 104 | 16.1 |
2023 | 86 | 16.5 |
2024 | 256 | 46 |
*I am advised by Revenue that of the 1,352 avoidance cases settled in 2017, 1,332 were closed following the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hans Droog case, in which it was successfully argued by the appellant that time limits set out in legislation relating to the self-assessment system apply to anti-avoidance legislation. As a result of the Supreme Court decision and acting on legal advice, Revenue closed similar cases involving time limit issues which it was no longer possible to pursue as a result of the application of the time limit.
As regards interest paid on interventions opened under GAAR, I am advised by Revenue that in the time available it has not been possible to finalise all of this data. Revenue is finalising the data and it will be provided to Deputy Doherty directly, by Revenue as soon as possible.
The avoidance surcharge is an additional penalty applied under Section 811C of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to deter taxpayers from engaging in tax avoidance transactions. A tax avoidance surcharge applies where a person seeks to obtain the benefit of any tax advantage which is withdrawn by Section 811C or one of the Specific Anti Avoidance Rules. The surcharge can be up to 30%.
Revenue has dedicated Anti-Avoidance branches in their High Wealth and Financial Services Division. These branches have responsibility for challenging tax avoidance nationally under both general and specific anti-avoidance legislation. Avoidance may be challenged using a number of sections of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. Settlements in cases can consist of yield relating to avoidance transactions and non-avoidance transactions. I am advised by Revenue that while Revenue’s case management system uses taxpayer unit level data, yield broken down by percentage is not generated as part of the recording process. Therefore, it is not possible to provide the data requested by the Deputy.
Protective Notifications (PNs) are available for taxpayers who enter a transaction that they do not believe to be a tax avoidance scheme. If concerned that Revenue may challenge a transaction under the GAAR, taxpayers can file a PN using Form PN1. This will ensure that if Revenue successfully challenges the scheme under the GAAR, the taxpayer may not have to pay the tax avoidance surcharge of 30%. Where Revenue receives a valid PN, interest will not accrue until 30 days after any assessment is made under the GAAR.
I am advised by Revenue that the following table sets out the PNs received since 2015:
Year | Number ofPN1 Forms Submitted | No of PN1 Forms Accepted | Invalid PN1 Forms * |
---|---|---|---|
2015 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
2016 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2017 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2018 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2019 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2020 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
2021 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
2022 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2023 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2024 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total | 6 | 4 | 2 |
In respect of the Deputy's question on the total number of agreements entered into by Revenue to reduce the tax liability, interest, or surcharge resulting from tax avoidance transactions, I am advised by Revenue that they do not reduce tax liabilities. At the conclusion of a compliance intervention, the final liabilities are determined. If these are not agreed, taxpayers may appeal and the final liability may be determined in the courts. Liabilities are reviewed in line with the full information available. Additional information may become available which leads to a revised tax liability in line with legislation and Revenue’s Compliance Intervention Framework before the conclusion of a case. Therefore, it is not possible to provide the specific information requested.
Finally, Revenue have advised me that the provisions of Chapter 3A of Part 47 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997, as they apply to penalties, applies to surcharges imposed by Section 811D(3) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. To date, no court applications have been brought by Revenue under the provisions of Chapter 3A of Part 47 as they apply to these surcharges.
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