Paul Connaughton Snr (Galway East, Fine Gael)
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Question 109: To ask the Minister for Health and Children if she will respond to the call by the MRSA and families organisation for a judicial inquiry into the non-implementation of the national guidelines contained in the 1995 Control of MRSA in the Irish Health care setting; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [35543/06]

Paul Connaughton Snr (Galway East, Fine Gael)
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Question 196: To ask the Minister for Health and Children her views on the call by MRSA victims and families on the setting up of a redress board to compensate MRSA victims and their families. [35544/06]

Mary Harney (Dublin Mid West, Progressive Democrats)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 109 and 196 together.

My Department has no plans at present to set up a judicial enquiry or a redress board to compensate people who have contracted MRSA.

The control of Health Care Associated Infections (HCAIs) including MRSA continues to be a priority for the HSE. Measures to control the emergence and spread of HCAIs are necessary because there are fewer options available for the treatment of resistant infections and because these strains spread amongst vulnerable at-risk patients. The prudent use of antibiotics underpins any approach to the control of antibiotic resistant bacteria, including MRSA. This, together with good professional practice and routine infection control precautions, such as hand hygiene, constitute the major measures in controlling and preventing healthcare-associated infection, including that caused by MRSA, both in hospital and in community health care units.

The implementation of the revised SARI Guidelines on the control and prevention of MRSA in hospitals and in the community, the "Clean Hands Campaign", the National Hygiene Audits and the development of national standards in relation to infection control and hospital hygiene are also aimed at addressing the challenges presented by HCAIs.

Ciarán Cuffe (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
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Question 110: To ask the Minister for Health and Children the latest preparations by both the Health Service Executive and her Department for a possible flu pandemic; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [35459/06]

Mary Upton (Dublin South Central, Labour)
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Question 126: To ask the Minister for Health and Children the position on the latest new estimates from experts for the expected numbers of persons that may become infected with avian flu; her Department's plans to deal with avian flu; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [35492/06]

Mary Harney (Dublin Mid West, Progressive Democrats)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 110 and 126 together.

I take it both questions relate to a possible human flu pandemic. For the sake of clarity, avian flu (H5N1) is primarily a disease of birds. To date, there have been a very small number of human cases of H5N1 infection in situations where there has been very close contact with infected birds. There is no evidence of efficient human to human transmission.

I would like to draw a very clear distinction between avian flu and the possibility of a future human flu pandemic. Experts advise that such a pandemic may arise as a result of the current H5N1 avian flu situation, but this is by no means inevitable. Nevertheless, the pandemic threat is real: while neither the timing nor the severity of the next pandemic can be predicted, experts advise it is a matter of when it arrives not if.

A global flu pandemic will affect all countries and will cause widespread disease and death, and massive disruption to the health services and to society.

Improving our preparedness to manage a flu pandemic is therefore a high priority for my Department and for the Health Service Executive. A high level pandemic flu plan will be published in December 2006 based on the framework recommended by the World Health Organisation for national pandemic plans and reflecting up to date advice from the Influenza Pandemic Expert Group. The plan will focus on the health response, but will also provide the basis for the contingency planning which must take place across all sectors of society.

It is not possible to predict the impact of the next pandemic: much will depend on the characteristics of the virus, such as the clinical attack rate, the severity of the illness and the resulting case fatality rate. These cannot be known until the pandemic virus emerges. However, in order to assist planning, a number of scientific models of the impact of a pandemic have been developed internationally. In Ireland an empirical model of pandemic influenza has been proposed by the Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC) and adopted for planning purposes. This model can be used to estimate the number of clinical cases, hospitalisations and deaths that will occur in Ireland during each week of a 15-week single wave pandemic, in the absence of any interventions.

The planning assumptions are:

a 25% clinical attack rate resulting in almost 980,000 clinical cases in the course of a pandemic hospitalisation rate between 0.55% and 2.4%, with a minimum total of 5,400 influenza-related hospitalisations over the 15 weeks peaking at 1,100 during week 6; and

a minimum total of 3,600 influenza-related deaths over the 15 weeks with a peak of 780 during week 6.

These assumptions are being kept under review and may be revised in line with international advice and risk assessment.

The following list gives an indication of ongoing preparedness activities:

the Influenza Pandemic Expert Group is updating expert guidance for publication in December;

the Pandemic Influenza Operational Response Plan is being updated in line with the most up to date expert advice;

a Standing Inter-Departmental Committee has been established to consider issues which go beyond the health aspects of an influenza pandemic;

arrangements have been made to procure a stockpile of the human H5N1 vaccine for key health care workers and other essential workers — my Department is also actively pursuing an advanced purchase order for a pandemic strain vaccine;

we have stockpiled 1 million treatment packs of the antiviral drug, Tamiflu, and a supply of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (oseltamivir phosphate powder) to treat children aged between 1 to 5 years of age;

on foot of expert advice, we are now stockpiling additional supplies of the other suitable antiviral drug, Relenza; and

the Expert Group is updating guidance on the non-pharmaceutical public health interventions aimed at reducing the spread of infection with reference to the latest recommendations from the World Health Organisation.

I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the progress made over the past year in preparing for a possible flu pandemic and this work will continue to be a top priority for my Department and for the HSE in the coming year.