Ciarán Cuffe (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party)
Link to this: Individually | In context

Question 553: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if his attention has been drawn to improvements that have been provided at the Sellafield plant in recent years to protect the highly active storage tanks from terrorist attack or accidental damage; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [18080/06]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
Link to this: Individually | In context

A review of security in relation to sensitive nuclear sites, including Sellafield, was undertaken by the United Kingdom authorities in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. This review, which was considered necessary given the threat posed by a malicious attack at Sellafield was welcomed by the Irish Government. Following this review, current UK policy is based on restricting access to security sensitive information to those who have an operational need for such information.

However, I have been advised by the UK Government that the highly active storage tanks are extremely robust structures, housed in massive, thick walled and roofed, reinforced concrete cells designed to provide radiation shielding and assessed to withstand seismic events. The security review concluded that no structural modifications to the highly active storage tanks themselves were required to maintain their integrity against a range of newly perceived threats, including aircraft impact.

Arising from the improved co-operative arrangements put in place between the Government and the UK Government, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland visited the Sellafield facility in September 2004. The detailed report by the Institute on their visit with significant references to the highly active storage tanks on the site is available on their web site at http://www.rpii.ie/download/Sellafieldvisit.pdf.

Under these co-operation arrangements access to Sellafield has also been provided by the UK Authorities to An Garda Síochána. A number of visits have taken place since June 2003, the reports of these, while they cannot be published for security reasons, do not identify issues of particular concern.

The Office Of Civil Nuclear Security, the body specifically responsible for the security of civil nuclear sites in the UK, reports separately on an annual basis to the Secretary of Trade and Industry in the UK. These reports are publicly available at http://www.ecdti.co.uk/cgibin/perlcon.pl and make various references to improved security initiatives at nuclear sites including reviews of vital areas which contain equipment, systems or devices, the failure of which could have serious consequences for the safe and secure operation of a nuclear site.

In January 2001, the UK Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate issued British Nuclear Fuels with a specification to formalise a programme to reduce the level of highly active liquid waste stored at Sellafield to a buffer stock limit of 200 cubic metres (m3) by the year 2015. This specification, which is a legal requirement, required that the maximum permitted holding of this liquid waste would reduce from the then permitted holding level of 1575m3 by about 35 m3 per annum until 2012, when it would be decreased rapidly to the buffer stock limit of 200 m3. I understand the operator is complying with this specification.

Notwithstanding these advances, the Government and the Institute have long been concerned about the continuing storage of highly active liquid waste in these tanks arising from reprocessing and have been pressing, and will continue to press, the UK Authorities to accelerate the rate of vitrification. Reprocessing operations are strongly opposed by Ireland on the grounds that they are an unacceptable threat to human health, the environment and the economy. The Irish Government will therefore continue to pursue every available avenue, both diplomatic and legal, to bring about a safe and orderly end to reprocessing operations at Sellafield, and ultimately to bring about the safe and orderly closure of the plant itself.