Written answers

Wednesday, 25 October 2006

Department of Foreign Affairs

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

9:00 am

Seán Ryan (Dublin North, Labour)
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Question 100: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his view as to whether the Proliferation Security Initiative, led by the United States since May 2003, is of assistance to or undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [34509/06]

Photo of Dermot AhernDermot Ahern (Louth, Fianna Fail)
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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched in Krakow, Poland on 31 May 2003. The decision to establish PSI originated in part from an incident in December 2002, when Spain intercepted an un-flagged vessel carrying a shipment of Scud missiles, en route from North Korea to Yemen. The ship was subsequently allowed to continue. In response to this incident, a group of countries, led by the United States, agreed to cooperate to interdict vessels on the high seas and to ground aircraft worldwide, which are suspected of carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials.

States participating in PSI activities operate under their own domestic law and in conformity with international law. A Statement of Interdiction Principles was agreed in Paris on 4 September 2003, outlining how suspect vessels could be detained and searched on entering a PSI State's territory, territorial waters or airspace.

In May 2004, under the Irish Presidency, the EU adopted a statement of support for the PSI. The statement noted that the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD contains a number of measures to prevent, deter, halt and, if possible, eliminate proliferation programmes that cause concern at the global level. One of these measures seeks to improve identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking, and, in particular, to provide support for international initiatives aimed at the identification, control and interception of illegal shipments. The statement went on to note that the principal purpose of the PSI complemented well the objectives set out in this Strategy and that the EU and its Member States fully endorsed and subscribed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.

As regards the impact on the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), I would note that the scope of PSI activities is much broader than the area of nuclear weapons and covers all WMD, including chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery. I do not consider that the objectives of the NPT are undermined by activities designed to prevent the acquisition of materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons or their means of delivery; indeed the reverse is the case.

I would also note, in this connection, that Ireland participates in a number of international export control regimes that regulate the supply of sensitive goods that have the potential to be used in the production of WMD or their delivery systems. While such regimes are not explicitly provided for in the NPT, we, nonetheless, see this activity as a necessary complement to our multilateral treaty obligations.

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