Michael Ring (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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Question 342: To ask the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources if his attention has been drawn to the fact that the extremely dangerous 345 bar Rossport pipeline of a company (details supplied) runs alongside the public road over significant portions of its length despite there being no precedent worldwide for such a pipeline passing through inhabited areas. [19355/05]

Michael Ring (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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Question 343: To ask the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources if his attention has been drawn to the fact that, with respect to version F of the risk assessment concerning the Rossport section of pipeline, it relates specifically and only to onshore, that is, refined, depressurised gas pipelines and is therefore entirely inadequate and inappropriate to gas-field pipelines operating at extremely high pressures and containing obstructive slugs such as are proposed at Rossport, that the HAZID hazard identification model employed was developed specifically for onshore pipelines and is therefore entirely inadequate and inappropriate for that which is proposed at Rossport and that the two risks which give rise to the gravest fears, that is, explosion of the pipeline and failure of the umbilical, have entirely and specifically been excluded from analysis in the risk assessment. [19356/05]

Noel Dempsey (Meath, Fianna Fail)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 342 and 343 together.

The quantified risk assessment, QRA, version F, which was carried out on the onshore Corrib gas pipeline that will be carrying unprocessed gas to the terminal, does take into account the pressure and nature of fluids that the pipeline will carry. That QRA addresses the onshore pipeline for the Corrib gas project. That QRA was not prepared for an onshore refined gas pipeline.

To clarify the position regarding pipeline pressures, the normal operating pressure at the start of production will be 120 bar, and the absolute maximum operating pressure will be 150 bar. The design pressure is 345 bar, as this is the initial reservoir pressure, and if production is shut in at the terminal and the sub-sea and subsurface valves in the field fail to close properly, the pipeline pressure could eventually rise to that figure, although it would probably take some time for that to happen.

The capacity of 345 bar was allowed for the purpose of providing the best emergency responses in the unlikely event of emergencies arising with the transportation of gas from the field to the terminal.

Michael Ring (Mayo, Fine Gael)
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Question 344: To ask the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources if, in view of his consent for the Rossport section of pipeline being founded on the original risk assessment and Johnston report, both of which are now defunct, he will acknowledge that said consent is consequently invalid and that the compulsory acquisition orders relevant thereto are null and void. [19357/05]

Noel Dempsey (Meath, Fianna Fail)
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Mr. Johnston's report on the pipeline design and the quantified risk assessment, QRA, based on that design are not defunct, and therefore any consents given by my predecessors for the pipeline and the compulsory acquisition of rights over land remain valid.

The QRA, version F, was submitted in support of the developer's application for consent to install and commission the onshore pipeline. That QRA is the updated version of the original series of QRAs prepared for the onshore pipeline. It does not depart in any relevant or material manner from the original version.