Joan Burton (Dublin West, Labour)
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Question 114: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views on the offer made on 30 January 2006 by Iran to suspend its enrichment programme in return for assurances on security issues; the consideration given to the offer at EU level; and the prospects offered for peace in the Middle East. [1941/09]

Joan Burton (Dublin West, Labour)
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Question 133: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views on whether Iran is in breach of Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. [1940/09]

Micheál Martin (Cork South Central, Fianna Fail)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 114 and 133 together.

Iran recommenced uranium enrichment and centrifuge research in January 2006. Since that date the international community, led on this critical issue by the 'E3+3' group (Germany, France and the UK, along with Russia, China, and the United States), have been trying to persuade Iran to suspend its enrichment activity as a necessary condition for full scale talks to reach a permanent solution to this issue. Since then there have been four UN Security Council Resolutions requiring the suspension of enrichment and imposing sanctions on Iran, targeted at its nuclear and military sectors. Iran has in that period, at various levels, made various suggestions that it might be prepared to suspend or freeze some activities in return for the removal of restrictions in place on its nuclear sector. None of these suggestions on examination has amounted to an offer of full suspension of enrichment. On the contrary, Iran has repeatedly stated that it will in no circumstances agree to suspend enrichment, and that any solution can only be on this basis.

In June 2008, on behalf of the EU3+3, High Representative Solana handed an improved 'incentives package' to the Iranian authorities, proposing areas of possible co-operation if Iran abandons its programme of uranium enrichment. Iran tacitly rejected this package by responding with a counter-proposal which did not provide for the suspension of enrichment. Ireland fully supports the twin track approach of the EU3+3, which offers Iran positive engagement and co-operation if it changes course, but a concurrent enforcement track at the Security Council while it refuses to do so. I hope very much that Iran will at last agree to negotiate seriously on this issue. It is also hopeful that President Obama has long advocated an open approach to Iran to see if a real accommodation can be made.

Article 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) confirms States Parties' right to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes — within the obligations set out in Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty, which prohibit efforts to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. At the same time Article 3 of the NPT obligates Parties to act within the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This, and this alone, creates the stable international environment and confidence necessary to allow for the full realisation of Article 4.

The Government would underline the importance for all countries to fully comply with all their obligations under the NPT. Full implementation of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol remains the only acceptable standard by which compliance with these obligations can be assured. I deeply regret Iran's decision not to implement its Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Equally, I am seriously concerned by Iran's failure to fully co-operate with the IAEA to address the serious issues raised by the Director General in successive reports. I am disturbed by the view expressed by the IAEA that some of Iran's actions are "not consistent with its obligations".

It is Iran's own actions that have raised serious doubts internationally regarding the intent of its nuclear programme. I would urge Iran, therefore, to fully implement its safeguards agreements with the IAEA, including the Additional Protocol. It should co-operate fully with that Agency to address all outstanding issues and to clearly demonstrate the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and should comply fully with Security Council Resolutions.