Fergus O'Dowd (Louth, Fine Gael)
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Question 128: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government his views on the issues raised in the recent report of the RPII visit to Sellafield; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [16446/05]

Michael D Higgins (Galway West, Labour)
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Question 130: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he has raised with the British Foreign Secretary the issue of the refusal of the authorities in Sellafield to make information which has been sought available for the Radiological Institute of Ireland; the steps he intends to take to make such information available; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13547/05]

Billy Timmins (Wicklow, Fine Gael)
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Question 138: To ask the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he has considered the recent report of the RPII visit to BNFL Sellafield; his views on the findings in relation to terrorist threats to the facility; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [12430/05]

Dick Roche (Wicklow, Fianna Fail)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 128, 130 and 138 together.

I welcome the publication of the report on the visit of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, to the Sellafield nuclear plant. I gave a commitment in December last that this report would be made public and was pleased to be presented with a copy by the RPII chairman when it was published recently. I would like to thank all those involved in facilitating this visit and commend the quality of the report which is clear and concise in its presentation of complex technical issues.

The Government remains opposed to the continued operation of the Sellafield plant. We seek the safe and orderly closure of the Sellafield site and we will continue to explore every diplomatic and legal route to this end. Obviously, the United Kingdom has and continues to hold a significantly different view. However, in my view and for some considerable time, there has been significant scope for both Governments and Administrations to develop a higher level of co-operative engagement on the nuclear issue. It is in this context that the provisional measures order of the UNCLOS tribunal was opportune and significant. This order provided for the development of improved co-operation and co-ordination measures between both Governments on nuclear safety. The visit by the RPII to Sellafield stemmed from discussions between Ireland and the United Kingdom under the terms of the order and further visits by the institute are planned.

This was the first visit to Sellafield by the institute since 2000. As the report clearly demonstrates, the visit helped the RPII to evaluate the associated hazards in the context of emergency preparedness. It also highlighted two areas that are of great concern and interest to Ireland, namely, developments in relation to the storage of high-level liquid radioactive waste on the site and the authorisation of radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea.

The nuclear inspectorate as regulators of Sellafield have imposed a requirement that the volume of liquid waste stored in the highly active storage tanks is to be progressively reduced. While this requirement is welcome, the modest rate of reduction in the volumes of this waste requiring storage at Sellafield up to 2010 does not, I believe, represent a decisive response. It remains to be seen if the recent events in relation to the THORP plant will result in a review of operational priorities at Sellafield that can positively address the risk posed by the long-term storage of highly active radioactive waste in tanks at Sellafield.

The highly active storage tanks represent a significant terrorist threat and the UK authorities have implemented a number of enhanced physical protection measures in attempts to address this risk. Additionally, assurances to the effect that the terrorist threat to Sellafield nuclear plant is continually reviewed and assessed have been received from the UK authorities. Nevertheless, the Government has continued concerns in relation to the threat posed by the highly active storage tanks and this was one of the issues addressed in the international legal actions by the Government against the UK in relation to Sellafield.

There is an obvious conflict between the necessity for the UK authorities to ensure the security of the installation is not compromised by limiting access to security sensitive material and RPII's need for access to information to provide additional evaluation and advice to this Government and the public in relation to threat assessments and security arrangements. In this regard, the additional access provided by the UK authorities to the Garda Síochána has been useful. A visit took place in June 2003, and while the report is confidential, the overall view formed was reassuring. Further visits and contacts at senior police level are continuing. While the issue has not been raised directly with the UK Foreign Secretary, discussions under the UNCLOS order are continuing between Ireland and the UK. Access to further information sought by the institute is one of the issues being addressed in this process.

In relation to marine discharges of radioactive waste from Sellafield, the Irish Government's view remains that continuing radioactive discharges to the Irish Sea from Sellafield are untenable and they should cease. The welcome success of improved abatement techniques recently introduced at Sellafield in reducing dramatically the amount of technetium-99 discharged to the Irish Sea indicates the real potential for addressing this issue in a constructive way.

Overall, the RPII visit and report reflect the benefit of the improved co-operation arrangements between Ireland and the UK, which in no way detract from Ireland's stated objective for the safe and orderly closure of Sellafield.