Seán Ryan (Dublin North, Labour)
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Question 143: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he has raised with his United Kingdom counterpart the concerns expressed by the All Ireland Nuclear Free Local Authorities Forum that rising sea levels will speed up the destruction of the Drigg radioactive waste disposal site thus causing problems for future generations; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [30300/05]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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The Drigg facility, which is located quite near the Sellafield plant, is a low level waste disposal facility and is run by British Nuclear Fuels Limited, BNFL. The overall responsibility for the Drigg site, as well as a number of other sites including Sellafield, has been assumed by the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority as of last April.

The Environment Agency regulates all disposal activities in the UK in accordance with Government policy. Disposal activities are subject to authorisation by the agency, and these authorisations are periodically reviewed. The agency has recently reviewed BNFL's post closure safety case and 2002 operational environmental safety case for Drigg. The agency's report on these safety cases is critical of a number of aspects.

BNFL has failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Environment Agency that radiation exposure to future generations from the site would not, potentially, increase. BNFL estimates that the facility could be destroyed by erosion from the sea within 500 years but this could happen sooner because of global warming and the consequent rise in sea level.

On this basis, the Environment Agency has recommended that BNFL undertake further work to improve the safety cases by considering a wider range of management options. These include constructing a thicker, more robust cap over the site; limiting future disposals to material with a half life of less than five years; removal of existing long-lived wastes from the trenches; extending the active management beyond 150 years; and combinations of the above.

The Nuclear Decommissioning Agency has a draft strategy open for consultation which includes the Drigg site. This draft strategy is under consideration by my Department and the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and a number of meetings with representatives of the authority are scheduled. Following detailed consideration of the draft strategy a submission will be made to the consultation and issues related to the Drigg site will be included in this submission.

Emmet Stagg (Kildare North, Labour)
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Question 144: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government his views on whether the RPII's attention has not been drawn to the re-evaluation by the UK authorities of the threat of a terrorist attack on the BNFL site at Sellafield on the grounds of security; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [30296/05]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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A review of security in relation to sensitive nuclear sites, including Sellafield, was undertaken by the United Kingdom authorities in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. This review was welcomed by the Irish Government and considered necessary given the threat posed by a malicious attack at Sellafield. As a result of this review, current UK policy is based on restricting access to security sensitive information to those who have an operational need for such information.

The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland visited the Sellafield facility in September 2004. The institute's ensuing report of this visit contends that the lack of an established framework for assessing the adequacy of threat assessments and security arrangements remains a significant concern. In this regard, the additional access provided by the UK authorities to the Garda Síochána has been useful. A visit took place in June 2003, and while the report is confidential, the overall view formed was reassuring. Further visits and contacts at senior police level are continuing. Additionally, assurances to the effect that the terrorist threat to Sellafield nuclear plant is continually reviewed and assessed have been received from the UK authorities.

Notwithstanding these advances, the safety of Sellafield and the protective measures in place to secure this are a particular ongoing concern in Ireland and are the subject of regular discussions at both ministerial and official level between the UK and Ireland. Further assurances were sought and received by me most recently in my meeting with the UK Secretary of State, Alan Johnson MP, on Wednesday last. They have also been addressed in the context of Ireland's case concerning the Sellafield MOX plant under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS.

Security at UK nuclear installations is regulated by the Office of Civil Nuclear Security, OCNS, which reports to the Minister for State for Energy at the UK Department of Trade and Industry. In his most recent report, the director of the OCNS advised the Minister that he was satisfied with the standards, procedures and commitment among those involved with civil nuclear security in the UK and that the measures in place are proportionate to the threat.

Seán Ryan (Dublin North, Labour)
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Question 145: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government the position regarding the international legal action taken by the Government with a view to securing the closure of the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [30299/05]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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The Government initiated international legal proceedings against the UK under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, in relation to the Sellafield MOX plant. The current position in relation to the litigation by Ireland under UNCLOS is that the arbitration remains suspended pending resolution of jurisdictional issues in the dispute, which were raised by the European Commission. These issues are now the subject of legal proceedings between Ireland and the Commission before the European Court of Justice and a court hearing of the case is scheduled for 8 November next.

The tribunal in the UNCLOS case issued an order on 24 June 2003 after hearing an application by Ireland for provisional measures. The provisional measures award and orders recommended that Ireland and the UK enter into dialogue to improve co-operation and consultation between the two Governments and report to the tribunal on specified dates. The most recent report to the tribunal was submitted on schedule by both parties on 31 May 2005 and the next report is due to be submitted by 30 November. In line with the obligation on both parties to improve co-operation and co-ordination arrangements, complex discussions, confidential to the tribunal and the parties pending outcomes, are continuing.

It was my stated intention to report on progress arising from this process at the appropriate instance and the signing of an agreement on notification and exchange of information. Arrangements between Ireland and the UK on 10 December 2004 afforded the two parties an opportunity to do so. The agreed package of measures announced is designed to address a wide range of issues related to nuclear safety and includes, inter alia, the facilitating of visits to Sellafield by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and the Garda Síochána, provision of access for the institute to the UK's radiation monitoring system and a series of initiatives to develop and improve existing co-operation arrangements between both Governments.

In accordance with the commitment in the programme for Government to use every legal and diplomatic opportunity to secure the orderly closure of Sellafield, both I and my Department utilise all bilateral and multilateral opportunities to articulate Ireland's concerns in relation to Sellafield. Considerable opportunities arise at international fora such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, the European Union and OSPAR Commission to advance our views on issues such as marine transport of nuclear waste, nuclear safety, and radioactive discharges to the marine environment. All these issues have direct relevance to Ireland's concerns regarding Sellafield and I intend to continue Ireland's proactive engagement at these and other fora with a view to maximising support for our policies among like-minded states.