Maria Byrne (Fine Gael)
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The Minister was discussing amendments Nos. 11 to 19, inclusive. Would he like to continue?

Jim O'Callaghan (Dublin Bay South, Fianna Fail)
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I thank the Leas-Chathaoirleach. I am very pleased to be back in Seanad Éireann on Committee Stage of the defamation Bill. As the Leas-Chathaoirleach indicated, when I finished on the previous occasion I was dealing with amendment No. 11 from Senator Keogan, which was an amendment to section 19 in respect of the anti-SLAPP provisions within the legislation. As I indicated on the last occasion, I am seeking to transpose into the defamation Bill the defamation aspects of the SLAPP directive to ensure that the directive will apply in this legislation to any proceedings that are brought in defamation which violate the principles of the directive.

The SLAPP directive specifically directs focus to the intent behind proceedings, rather than their effect. It defines abuse of court proceedings against public participation as proceedings that "have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of public participation". The Bill's definition uses almost exactly that wording. Adopting a different definition, such as the one suggested by Senator Keogan which focuses on the effect rather than the purpose, risks causing legal confusion and uncertainty and may not correctly transpose the directive. Senator Keogan's amendment also narrows an important potential indicator of SLAPP proceedings, which may often involve multiple lawsuits or threats of lawsuits against the one individual. This is recognised as a feature of SLAPPs, not only by the European Union in the directive but also by the Council of Europe in its recommendation on SLAPPs. For those reasons, I regret to say that I consider it important that we retain that reference in Part C. I cannot accept her amendments Nos. 11 or 12.

I am conscious the Leas-Chathaoirleach said that I was dealing with amendments Nos. 11 to 19, inclusive, which have been grouped. I am aware that Senators Stephenson, Higgins and Ruane also have amendments in respect of that. If they would like to speak, maybe I should hear them in the first instance.

Alice-Mary Higgins (Independent)
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I thank the Minister. We have a series of amendments under this section. I look forward to the Minister's engagement with them. Effectively, the concern in this whole group of amendments relates to the anti-SLAPP provisions in the Bill, which are required, under EU Directive 2024/1069, to be implemented by March of next year. We have concerns that the provisions contained in the Bill put to the House are weak and overly complex and that, as a result, they are likely to be unused or underused by defendants. Without clear and reliable mechanisms for early dismissal and cost protection, which I will come to in some later amendments, defendants will not have certainty that invoking these provisions will result in their case being thrown out.

SLAPP targets could risk being drawn into further layers of costly and time-consuming litigation, rather than being offered protection. This is not only costly to the individual but to all of us who deserve to be made aware of public interest information. I refer to the chilling effect on those who may be wishing to share information. If a case were taken, it may indeed emerge that they have a potential defence or may well have a case, but in many cases they will not be able to take the risk and will be uncertain of the protections that are going to be available to them under the SLAPP application. I raise the chilling effect that happens if we have anti-SLAPP provisions that do not work. It is important to say that they do not just affect the individuals. They affect all of us who may have benefited from the public service of somebody who has relevant information to place in the public realm.

The Government could and should have drawn on established international best practices, including the Council of Europe's recommendations, to provide clear, practical guidance for safeguarding free expression and democratic accountability. It is important to note in this context that this Bill only applies to defamation proceedings, even though SLAPP frequently exploits other causes of action, including privacy, copyright and data protection to intimidate and silence matters of public interest.

I will go to my specific amendments in this grouping. Amendment No. 12 seeks to delete the line that has “but that have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of” and substitute “have the effect of preventing, restricting or penalising”. Amendment No. 12 changes the definition of abuse of court proceedings against public participation so that the prevention or restriction of public participation is not required to be shown to be the main purpose of the Defamation Act. The need to prove that the main purpose of the proceedings is to restrict public participation requires an understanding of the intention of the litigant. It is very vague and subjective and it is open to abuse.I know that is not always the case but in many cases - and this is the concern we are acting from - the vulnerable party who is facing a potential defamation action may not have the same level of resources and we are placing upon them the burden of proving a particular intent on the part of those taking the case. That is quite a difficult thing to prove. It is quite subjective and requires insight into and access to the internal decision-making processes. The Minister has been very clear that defamation cases are used by a wide range of actors in a wide range of circumstances but our concerns and the concerns the EU anti-SLAPP directive was trying to address in looking for anti-SLAPP laws relate to cases where very large, well-resourced and well-equipped actors misuse our legal system to intimidate and silence individuals. This is what the directive was pointing to and what the anti-SLAPP provisions are meant to address. We are not talking about every defamation case. We are talking about tackling the problem of SLAPP cases. These provisions require persons to prove intent rather than to prove something had the effect of preventing, silencing, restricting or penalising or that this was one of its purposes, which is something that might be looked at on Report Stage. Proving that this was the main purpose is a high bar. It is difficult to prove. It is about inferring and demonstrating intent, which is, in many cases, internal and subjective, on the part of the actor taking the potentially aggressive action in what may be a SLAPP case. It is something to be examined again.

The Minister indicated in previous responses to others that he is concerned about cases that simply have this effect but even meeting the burden of proof to show that it was a purpose is not enough. You must miraculously find an email or get evidence of someone saying they will take a case to shut you up. You have to show that is the main purpose and that, among the balance of all other reasons, this is the primary purpose. That is a high bar. I suggest that, even if the Minister is not accepting these amendments at this point, he think about the question of the main purpose. Perhaps it should be required that this be one of the purposes of the case being taken. If one of the purposes of the case being taken is to prevent, restrict or penalise public participation, that should be significant enough for us not to support or allow it to have its desired effect.

Amendment No. 12 simply requires that the legal action would have the effect of preventing public participation. It would ensure that abusive court proceedings against public participation are defined by consideration of the consequences of the legal action, something that can be seen, demonstrated and proven, rather than the intention of the litigant taking the action, which can be ambiguous and difficult to prove. The intent of that person should be given a particular weighting in terms of it being the main purpose.

Amendment No. 13 seeks to delete “manifestly unfounded” and substitute “an abusive lawsuit against public participation”. The term "manifestly unfounded" in the newly inserted section 34E, which sets out the details of an application to strike out a claim or appeal, would be replaced with “an abusive lawsuit against public participation”. The definition of "manifestly unfounded" in the Act does not give a clear indication to the court and is somewhat overcomplicated. This is a clear example of the unnecessary complexity of the anti-SLAPP provisions of this Bill. It could lead to layers of litigation, allowing powerful and wealthy figures further mechanisms by which they may abuse the legal system to silence critical thought and to create a fear and uncertainty for those faced with these lawsuits that, even in their attempts to have the case dismissed, they may face matters of interpretation. According to whom and to what standards is a claim manifestly unfounded? Again, we are doing this rather than looking to the effect. This means that all you need is one or two cases in which the grounds on which something is considered manifestly unfounded are questioned and where demonstrable ambiguity as to how it is interpreted arises to go back to a point where there is that chilling effect and somebody who is putting important information in the public domain for the purposes of the public interest will not be confident that a case taken against them, even though it may be an abusive case, will be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

It should be borne in mind that the negative effect of having inadequate anti-SLAPP provisions is not contained in the courtroom. It does not happen in the courtroom. The negative impacts of inadequate anti-SLAPP provisions come in the chilling effect on those who, because they are not certain they will be protected from abusive lawsuits, withdraw from or fail to pursue the sharing in the public domain of information they believe is of public interest and important. Amendment No. 13 is an attempt to move away from that unnecessary complexity.

A number of amendments to this section have been proposed but I will only speak to my own. Amendment No. 18 seeks to insert a new section in page 16, between lines 20 and 21, that provides that, upon an application being made under section 34E by a defendant to a proceeding, no further step may be taken in the proceeding until the application, including any appeal against the application, has been finally disposed of. It provides that:

Unless a judge orders otherwise, the claimant is not permitted to amend his or her pleadings in the proceeding— (a) in order to prevent an order under this Act dismissing the proceeding, or

(b) if the proceeding is dismissed under the Act, in order to continue the proceeding.

We will come back to the question of intent or purpose. If, for example, in an initial pleading, it is made clear that one of the purposes, or, indeed, the main purpose according to the high standard and bar set by this Bill, of the case is to discourage public participation, it is important that the claimants are not able to change their pleadings or change the grounds on which they are making their claim in order to avoid a dismissal on the grounds of the claim being manifestly unfounded or, indeed, a rejection on the basis of the intent being the ending or chilling of public participation where that is demonstrated in those pleadings. It is really just to ensure loopholes do not develop whereby the intended provisions of this Bill can be dodged. Amendment No. 18 proposes a stay on court proceedings where the application has been made by a defendant in a defamation case to strike out a claim as an abusive lawsuit against public participation. The Council of Europe's recommendations included instituting an automatic stay on proceedings while an early dismissal motion is being heard. This is designed to protect against abusive litigation.Article 11 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069 indicates that member states shall ensure courts may grant dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims at the earliest possible stage. This is reflected in the proposed section 34E. It is still concerning, and abundantly possible, that such decisions may take time, however. During that period, the fees for court proceedings can build up for the defendant and, again, this effectively gives the claimant a different mechanism to weaponise the costs of retaining representation within the legal system against the defendant. The lack of safeguards is something that could continue to chill public participation. Far from being a solution, the process to strike out a claim could end up extending matters. It is an important mechanism but unless it includes a stay on proceedings, it could exacerbate the problem. Again, there are layers of procedural complexity added in the sections 34F, 34G and 34H that could mean exercising these sections under the process could become counterproductive in that it could become more complex and involve either more time or more legal representation. It could be a matter that not only will people feel, before they even get to a substantive court hearing where they can push back, that they are going to face a series of challenges in relation simply to a request to dismiss.

I come to the second part, which I really urge the Minister to consider, whereby a defamation case is taken and somebody states that it is an abusive case. It is very important that there is no capacity – perhaps the Minister can reassure me that this will not be the case – for a claimant to amend their pleadings when they know it is likely that they will be challenged on the question that it is, potentially, an abusive defamation case. That is important. Other jurisdictions which have implemented poorly designed anti-SLAPP laws have shown that those laws can end up doing more harm than good because they give an illusion of protection while failing to protect against abuse in practice. This results in a loss of trust in the system’s capacity to protect those who are acting in good faith and in the public interest.

Amendment No. 19 seeks to insert the following into the Bill:

Where an application for declaration has been made before or during a trial of action and costs, a judge must not strike out a claim and appeal under section 34E if the claimant satisfies the judge that— (a) the claim is likely to prevail at trail, and

(b) the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the claimant as a result of the defendant’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in dismissing the case before trial.”.

This is complicated. Where there is a defamation action that is considered to be a claim against public participation and an application is made by the defendant to have the case dismissed, amendment No. 19 would place the burden of proof on the claimant to show that their claim is likely to prevail at trial. Rather than the person who is being subjected to the defamation case and who is claiming that it is an abusive case having the burden of proving that the party taking the case against them is acting in a manner that is abusive and that is designed to curtail their public participation, under the amendment, the burden of proof would be reversed. As a result, the party taking the defamation case would be required to show that they are acting in good faith and are not taking the case for the purposes of creating a chilling effect but, rather, because they believe they have reasonable grounds. Their argument may or may not be successful on the basis of those grounds. This is a different approach but it is an attempt to address the question of an excessive burden of proof being placed upon the party who has already potentially been subjected to pressure and a chilling effect. I am aware that this is not true of all defamation cases but it is when it comes to SLAPPs. It would, as stated, reverse the burden of proof. Those who are taking defamation cases in good faith should be able to demonstrate they the latter is, in fact, the position and that they have credible grounds for doing so, with a reasonable possibility of the court finding in their favour. Amendment No. 19 would lay the responsibility with the claimant rather than the defendant when it comes to the burden of proof and in terms of demonstrating that a defamation case is credible and is not unfounded or abusive in nature.

Article 12 of the EU directive, which required that this legislation be brought forward in the first place, states that where there is a claim against public participation "The burden of proving that the claim is well founded rests on the claimant who brings the action." This means that the directive envisages that he burden of proof should sit with the claimant rather than the defendant. Despite this clearly indicated by the directive, we do not see the same burden on the claimant in the Bill before us. We mainly see a set of difficult things for the defendant of the defamation action to prove. This is another example of how the legislation, as drafted, fails to address the potential abuse of the power imbalance in defamation proceedings.

There is a risk to be examined. Many who have contributed to the debate in this House have done so from a legal perspective. I am coming at this from the perspective of 15 years of involvement in civil society before I entered these Houses and on the basis of an awareness of the chilling effect on very poorly resourced organisations, including watchdog organisations and those who some of the most vulnerable groups in society, that face a situation where even the existence of a court case can means they cannot get insurance or continue with their operations. I have given these examples before. I have worked for organisations that have been €2,000, €3,000 or €4,000 away from a project falling. The moneys involved are very small and are very tightly administered. There is not usually a huge contingency fund available. In many instances, we are talking about project funding. Those who may want to blow the whistle or highlight something for the public or who see the effect an action on the part of, for example, large corporation may be having on the ground face a difficult decision about going public with that information and they are in a particularly vulnerable situation at times. There is a reason the EU directive tries to shift the burden of proof and tries to state that we have to have anti-SLAPP legislation.

Let us be really clear about this. The legislation is not just about defamation; it also refers to SLAPPs. Furthermore, it refers to the abuse of the legal process to limit public participation. The latter has been so clearly recognised as a genuine problem in society that the EU directive sets out an obligation to address it. We are not talking hypotheticals; we are talking about a real, noted and definite problem. The challenge we have is to say whether the provisions in the Bill are sufficiently fit for purpose to address that problem. This is not the position with every defamation case. Where there is a SLAPP and where there is an abuse of power – the Minister pointed out that defamation cases can be between all kinds of parties – and of the legal process in order to curtail, intimidate or prevent public participation, will the provisions currently contained in the Bill actually work?Will people be confident enough that a manifestly unfounded case against them will be dismissed quickly, that they will not be disadvantaged and that the process will not drag on, even the process of a dismissal? Will they be confident that they can go ahead with that public information they believe to be important and in the public interest and they are not going to have to prove something almost impossible in terms of proving the intent of a large actor, whose private minutes and correspondences they do not have access to, when they can see the effect? Is it not more appropriate, as the directive called for, to say that, if you are taking a defamation case and somebody says they believe you are taking this defamation case in an abusive manner in order to limit public participation, you would be able to demonstrate that you are not taking this case in an abusive manner in order to limit public participation and that the burden of proof would be on the claimant? That is what Article 12 of the directive wanted. They would have to demonstrate they are acting in good faith, taking this defamation case for demonstrable reasons that are not around the limiting of public participation and are doing so in good faith because they believe they have a credible case. That is a more reasonable place to place the burden of proof. That is not being put in every defamation case. It is put on every defamation case against which a claim of abusive practice has been made, which is not something people do lightly either. I urge the Minister to consider somewhat of a reversal in relation to that burden of proof so that we have anti-SLAPP legislation that actually works and has the desired effect, we move away from the intimidation, silencing and imbalance of power we have seen in SLAPP, and we address the fundamental problem identified in the EU directive. I hope the Minister will consider these amendments. I would like him to consider taking them on board. If he feels there is another way to approach them, I hope he will at least agree and recognise there are concerns that need to be addressed.

Gerard Craughwell (Independent)
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I thank the Minister for his patience in bringing this Bill forward. There are a couple of things I want to address at the outset. In drafting this legislation, part of the purpose behind it was to simplify things and increase clarity where possible but there is a huge media interest in the outcome of this. The various publishing bodies and so forth expect to come out of this pretty good, from what I can see. Maybe I am wrong and the Minister will disagree with me. I am looking at key Irish cases over quite an extended period where potential defamation took place but as I said to the Minister last week when he was here, it is all very well telling somebody they have been defamed and they should take the defamation to the courts but not everybody can afford to go to the courts. Even those who can and who find themselves up against very large or very wealthy organisations may be unwilling to do that.

One thing I would have hoped this legislation might have dealt with was the ambiguous wording used in media, the use of innuendo in media and the use of phrasing or cautious phrasing in media where the liability is not perhaps 100% evident at the outset. I am looking back at key Irish cases like Berry v. The Irish Times in 1973. They were concerned whether the article's innuendo conveyed a defamatory meaning. The court in that case held that even if the wording was indirect, liability may arise if a reasonable reader could infer a damaging meaning. This is where the courts have shown, in my view, great maturity and understanding. In that particular case, it was vagueness but that vagueness did not protect the publisher. In Travers v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd., the plaintiff argued that a vague reference in a newspaper article implied misconduct. The High Court examined whether the words were reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The case highlights how Irish courts scrutinise subtle, suggestive language and in that case the plaintiff was successful. In Corrigan v. Kevin P. Kilrane and Company Solicitors in 1997, the solicitors claimed defamation based on implied allegations in correspondence. The court considered whether the wording, though not explicit, would lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of reasonable people. It shows that even professional communications with vague phrasing can be actionable. Another case against Sunday Newspapers Limited, Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd., concerned whether the publication's generalised statements about wrongdoing were linked to the plaintiff. The court analysed whether the vagueness still allowed readers to identify the plaintiff and infer defamatory meanings. An interesting one is the case of Stillorgan Gas Heating and Plumbing Limited, where the defamation took place in a social media context. In that particular case, the High Court ruled that the company had been defamed and an award of €40,000 was the outcome. It would have been useful if we could have included in the Bill in some way in relation to vague comments, innuendo and so forth that the liability of those publishing such things should not be in any way protected.

On reading section 34A, which amendment No. 11 relates to, the Minister has been very careful in trying to cover all the aces. The specific area I am concerned about is 34A(d), dealing with bad faith. The amendment tabled by Senator Keogan would make a couple of changes. In the first paragraph, the Bill states, "pursue unfounded claims and that are not brought to genuinely assert or exercise a right, but that have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of public participation". Senator Keogan's amendment would change it to "have the effect of preventing". In 34A(d) on the use of bad faith, the Minister has attempted - I think he does a fair job - to cover what bad faith is. I believe the Minister said the previous day he was here that it was too broad to finish on the idea of just using bad faith or procedural tactics. I think he thought it was too broad. In the Bill, he has tried to narrow that down and give a definition of what would be regarded as bad faith or procedural tactics. I have had a few days to look at it. One thing that concerns me is the subjectivity of the term "bad faith". While I understand the Minister is trying to narrow it down, are the hands of the Judiciary being tied in doing so, in that the criteria set out in the Bill must be met? Senator Keogan's amendment allows a lot of discretion on the part of the Judiciary to decide what is and is not bad faith. If we look at the motive behind the notion of bad faith, determining bad faith requires inferring a claimant's intent, which is inherently subjective. Another person may think it is a reasonable argument but the tying down of various things concerns me. The Bill talks about "such as delaying proceedings, fraudulent or abusive forum shopping or the discontinuation of cases at a later stage of the proceedings in bad faith".Let us deal with the last one first. I may go so far in a legal action, which I am paying for, and my lawyers bring me to one side and say to me, "You are not going to win this, you have a chance now to pull out of it and walk away with the least possible damage to yourself, but if you continue on the chances of losing are quite significant." At that stage I have to make up my own mind whether I will go ahead with it or not. On the other hand, the defendant in a case may decide to use every tool in the box in order to delay the case, from my perspective, but from their perspective they are taking every step they possibly can to ensure that their defence is up for running in court. For example, this may involve using discovery. Sometimes discovery leads to delays where the defendant decides they are going to frustrate the discovery or, in some cases, it may be the simple fact that it takes time to get documents. If I am the plaintiff and believe you have documents that will prove my case, I seek discovery on them, the High Court orders discovery and you go to try to find those documents. What I believe you have may not be factual or it may be the case that the documents I am referring to are long since destroyed. I remember a noted senior counsel one time saying to me, "We settled a court case at the Supreme Court." The case had started as an unfair dismissal and it finished up as a Supreme Court case. They settled, which I could not understand, so I asked the senior counsel, "How did you settle when we won the whole way along?" He said, "Every court case is a 50:50 case. At the end of the day, it is how the case is presented." From that point of view, what I believe is bad faith on your part may not be bad faith at all.

Looking at the chilling effects on the claimants, fear of being accused of bad faith may deter an individual from pursuing a defamation case. Some people are very sensitive to words. Words mean a lot. In the natural course of a defamation case in the High Court I may be accused of bad faith, or I may be accused of bad faith before I ever get inside the door of the court. Very often, these cases are between people who knew one another or there was a vague relationship of some sort or other and suddenly one of them is being accused of bad faith. The person's good name is on the line already because they are in there trying to defend it and now somebody is accusing them of bad faith. That may cause them not to go ahead with a defamation case.

The Minister said here last week that everybody has a right to the courts and everybody can have a case settled in the courts. I may be wrong, but if bad faith is something that is going to haunt me, does that undermine my constitutional right to take a matter to the courts? Very often there is a certain amount of ill will towards the publisher of something that you or I may regard as defamation. There is also the situation that there are safeguards within the system already. Do we need to further define those safeguards? Courts already have tools available to them to strike out cases that come before them. I have no doubt that senior counsel on both sides will argue for a strike out at the earliest possible situation. We should remember that if a case has been struck out, there is the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, if one feels that important about it. Adding bad faith as a separate ground risks making some of the tools that are available redundant for all intents and purposes. I am asking the Minister as he is the man who knows these things. Are we in any way trying to limit the discretion of the Judiciary in their interpretation of what may or may not be bad faith?

On procedural tactics, the Minister in his Bill has set out what procedural tactics he wants to define in the Bill and make it fairly easy for those of us who might take defamation cases to understand but, as I said earlier on, procedural tactics could encompass legitimate litigation strategies. A person may require an injunction to stop something happening. A person may require to go to the courts and make applications. Again, as I mentioned, a person could look for the discovery of documents but not get the discovery that he or she feels entitled to and, as such, have to go to the courts and seek the assistance of the courts to get the documents that are being sought. From that point of view, these are genuine honest tactics. Surely what we should do is stop at the term "bad faith" and procedural tactics and allow the Judiciary to decide whether or not what a person is doing, as a plaintiff or defendant, is in bad faith and is a misuse of procedural tactics. What one judge sees as a delay, another judge will see as a fair system or fair means of establishing a case in order to run a legitimate case in the courts to the best possible advantage. I always think when we talk about court cases that both sides are right until one side is proved wrong, and that is always the difficult one.

Defendants could weaponise the provision by alleging the plaintiffs are using procedural tactics. How many times have we heard it from laypeople within the public that they are deliberately setting out to delay my system and they have slowed the system down? There is some justification for that claim. Some cases go on for years on end but are they genuinely slowing it down? Surely we should leave that to a judge to decide rather than prescribing what is procedural tactics at the end.

When it comes to the litigation process for defamation or whatever, I constantly return to the fact that money is needed to take any case to the High Court or any court for that matter. If a defendant is well resourced - a large company or a major national publisher, for example - it can ensure that it delivers the best possible defence for itself by what would seem to me, as a plaintiff, to be deliberate procedural tactics of delaying my case. Is that fair? Again, we should ask the Judiciary to make a decision on that.

On fair trials, this is something that frequently comes up. Early dismissal based on alleged tactics may deny the plaintiff the opportunity to fully present evidence. I do not know. The Minister has appeared in court on behalf of clients. Where a case is struck out, does the client not feel that in some way he or she has been dealt a grave injustice by not having the full rigour of his or her case examined? Certainly anecdotally speaking to people who have been through court cases I have heard these things said very many times. I have to admit that mainly it was in cases of employment law, in which I was involved at various stages in my career.

The other thing is that defamation cases often hinge on a nuance or a context of credibility, and matters need to be tested at trial, not struck out prematurely. I wonder, looking at the definitions, is there a chance that a case would be struck out without being given its 15 minutes or five years in the courts to have the case fully and properly examined by a judge? We are not going to have juries so we are going to depend on the judge in these cases. Are we running the risk of those who feel they have been hard done by having to incur additional costs to lodge an appeal where a case has been struck out? Anecdotally, we know that cases that have been struck out at one level actually do succeed at another level. I am mindful of a case concerning a young boy in Cork and an inoculation.The case went on for ten years, and at the High Court it was struck out. Eventually, when it went back to the Supreme Court, as far as I recall, there were millions involved in the settlement at that time. If it can happen in a case for personal injuries, it can happen in any case.

Going back to the broader policy of things, access to justice is what it is all about. We should try to be as broad as we can and trust our Judiciary because we have skilled lawyers in this country. If a judge errs or if your lawyers feel a judge erred, then they have the capacity to run an appeal on your behalf, and appeals have been successful. I am a little concerned about the term "bad faith" on its own, but if we are to have that section in the Bill, I would rather it was just "bad faith and procedural tactics" with nothing else and left to the Judiciary to define for themselves what they believe is bad faith and what they believe is a misuse of procedural tactics.

There are other things I want to say on other sections but I will leave it for the Minister to respond to now and I appreciate his time and patience on this.

Cathal Byrne (Fine Gael)
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I thank the Minister for being here with us this evening.

I also briefly want to speak on this section 34A and I have several questions which I would be interested in hearing the Minister's contribution on. Similar to some of the earlier points raised on section 34A, at the very beginning it says this protection is against strategic lawsuits against public participation, which we all understand and which is important is incorporated into our laws here in Ireland and that there is clarity brought to the situation which we all know currently exists. However, regarding the definition, where it says that this "means defamation proceedings or part thereof that pursue unfounded claims" and the specific wording there, does that mean at the very beginning of a court case involving defamation, there will need to be an interim hearing to ascertain whether this is an unfounded claim? How is this going to operate in practice?

If it is the case that the barrier and threshold that have to be met in order to rely on this section are that you first must show that you have either a founded claim or an unfounded claim, as the case maybe, depending on which side you are operating on, is that not just creating another procedural threshold that must be first met before this case can continue? Second, in respect of paragraph (d), which has been much discussed, on the question of fraudulent or abusive forum shopping, surely if the case has already made its way into the court, the courts have decided this particular court is the right forum for this case to be heard? Then, in and of itself, it is not possible to argue there is fraudulent or abusive forum shopping taking place because, by the very fact the case has made its way into the court as a forum, inherently that has to be the forum. How is that going to operate in practice? At present, we have a very clear set of rules around which forum a case can be brought to. They are well laid out, much litigated and there is plenty of precedence that can be relied on, but how in practice is that definition of "such as, delaying proceedings, fraudulent or abusive forum shopping" going to make its way through the system?

Is it envisaged there will be further amendments brought into this whole area of forum shopping that were perhaps envisaged when the defamation report was first considered but have not made their way through into this Bill? For instance, if I am somebody who feels I have been defamed by a publication which predominantly is based overseas and which might have a small readership in Ireland but, because of the nature of our laws around defamation, I choose to take the case here in Ireland, is that whole area discussed in the defamation report likely to be incorporated in the future?

Jim O'Callaghan (Dublin Bay South, Fianna Fail)
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First, I thank Senators Higgins, Craughwell and Byrne for their contributions. I thanked Senator Keogan on the last occasion for her amendment also.

Before I start dealing with the amendments that have been spoken to by Senators, it is important at the outset to remind Members here of the powers which exist at present within our courts system. Sometimes as Members of the Oireachtas, we assume all sources of the law derive from our Houses, but in fact, as people will know, the common law exists in this country and there are some advantages of having a common law system operate within our jurisdiction. The effect of the common law is there is an inherent jurisdiction which operates within the High Court in Ireland which has full original jurisdiction, but also the common law means that, over the centuries, judges have looked at situations which have arisen. Even in circumstances where there is not a statutory provision in place to respond to the legal issue raised, the courts have historically, and continue to do so, applied the common law, which is judge-made law, to resolve and respond to circumstances where justice dictates there should be a response.

The reason I say this is to remind people that, for many centuries now, proceedings have been struck out in our courts because those proceedings have disclosed no cause of action, they have constituted an abuse of process or because, to use the language in our rules of court, those proceedings are regarded by the court as being frivolous or vexatious. In case people are concerned this type of issue is not being regulated or responded to by our legal system, that is not correct. It is dealt with on a frequent basis. What will happen is, if a claimant issues proceedings against a defendant in our courts, let us say in the High Court, in Ireland, and if the defendant believes this is a completely frivolous case, an abuse of process or what we are talking about here and now in the Bill - strategic litigation against public participation, there is at present an avenue pursuant to which a defendant can bring an application. If proceedings are issued making an unfounded claim, a manifestly unjust claim or a claim that is frivolous or vexatious, what generally happens is the defendant or party being sued will issue a notice of motion grounded on an affidavit and in the affidavit they will set out the basis upon which they say the claim is an abuse of process, the claim disclosed no causes of action or the claim is frivolous and vexatious. The person then bringing the claim will have to put in an affidavit with their evidence stating why that is not so. There will be an interlocutory or preliminary hearing in respect of these matters in the court before the case ever proceeds to a full hearing. This happens at present, even in the High Court and defamation proceedings, and there will not be any jury involved in this. The High Court will be required to assess whether a claim is in fact an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or whether there is no reasonable cause of action. It will then proceed if it believes that has been established to strike out the proceedings.

It is important we are aware there is a remedy for this type of situation already in our legal system. What we are doing here is ultimately transposing an EU directive, namely, Directive 2024/1069, in respect of strategic lawsuits against public participation. We are all aware that, in this Bill, it is limited to defamation proceedings. However, as I have indicated, I will be bringing other legislation before the Houses for the purpose of transposing that directive in respect of all other types of proceedings. My primary purpose here is to transpose what is in the directive for the purpose of defamation proceedings. That is why when Senator Higgins raised her amendment No. 12, which was identical to Senator Keogan's amendment No. 11, I had to respond by saying I cannot accept the amendment No. 12.This is because it would interfere with the transposition of the EU directive. We know the directive defines abusive court proceedings against public participation as proceedings that have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of public participation. It is proposed by Senator Higgins that there be a different definition, which would focus on the effect rather the purpose. As I said in response to Senator Keogan, I cannot agree to that amendment because it would not, in my opinion, correctly transpose the directive.

However, it is worth pointing out that the rules in respect of frivolous and vexatious proceedings, the rules in respect of abusive court proceedings or where there is no reasonable cause of action that are there at present will still continue. There will be an opportunity if a defendant in defamation proceedings wants to bring proceedings, or bring an application on the basis they believe the proceedings are strategic litigation against public participation and they are abusive court proceedings against public participation, to do so on a statutory basis under this legislation, once it is enacted. Alongside that will be the ongoing rules of court and inherent jurisdiction at the High Court, which permit applications to be made for the broader reasons I set out. I cannot accept Senator Higgins's amendment No. 12. I do not believe it is necessary.

Before I deal with Senator Craughwell's issues, I will proceed by dealing with amendments Nos. 13 to 15, inclusive, put forward by Senator Higgins, which seek to delete the reference to "manifestly unfounded" contained in section 34E of the Bill. Section 34E transposes Article 11 of the directive, under which a court may strike out proceedings that have been initiated against a person on account of their engagement in public participation, without proceeding to a full hearing, if satisfied these proceedings are manifestly unfounded. I understand the Senator's desire to provide protection for those targeted by abusive proceedings against public participation. However, this aim must also be balanced with the constitutional right of access to the courts.

Section 34E(2) outlines an indicative list of circumstances where proceedings might be considered manifestly unfounded. For example, it includes where the endorsement of claim "is an abuse of the process of the court", which would seem to reflect the Senator's point in relation to abusive proceedings. The list is expressed to be non-exhaustive and is broader than that contained in the general scheme, taking account of the recommendations made by the justice committee in pre-legislative scrutiny. The wide definition aims to allow the court enough flexibility to balance those rights as fairly as possible in the circumstances of each case. These amendments would substitute the current requirement for a court to be satisfied that proceedings were "manifestly unfounded" with a requirement merely to be satisfied that the proceedings came within the definition of abusive proceedings against public participation. I am satisfied the list provided in section 34E is sufficiently broad and appropriately reflects the requirements of the directive. I do not consider that the amendments would provide any additional protections. Therefore, I cannot accept amendments Nos. 13 to 15, inclusive.

Amendment No. 16, tabled by Senator Keogan, would insert a new section 34EA into Part 4A. Section 34EA(1) would prohibit the taking of any further steps in proceedings in respect of which an application for early dismissal has been made under section 34E. I do not consider such an amendment to be necessary. First, section 34E requires the court to act as expeditiously as possible in determining an application for early dismissal and, second, in practical terms, it is difficult to envisage what further steps in the proceedings would arise in advance of the determination of that application by the court. Rules of court also provide the court with discretion to stay proceedings, where an order to strike out those proceedings has been made. This provides flexibility to the court so that cases can be dealt with according to their particular circumstances rather than the Legislature providing for a blanket rule, which may not suit all cases.

At present, in circumstances where an application is made to strike out proceedings on the grounds they are abusive, frivolous or vexatious, the effect of that application is the proceedings are, in effect, stayed. No further steps are taken in the proceedings because nothing can happen until that interlocutory application is determined. Even if that interlocutory application is then appealed, nothing would happen in the proceedings because the proceedings cannot go any further until such time as that issue has been finally determined.

Section 34EA(2) introduced by amendment No. 16 would prevent a plaintiff from amending their pleadings in proceedings, subject to an early dismissal application, in order to avoid such dismissal or to continue the proceedings after dismissal. This is also the effect of the new section 34EA(2) proposed by Senators Higgins and Ruane in amendment No. 18. Amendment No. 18 would also insert a new section 34EA(1) which would allow the target of SLAPP proceedings in a defamation case to apply for a declaration that the proceedings in question are abusive proceedings at the same time as he or she applies for early dismissal of those proceedings. This is already provided for in the existing section 34F(1) to be inserted by section 19 of the Bill, so it is unnecessary.

I understand the intention behind these amendments. I note that section 34EA(2) proposed in both amendments reflects the requirement in Article 8 of the anti-SLAPP directive, which requires member states to ensure that subsequent amendments to claims, pleadings or withdrawals of claims made by the claimant in SLAPP proceedings do not affect the possibility for the defendant to apply for remedies provided for by the directive. However, as the rules of court provide for rules and limitations with respect to the amendment of proceedings, I do not consider it necessary to introduce any additional provisions specifically in relation to applications under section 34E. For those reasons, I cannot accept amendments Nos. 16 and 18.

Amendments Nos. 17 and 19 provide that where an application is made for early dismissal under section 34E, the claim shall not be struck out if the claimant demonstrates, first, that the claim is likely to proceed at trial and, second, "the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the claimant as a result of the defendant’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in dismissing the case before trial." My understanding is that this provides for a somewhat automatic presumption in favour of strike-out, once an application has been made, unless a defendant can demonstrate not only that a claim is likely to prevail at trial, but also that the harm suffered by the claimant in the proceedings is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceedings to continue outweighs the public interest in dismissing the case before trial.

I understand the purpose of this amendment is to enhance protections for the targets of SLAPP proceedings. I also note that Article 12 of the directive provides that where a defendant has applied for early dismissal, it shall be for the claimant to substantiate the claim in order to enable the court to assess whether it is manifestly unfounded. However, it must be remembered that the striking out of proceedings represents a limitation on the right of access to the courts. The amendments put forward, in this case, would deprive a claimant of the right to take proceedings, which they had demonstrated were likely to proceed, unless it could be demonstrated that it was in the public interest to allow that claim to continue. This gives rise to a serious risk that the provision would be seen as an unjust interference in an individual's constitutional right not only to access the courts, but also to vindicate their right to a good name.

At present, section 34E allows a plaintiff to apply for early dismissal of proceedings on the basis that those proceedings are manifestly unfounded. The court has indicated in previous cases that it can apply the strike-out doctrine so that a defendant can make out a prima facie case of abuse by showing that the case has indicators of a SLAPP action. The onus would then shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the case was bona fide and not taken for the purpose of oppression. Section 34E seeks to transpose the directive and carefully balances the right of access to the courts and freedom of expression.

I consider section 34E to provide sufficient flexibility to the court to ensure cases that should go to full hearing are permitted to do so. It will also be remembered that even where an application for early dismissal is unsuccessful, it remains open to the target of SLAPP proceedings to seek a declaration at any stage before, during or at the conclusion of the action that the proceedings are abusive proceedings. Where such a declaration is obtained, the target of those proceedings may not only recover their costs on a more generous basis than normally provided for, but may also seek damages to compensate for any harm suffered as a result of those proceedings. On that basis, I consider Part 4A to provide protection for the targets of SLAPP proceedings, while maintaining an appropriate regard for the constitutional right of access to the courts and the obligation on the State to vindicate the individual's right to a good name. For those reasons, I cannot accept amendments Nos. 17 and 19.Senator Higgins approached her amendments from the point of view of the perspective of individuals who may be sued before our courts and who may regard themselves as being the target of SLAPP proceedings. From the perspective of those individuals, I have to say that the provisions that have been introduced in Part 4A are very effective and novel in terms of providing a mechanism, not just for the person to bring the application to strike out or get a declaration, but also for a claim on damages on the basis that they can say that they have been sued inappropriately, that they were the subject and target of strategic litigation against public participation and, as a result of that, they are entitled to remedy beyond the standard remedy, which is the award of costs. In the Part that I am proposing to introduce, not only will they get higher costs if they can establish that they were the target of strategic litigation against public participation, but they also will have the remedy of seeking and perhaps being ordered damages. That is my response in respect of Senator Higgins's amendments and comments.

Senator Craughwell, in fairness to him, looked at it - and this is the great balance we get in this House - more with the eye of a claimant. It is important that we get a perspective in this House that looks at it not just from the point of view of parties who may be sued, but also from the point of view of a party who is a claimant. One of the issues that was raised by Senator Craughwell was his concern about innuendo and whether the Bill sufficiently takes into account the innuendo that can be used for the purpose of communicating and publishing a defamatory meaning. My own belief, and it is a strong one, is that this is adequately provided for already in the Defamation Act and in our defamation laws. It is a matter for the court to determine what is the meaning of a publication. As I mentioned here on another occasion, a very damaging meaning can be communicated through the use of an innuendo or a reference. I think Senator Ruane referred, on Committee Stage, to how a prominent politician brought proceedings simply because a publication had been put up on social media, asking "Why is politician X so quiet at present?" That might appear to individuals in this House as being a completely innocuous, non-defamatory publication but, in fact, that was published on social media at a time when the whole of social media was engrossed by the fact that a politician who had not been identified was alleged to have been involved in the abusive sexual assault of another person. The meaning of that statement, "Why is politician X so quiet?", in that context was indicative, and the court held it to mean that it is clearly an innuendo suggesting that he was the politician who was involved in that sexual assault. At present, in our law, innuendo is well covered. It is not just in the law at present. The Senator referred to the case of Berry v. The Irish Times. The plaintiff in that case was a former Secretary General of the Department of which I am now the Minister. That was a case that involved a photograph and a sign, a reference to him as being a modern-day felon setter. That was a case in which he ultimately succeeded.

Senator Craughwell also mentioned a few other things in terms of discovery and bad faith. What we have to realise is that when proceedings get before a court, every aspect of the dispute is taken into account by the court. Sometimes when it comes to drafting legislation, we should not try to be too prescriptive in what we provide or how we define bad faith. A court understands what is meant by the terms "bona fides" and "bad faith". We have to be careful about being too prescriptive in our definition. I disagree with the senior counsel who gave advice to whomever it was that every case is 50-50. Not every case is 50-50. If every case was 50-50, there would be no purpose in retaining lawyers or anyone to advocate on your behalf. There is no case which is not without risk, certainly in terms of defamation cases. It is certainly not correct to say that every case is 50-50.

The Senator mentioned that one cannot go to court for defamation without money. That is not my assessment of it. I am not going to read them out now, but if you look at some of the very prominent cases that have been taken in defamation in recent years, particularly when the people have been very successful in their defamation claims, very many of them have been people who were hard on their luck, did not have much money and were able to take a case because of the principle that operates for funding in most Irish litigation, which is that the solicitor will take the case on the basis of no foal, no fee. If you win the case, you get your costs; if you lose the case, you get nothing. I know people are sometimes cynical about that rule, but it is a significant aspect of funding litigation in Ireland. It requires lawyers to carefully assess whether a case is good or not. It is fair to say that a lawyer is not going to devote a huge amount of time and energy to a case which they believe is not going to succeed if, at the end of the day, they do not get paid anything for it.

Senator Byrne raised a couple of questions. The first was about the reference to the pursuit of unfounded claims in section 34A. The Senator asked if there will always be an application at the outset of defamation proceedings. The answer to that is "No". Most defamation proceedings are not black and white. Where you are dealing with strategic litigation against public participation or abuse of court proceedings, my own view is that they will be a very small element of proceedings which are issued in defamation. It is unquestionably the case that defendants in defamation proceedings will not like it. Very many of them will regard the claim as being unfair or abusive, but it is not for them to determine that. Just because a defendant thinks it is unfair that they are being sued for defamation does not mean that it is abuse of court proceedings. There will not always be interim applications. If somebody issues proceedings in the High Court against an entity - let us say a Senator is sued and they believe they are being targeted for abuse of court proceedings - the defendant in that instance can bring an application, pursuant to what is set out here, seeking to strike out the claim under section 34E or looking for a declaration under section 34F. That will be heard promptly. It will be heard before the case progresses any further. If the defendant succeeds in it, they may then be able to proceed and claim damages. I suspect, in most cases, people will realise that it is a big task to be able to convince a court that proceedings being instituted against a person are abuse of court proceedings. In my own experience, most people do not issue court proceedings for the purpose of intimidating others, although that can be the effect of them.

The Senator also asked about abusive forum shopping, which is contained in section 34A(d). When we talk about forum shopping, generally that is a term that arises where people are looking to bring proceedings in different jurisdictions. It can happen now in defamation because of publication online. If somebody publishes information about an individual online, it is published all around the world. Notwithstanding that, generally people institute proceedings in the area where their reputation is established, where they are best known. That sometimes can be more difficult with a very famous person or a person who is renowned internationally. There are many American people living in America who will have reputations here. I do not want to get too detailed, but a court will take into account whether or not the forum is the forum conveniens- the appropriate forum for the taking of proceedings.

The Senator also asked if there will be further amendments regarding forum shopping. I do not believe there will be further amendments. If this legislation is enacted, I do not think we will be seeing many applications being brought under Part 4A because it is already the case that when it comes to issuing defamation proceedings, plaintiffs are aware and will be advised that issuing abuse of court proceedings is not a sensible thing to do. In the first instance, you will be met with an application to strike out. If you are not, you are ultimately going to end up in court for the case to be determined.If you have an abusive case that is not merited, you will lose your case and that will have negative consequences for you. From the point of view of Part 4A, what really distinguishes it is that if someone does it, they find themselves in a situation where the party being sued can also bring a claim for damages against them.

That is all I have to say in respect of those amendments contained within the grouping, namely, amendments Nos. 11 to 19, inclusive. I hope I have answered the Senators' questions.

Gerard Craughwell (Independent)
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I thank the Minister. He has destroyed some of my paperwork in his answers, but that is fine. I want to go back to section 34A(d). The Minister made points in his speech about a couple of things, one of which was judge-made law. We are very lucky in this country that judges can make law and, indeed, some of the laws they make can be challenged by other judges or changed by other judges. That is a good thing. The Minister also made the point that we do not want to be too prescriptive. In legislation, we want to allow as much flexibility as we possibly can and trust our legal system to deliver fair and just results for litigants at all times. When it comes to Report Stage, is there any chance the Minister would stop in section 34A(d) at "the use in bad faith of procedural tactics" and leave that discretion to the Judiciary and let the Judiciary make up its mind as to what is and is not bad faith and what are and are not procedural tactics? If we look at it from a plaintiff's point of view, to have these things thrown in there could make a layman a little bit afraid. I trust the Judiciary in this country. Maybe I am wrong, but I do.

I want to go back to amendment No. 13. The Minister has said he will not accept this amendment, which seeks to delete the fairly strong phrase “manifestly unfounded”. The Minister makes the point that there is little evidence in Ireland of people taking cases to frustrate or delay people. There is a very high-profile businessman in this country who, between 2015 and 2018, took a case against The Irish Times. He brought multiple defamation proceedings against media outlets following the coverage of financial dealings. The suits were widely criticised as attempts to intimidate journalists and chill reporting on matters of public interest. I have not named the individual. I do not believe I should, at this stage. Even though some of the claims were unsuccessful, the litigation consumed significant resources and created a chilling effect on investigative reporting. One of the things I find - the Minister is in politics like I am - is that there is very little of what used to be investigative reporting in this country. The best example we have is "Prime Time Investigates" but in print media, there is very little by way of genuine investigative reporting, in my view.

There was another case taken between a voluntary group and developers. It was an environmental NGO that was involved. Community activists faced defamation threats from a developer when opposing a planning project. Ireland Anti-SLAPPs Network's submission to the justice committee highlighted that as a classic example. I think the Minister was a member of the committee at that time. There are several examples of journalists threatened with defamation suits and one that related to one particular gender group. Irish journalists investigating corruption and misconduct were threatened with defamation cases by several very powerful figures. The threats often did not proceed to trial but served as legal intimidation tactics to discourage publication. There is also the case between a well-known politician and media outlets. The politician initiated defamation proceedings against newspaper reporting. The allegation was that the proceedings were initiated purely to silence the media. It is a serious situation if we can introduce litigation purely to silence comment or what we believe is unfair comment. From that point of view, I am happy the Minister said in his presentation that if a defamation case was taken against me, for example, that was only designed to shut me up for a period of time-----

Jim O'Callaghan (Dublin Bay South, Fianna Fail)
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That would be hard.

Gerard Craughwell (Independent)
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----- and I could show it was a misuse of the system, I could get damages for that and, more importantly, my legal team could get top-of-the-range fees for it. Is there a case to be made for criminal charges against somebody who uses the court system to frustrate what is legitimate comment? I am talking about the public domain.

I will come back in a few minutes with something else. I am interested in the Minister's answers on those points.

Pat Casey (Fianna Fail)
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Before the Minister comes in, I welcome the guests of Senator Shane Curley's partner Selena's family here to the Chamber. Dan, Alison, Michael, Sammy are very welcome here and I hope Shane is looking after them very well. We have a lovely restaurant in there, so I am sure he will look after them for the rest of the evening.

Jim O'Callaghan (Dublin Bay South, Fianna Fail)
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Senator Craughwell asked whether I would consider amending section 34A(d). I will always consider what is said in this House and I will reflect upon it for Report Stage, but my own view at this preliminary stage is that, when I look at section 34A(d), what is set out there is comprehensible. The Senator says I should stop at "the use in bad faith of procedural tactics". What is also included is:

such as delaying proceedings, fraudulent or abusive forum shopping or the discontinuation of cases at a later stage of the proceedings in bad faith ...

I see no harm in that being included. They are not completely exhaustive; they are examples of the type of behaviour that gives evidence of bad faith. As the Senator says, a court knows what bad faith is, but notwithstanding that, in the context of the transposition of the directive, it is probably important that we try to stay loyal to the terminology used within the directive.

The Senator also spoke about investigative reporting. My own view is that we have good journalists and good reporting in Ireland. There is an index of journalism and free press throughout the world. Ireland is always in the top ten. Notwithstanding criticism that may come from the media about our defamation laws, we still have a very vibrant media and a media that is regarded internationally as operating in a very free environment. It should be said that, unlike stuff we read on social media, if we see something published by the traditional media in Ireland, there is a good belief that what they are publishing is true. We know that sometimes they will get it wrong, but in general if a newspaper publishes allegations that are strong, we know that it must have a good basis for doing so because of the defamation laws. That is one of the understated but important benefits of the balanced defamation laws we have in Ireland.

The Senator referred to a number of individual cases. I am not going to go into that. I have said before that we do not want the courts to be used as the place where people go to try to score political points or for the purpose of trying to pursue a greater political agenda. That does not just happen in the field of defamation. I disagree with the Senator suggesting we should criminalise the behaviour of people taking actions that are found to be abusive. That is not a good idea. We must be careful about the types of behaviour we criminalise. If there are abusive court proceedings, there is a civil remedy set out here that is going to be sufficient. Politicians must have a thick skin, as we all do. I do not think we should be running off to the courts when somebody says something about us that is wrong and damaging. However, there are times where people may be very severely damaged in their reputations by the publication of false statements. That is something the Defamation Act is designed to deal with. It is not designed to facilitate people scoring points.

Patricia Stephenson (Social Democrats)
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I move amendment No. 12:

In page 14, lines 8 and 9, to delete “but that have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of” and substitute “have the effect of preventing, restricting or penalising”.

I withdraw the amendment but will bring it back on Report Stage.

Patricia Stephenson (Social Democrats)
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I move amendment No. 13:

In page 15, lines 40 and 41, to delete “manifestly unfounded” and substitute “an abusive lawsuit against public participation”.

Sharon Keogan (Independent)
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I move amendment No. 14:

In page 15, lines 40 and 41, to delete “manifestly unfounded” and substitute “an abusive lawsuit against public participation, the court shall determine the application as expeditiously as possible consistent with the administration of justice”.

Gerard Craughwell (Independent)
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I move amendment No. 15:

In page 16, to delete lines 5 to 20.

Mark Daly (Fianna Fail)
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When is it proposed to sit again?

Seán Kyne (Fine Gael)
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Tomorrow morning at 10.30.