Emmet Stagg (Kildare North, Labour)
Link to this: Individually | In context

Question 90: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views on whether the general failure by key state parties to implement the nuclear proliferation treaty is a crucial element in the current impasse over Iran's development of nuclear technology; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [6978/06]

Tom Hayes (Tipperary South, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context

Question 106: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs the discussions that Iran has had with the EU3 (details supplied) with regard to nuclear development in Iran; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [6853/06]

Enda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context

Question 120: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs the latest status of IAEA testing in Iran; the discoveries which have been made with regard to nuclear development; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [6842/06]

Dermot Ahern (Louth, Fianna Fail)
Link to this: Individually | In context

I propose to take Questions Nos. 90, 106 and 120 together.

The IAEA board of governors adopted a further resolution on 4 February 2006 which set out a number of confidence building measures that Iran should take and requested Iran to extend full and prompt co-operation to the agency, which the director general deemed was indispensable and overdue. In particular, Iran was requested to help the agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension. The resolution asked the director general to report to the UN Security Council that these steps are required and also to report all relevant reports and resolutions. A further report from the director general is scheduled to be issued in advance of the next board of governors meeting on 6 to 10 March. It will thereafter also be sent to the Security Council.

An oral report by the IAEA deputy director general at the 2 to 4 February board of governors meeting detailed a number of recent discoveries by the IAEA inspection team relating to Iran's nuclear programme. One issue of particular concern to the IAEA inspectors, which was noted in the resolution reporting Iran to the Security Council, is the existence of a document concerning the production of uranium metal hemispheres. The process of producing these uranium metal hemispheres is related to the production of nuclear weapon components.

Following the decision by the IAEA board of governors to report Iran to the Security Council, Iran notified the IAEA that it would no longer implement the provisions of the IAEA additional protocol. The IAEA will now revert to an inspector presence in Iran based on its safeguards agreement of 1974. This agreement allows the agency, inter alia, to take environmental samples at declared facilities and use unattended monitoring equipment. However, the IAEA will no longer have the same degree of access, for example, access at short notice to all buildings on a nuclear site, or the taking of environmental samples beyond declared locations. Negotiations between the E3-EU and Iran are currently suspended following Iran's decision in August 2005 to recommence conversion of uranium at its Isfahan facility. This action was in breach of the Paris agreement signed by Iran and the E3-EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in November 2004. There had been several rounds of these negotiations and the E3-EU had just presented detailed written proposals before Iran's actions in August brought the process to an end.

Last December, officials representing the E3-EU and Iran met in Vienna to explore whether there was a basis for a resumption of negotiations. There was no concrete outcome from the talks but both sides agreed to meet again in January. Before the meeting took place, Iran decided to recommence enrichment related activities. I believe that the issue can still be solved by negotiations but this will require a co-operative and transparent approach on the part of the Iranian government and the implementation of the confidence building measures set out by the board of governors.

There have been suggestions that the failure to implement the NPT on the part of other states may be a factor in the current impasse over Iran's nuclear programme. Moreover, the fact that Israel, India and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT undoubtedly adds to tension in the wider region. At the same time, all parties to the NPT have obligations which must be implemented in full; conditional implementation is not an option. At the NPT review conference in New York last May I made clear the particular importance Ireland attributes to the nuclear disarmament obligations in the treaty. I stated my conviction that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring irreversible progress on both fronts. At the same time, I stressed that neither the continued retention of nuclear weapons nor the unsatisfactory rate of progress in their elimination can ever serve as a justification for proliferation by other states.