Tom Hayes (Tipperary South, Fine Gael)
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Question 25: To ask the Minister for Finance his views on the findings of the bank inquiry that the Irish bank guarantee was cast too wide and took the question of optional loss sharing off the table; and if he accepts that he did not obtain a sufficiently broad range of advice in formulating its response. [25699/10]

Brian Lenihan Jnr (Dublin West, Fianna Fail)
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In his report on the banking crisis Governor Honohan is very clear that an extensive guarantee needed to be put in place. The Governor does raise some questions regarding the scope of the guarantee relating to existing longer-term senior bonds and dated subordinated debt.

I have on a number of occasions discussed the question of the inclusion of dated subordinated debt in the guarantee and have been clear on the basis the decision was made. This was, in particular, the requirement to maintain access to wholesale capital markets and guard against the risk of a default for any of these liabilities which could arise from the non-payment of either principal of interest that would have had the effect of triggering the entire guarantee.

As far as opportunities for risk-sharing are concerned I understand that holders of subordinated debt in the three largest banks have suffered losses of more than €5 billion so far. In addition, credit rating agencies have downgraded subordinated debt in some of the Irish institutions on the basis that they expect further costs to be imposed on these bondholders. I have consistently made clear that there is no question of the guarantee for existing dated subordinated debt being extended beyond 29 September 2010 next.

Turning to the inclusion of the guarantee provided for existing senior debt on the 30 September 2008, it is not straightforward to assess what options were available for burden sharing and how that burden sharing could be achieved in practice. Moreover, there were significant risks from excluding existing senior bonds from the guarantee which could have resulted in the guarantee being called on other guaranteed securities with severe consequences for financial stability overall.

Apart from these issues, the fact remains that a comprehensive guarantee of bank liabilities was an established part of the standard toolkit for responding to systemic banking crises internationally. Sweden, which is often regarded as the template for successfully dealing with its banking crisis, provided a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities in the 1990s. In the current crisis Denmark, another small EU Member State, provided a very extensive guarantee including existing bonds early in October 2008. The Deputy may wish to note that the UK authorities provided a broad guarantee to existing senior bondholders in Northern Rock.

In overall terms as is evident from Governor Honohan's report, the guarantee preserved the stability of the entire banking system at a time that it was at serious risk of collapse. In the circumstances of September / October 2008, with markets characterised in the Governor's Report as hysterical, it was essential that the commitment provided by the Irish Government to stand behind our banking system was entirely credible, clear and consistent. In those circumstances, there were significant risks in an approach which sought to discriminate between different types of bank liabilities which resulted in the financial markets concluding that the guarantee was not market acceptable or indeed credible.

Very significant volumes of both short-term and longer-term funding were secured by the banks from wholesale capital markets in the weeks following the introduction of the guarantee. This has subsequently provided an important foundation to the funding of the banks and a bulwark against funding pressures that have arisen at various times since.

I am, therefore, fully satisfied that the Government's Decision in this matter was at that time informed by a sufficiently broad range of advice on the formulation of the guarantee and it will be a priority for me to ensure that it remains the case that Government decision-making on returning our banking system to health is fully informed by expert advice from the Governor of the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator and indeed the NTMA to which I have delegated significant roles in relation to the restructuring of the banks.