Mick Wallace (Wexford, Independent)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

26. To ask the Minister for Justice and Equality if he will consider establishing a Garda Síochána independent board with monitoring, supervisory and oversight functions over An Garda Síochána in order to strengthen the democratic accountability of the force; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [5351/14]

Alan Shatter (Dublin South, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

It is important that the Garda Síochána is operationally independent and democratically accountable. The Garda Síochána Act 2005 seeks to achieve those objectives by specifying the functions of the Garda Commissioner and the Force, on the one hand, and the Minister for Justice, the Government and the Houses of the Oireachtas on the other. The Act provides that the Commissioner has the function of directing and controlling the Garda Síochána, and that he is accountable to the Minister for the performance of that function. The Commissioner is responsible for recruitment, training, discipline, the distribution of members and for all other aspects of the management and administration of the Force. The Act also made the Commissioner the Accounting Officer for the Force, and liable to appear before the Committee of Public Accounts in that capacity.

In addition, the 2005 Act established the Garda Ombudsman Commission, which is empowered to carry out independent investigations into Garda conduct, and also the Garda Inspectorate, which provides expert advice on achieving the highest levels of efficiency and effectiveness in the operation and administration of the Force. The accountability of the Garda Síochána has, through these measures, been significantly strengthened.

There are those who advocate a police authority, but the onus is very much on them to explain how this would improve accountability. Up until recently, England and Wales would have been one of the main examples of a comparable jurisdiction with police authorities. But police authorities there were abolished in 2012 and replaced by directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners, precisely on the ground that police authorities were not sufficiently democratically accountable. It is true that Northern Ireland retains a police authority - the Policing Board - and it does a good job, but most people understand that the need for the Policing Board arises from the unique requirements associated with the need for confidence building in a cross-community environment.

Another important point often overlooked by those who advocate a separate authority is that the Garda Síochána is not only the police service in this jurisdiction, but is also the security and intelligence service of the State. This makes it even more appropriate that the Garda Síochána should be accountable to the Government and ultimately to the Oireachtas. I am willing to listen to all legislative proposals on accountability, but they must deal with the issues involved in a comprehensive and complete way.

Niall Collins (Limerick, Fianna Fail)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

27. To ask the Minister for Justice and Equality his planned reform of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [5296/14]

Pádraig Mac Lochlainn (Donegal North East, Sinn Fein)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

47. To ask the Minister for Justice and Equality his plans to introduce amending legislation to give more powers to the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission; and if he will outline what those additional powers will be. [5335/14]

Alan Shatter (Dublin South, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context | Oireachtas source

I propose to answer Questions Nos. 27 and 47 together.

The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission was established under the Garda Síochána Act 2005 to provide independent oversight of complaints made against members of the Garda Síochána. The Garda Ombudsman Commission has a hugely important role in ensuring that public confidence in the Garda Síochána is safeguarded, and has extensive powers under the 2005 Act to enable it to carry out its responsibilities.

With regard to the case for additional powers, I have already said that the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission has extensive powers, including full police powers of investigation. These include powers relating to, for example, entry and search of any place pursuant to a warrant, arrest with or without a warrant, search of a person, detention and questioning, taking fingerprints, issuing a summons and the bringing of a charge against a person.

I am, however, currently reviewing the relevant provisions of the 2005 Act and examining suggestions by the Ombudsman Commission for changes to it aimed at enhancing the process of investigating complaints. Once my review is complete, I will bring forward proposals to Government to address any amendments considered necessary. I would also refer the Deputy to a review of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007 which is underway.

As the Deputy is aware, revised protocols were agreed and signed by the Chairperson of the Ombudsman Commission and the Garda Commissioner on the 23rd September 2013. These revised protocols put in place clear procedures for the timely sharing of information and more generally for enhanced co-operation. The new protocols will support the Ombudsman Commission in carrying out investigations in the most effective and timely manner possible, to the benefit of both complainants and members of the Garda Síochána alike. They also reflect the commitment of the Garda Commissioner to the full co-operation of the Garda Síochána in these investigations.

In addition in relation to the question of access by the Garda Ombudsman Commission to the PULSE system, new protocols were agreed last year between the Garda Commissioner and the Chairperson of the Garda Ombudsman Commission. These revised protocols provide that the Garda Ombudsman Commission has access to PULSE through the two Garda Superintendents working on secondment with the Garda Ombudsman Commission (in this context, under the 2005 Act, a member of An Garda Síochána, during a period of temporary service with the Garda Ombudsman Commission, is not subject to the direction or control of the Garda Commissioner.)

However, the above notwithstanding, and in particular in respect of this investigation, where information on the PULSE system, how it is recorded, and the detail of the information is of central relevance, the Garda Commissioner and I are agreed that the Garda Ombudsman Commission will have direct access to the PULSE system, without the need to go through the intermediary of a seconded member of An Garda Siochana. Going forward, this will be the case for both this and any other investigation in which the Garda Ombudsman Commission is engaged. The revised protocols will be amended accordingly and arrangements will be made to put in place the necessary technical infrastructure and training required to facilitate this access.