Martin Mansergh (Tipperary South, Fianna Fail)

I thank Senators for the broad support for the Government response to the arguments and the amendments. As Senator O'Toole pointed out, he and I had an interesting experience when we soldiered together between 2002 and 2007 on the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission. We were both on the audit committee together. I left it and perhaps he did too when some things were up in the air, but subsequent events also underlined the importance of the relationship between the audit committee, the Clerk of the Dáil or the Secretary General, and the commission. While I am only taking Report Stage of the Bill I appreciate the importance of the argument. I am pleased that we have been able to address concerns expressed in well reasoned debate.

I appreciate that some of the amendments are not being pressed but I will outline briefly some of the points and arguments in regard to them. All the amendments were grouped together for discussion purposes. It would not be appropriate to grant the Secretary General and the head of finance an automatic right to attend audit committee meetings. That has to do with the independence of function of the committee. By excluding an automatic right of attendance by officials the committee can engage in its own internal discussions in a manner that is free, or more importantly, seen to be free, of any official interference.

As pointed out by the Minister of State, Deputy Peter Power, on Committee Stage yesterday, subsection (13) provides that the audit committee may invite a person who has responsibility for internal audit or financial matters within the staff of the service. In practice, that means that the committee invites attendance by the head of finance frequently but the Government would prefer to leave that as it stands so that the committee remains in control of the persons who may attend its meetings. For that reason I do not propose to accept the amendment.

Senator O'Toole has accepted that point in the case of amendment No. 2. His amendment did draw a distinction between advising the commission and advising the commission chair. The Government does not consider it necessary to draw that distinction within the legislation.

On amendments Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 7, that is effectively the response to Senator O'Toole's well-made points regarding the giving of advice by the audit committee to the commission. It is not just the case that I consider that these amendments take his concerns into account, but he agrees with that.

The Minister for Finance noted with interest last night the views and proposals of Senators on the role and functions of the audit committee, as reported to him. Following a review of the general principles underlying section 10 and its relationship with the rest of the legislation, he considered it appropriate to propose an amendment, the effect of which is to provide scope for the audit committee to advise the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission in regard to corporate governance matters relevant to its functions. That phraseology can cover a multitude of sins.

In the case of the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission it must be acknowledged that its situation is somewhat different from that of a Department. On the one hand it exercises a number of functions normally associated with Ministers, such as the making of regulations for particular purposes, but it also exercises a number of oversight and policy-setting functions in providing for the running of the Houses and acting as governing body of the service.

The Bill provides for greater accountability to the Houses in respect of the carrying out of its functions. I understand that there was some lively speculation yesterday as to how that might work in practice. Some of the responsibilities of the commission are matters which may be of legitimate interest in the workings of the audit committee, or may become so in the future. It is appropriate that the audit committee would be able to advise the commission in respect of its exercise of those responsibilities.

The purpose of the amendment, therefore, is to enable the audit committee to advise the commission on matters relevant to its corporate governance functions, while respecting the fact that the commission itself is not primarily responsible for the financial accounting or financial control functions which are vested in the Secretary General, in other words the Clerk of the Dáil. The Minister is satisfied that the amendment reflects the appropriate balance of statutory responsibilities in respect of governance, accounting and accountability in the legislation governing the commission's operations.

Under the amendment the audit committee's advice in the area of the more detailed financial and control matters would still be primarily targeted at the person who is accountable and responsible for those matters. At the same time it can provide the best available support and advice to the commission in its areas of responsibility. The audit committee is also required anyhow to report to the commission at least once a year on its activities. The point has been accepted that that might not be enough.

While the commission is somewhat of an exception to the departmental model in that it exercises board and policy-level oversight in a manner that does not apply in Departments, the essential role and responsibility of the chief civil servant and Accounting Officer remains vested in the Secretary General. It is appropriate that the audit committee continues to advise the Secretary General or Clerk of the Dáil in regard to those functions in the first instance.

If the audit committee were to advise the commission on the carrying out of particular accounting functions the commission, and particularly its chairman, would have to assume significantly greater responsibilities and accountability at the level of individual financial transactions than it does at present, and in respect of which it would not have statutory cover. That might be a bridge too far in the context of the other roles of and offices held by some members of the commission.