Written answers

Tuesday, 27 January 2009

Department of Foreign Affairs

Nuclear Proliferation

9:00 pm

Photo of Joanna TuffyJoanna Tuffy (Dublin Mid West, Labour)
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Question 147: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views in relation to the proposals for international control of enriched uranium supply and fissile material made to the First Committee of the General Assembly in November 2004 and his evaluation of the proposals, the vote and its implications for the ongoing discussions between the European Union and Iran in relation to the enrichment of uranium. [1939/09]

Photo of Micheál MartinMicheál Martin (Cork South Central, Fianna Fail)
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At its meeting on 4 November 2004, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/C.1/59/L.34 urging the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that included the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The resolution was overwhelmingly approved by a recorded vote of 147 in favour to 1 against (US) and two abstentions (Israel and UK). Ireland was one of the resolution's co-sponsors.

Since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for the disarmament and arms control community has been the continued production of fissile materials — the fuel used for nuclear weapons. Many States have long been calling for a ban on the production of fissile materials, and the issue has been on the proposed agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for many years. The CD has not, however, managed to agree a programme of work since 1999. Though commonly referred to as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the title is objected to by some States who believe that it prejudges the outcome of negotiations. They would like to see not just the stopping or "cutting-off" of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, but also the inclusion of existing stocks of weapons-usable fissile material in any agreement.

The negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is a priority for Ireland, the EU and most States Parties to the Conference on Disarmament. The US, Russia, UK and France have unilaterally declared moratoria on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes although all are believed to consider that they have sufficient stocks of weapons-usable fissile material.

The key issues in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme relate to compliance with existing safeguards instruments, and Iran's failure or inability over several years of interaction with the IAEA to demonstrate transparently that it is in compliance. While the existence of an FMCT could only be a positive factor, the most helpful steps in Iran's case would be co-operation with the IAEA, adherence to the Additional Protocol of the NPT, and full compliance with successive Security Council resolutions. The European Union continues to urge Iran to give full co-operation to the IAEA in a spirit of full transparency in relation to its nuclear programme, with a view to solving all outstanding questions. The EU has consistently called upon Iran to demonstrate full proactive and transparent co-operation with the Agency and will continue to do so.

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