Derek McDowell (Labour)

I join other Members in welcoming the Minister to the House. It is useful to provide time for an expression of views from all sides of the House on what was, before Omagh, the worst single incident in the history of the so-called Troubles.

I commend the work done by Mr. Justice Barron and prior to that by the late Chief Justice, Liam Hamilton. In the 30 years since the bombings there were rumours, counter rumours and reports, some substantiated and some not, about what might have happened. We all were privy to that and a general view formed in the Republic and elsewhere as to what might have happened. It was nonetheless extremely useful for Mr. Justice Barron to examine all those reports, to speak to those witnesses who made themselves available and to come up with the report he prepared.

It is clear from reading the report, and this is confirmed by the sub-committee report that followed its publication, that we know most of the facts. We know most of the individuals who partook in this event. We know most of those who were involved in planning it and those who carried it out. It was primarily, if not exclusively, the responsibility of the UVF, in terms of operational activity, in Belfast and Lisburn.

What is less clear is the extent to which there was collusion of one type or another. There are different levels and types of collusion that could have taken place and none of it is exclusive to each other. It is clear from the evidence of a number of witnesses that there was collusion of a general nature at the time between the RUC, the UDR and some loyalist paramilitaries. Some of the individuals thought to have been involved in the particular incident had contacts or connections of one type or another with the RUC or the UDR. However, the judge was unable to draw the conclusion that individuals within the UDR and the RUC or individuals higher up within the RUC and the UDR, as institutions, were directly involved in either the planning or the implementation of the act. That is the reason we still have a difficulty in deciding where we go from here.

I will return to the recommendations regarding an inquiry. I was struck by remarks the Taoiseach made in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid bombings a few months ago when he said he knew from his experience — I assume he was referring to his experience in regard to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings — that it was extremely difficult for the relatives of victims or victims who survive to find closure in regard to such incidents. Even in those circumstances where it is possible to determine who carried out such an act and people are prosecuted and convicted, the relatives of those who died and those who survived still find it extremely difficult to determine why it was that their particular relative — their daughter, son, husband or wife — died.

It is in the nature of terrorism at its purest that it is random. Terrorists seek to terrorise a population and the fact that a particular individual or individuals became involved was purely a matter of the awful chance of being on a particular street on a particular day at a particular time. It is in that context that we must consider the issue of closure. I was struck by what Senator Brian Hayes said about the issue of considering even now victims not only of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, but of other incidents that have taken place over the past 30 years. It is an issue with which I have some difficulty.

I have no problem, in principle, and I am sure nobody else does, with the notion of a victims' forum that would allow for views to be exchanged, a feeling of solidarity among victims to be nurtured, for support, counselling and so on. Something along the lines of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was held in South Africa requires, as Senator Brian Hayes rightly pointed out, the co-operation of the paramilitary organisations concerned. That will only come to pass and be granted, if at all, in the context of an amnesty, which is what happened in South Africa.

In this context, it is worth examining the South African experience, as that is the experience on which we draw. The response and the result of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under Archbishop Tutu was mixed. It is true that some victims found out facts they did not previously know or could not previously confirm. A small number of victims were able to find within themselves the forgiveness to move on and the closure which the process offered. However, it is also true that it opened up many wounds for individuals and society there. That was within the context of a process where clearly there was a past, a present and a future process, where black majority rule was in the process of being established and the apartheid era was over. Even in that fairly clean break of a set of circumstances, where a line could be drawn under the past, it seemed to be difficult for victims to find closure. In terms of society there, it probably opened up more wounds than it closed. It is an experience on which we need to draw in a practical way.

I do not approach this issue with any ideological baggage or prejudice except in so far as we, as a society, can provide closure to individual victims and the circumstances which would allow for greater reconciliation between the two societies in Northern Ireland by virtue of providing such a forum. However, let us not imagine that this is an open and shut, black and white case; it is not. There are two sides to this issue and the experience of the results elsewhere was mixed.

The Minister pointed out that the Barron report and the sub-committee's report basically examined two types of issues — the issues that are internal to this State and those that are external. We need to be clear about the issues that are internal. I find it extremely shocking, as Senator Jim Walsh rightly said, that the report of the investigation of the gardaí into what happened in May 1974 was closed down effectively, or run down, within three months. That is astonishing. I had to look again at the date to see whether I got the year wrong when I first saw it. Even with the benefit of hindsight, that circumstances have changed greatly and that relations between this State and the other authority on this island and this State and the UK are different, it still seems astonishing that could have happened. Even taking into consideration the measure and nature of the atrocities that were happening on a fairly regular basis, it still seems, in whatever context one would want to put it, astonishing that should have happened. We need an explanation in that regard. The recommendation of the sub-committee in regard to the Bill we passed in this House today and that has already been passed in the other House to provide that a commission of inquiry be established must be followed up.

The issue of addressing the lost files is a little more complicated. I read the sub-committee's report and it is not clear from it whether files were lost, whether they ever existed or if they were true copies, full copies or whatever. There is an issue in that regard. There is enough to be concerned about and inasmuch as we will have a commission examining the other issue relating to the Garda inquiry, that issue should also be examined. I note from the sub-committee's report that it suggests that this type of thing is unlikely to happen because of the National Archives Act and the new procedures that have come into place on foot of that, and I take some solace from that fact.

There is an outstanding issue, on which Senator Jim Walsh touched, regarding forensics and how we approach that area. The suggestion from Dr. Willis, the director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, that even now we would not, or might not, be in a position to deal adequately with forensic evidence if an atrocity of that nature were to happen again is worrying and it is something the Government must address.

I regret that the time available is short because I have a great deal more to say. I will skip to the bottom line. There are issues with which we cannot deal in this State. I was confused by an extract in the sub-committee's report quoting what, I presume, was only part of what the Taoiseach said. He appeared to say that, on the one hand, he is satisfied we have got everything the British are willing to give and, on the other, that he thinks there might have been some MI5 or MI6 reports we do not have. One point is clear — we need some clarity on this issue. Such clarity can only come about by virtue of the political process and bilateral contact between the British and Irish Governments. It is incumbent on the Government to bring this to finality by approaching the British Government — I presume it has done this already and, if not, it should do so — and pointing out that we need co-operation. If the Cory-type report is a better way to go, and it seems that there is a good prima facie case made for it, we should go that way. If that in turn produces enough, then we should have a public inquiry in Northern Ireland or in the United Kingdom.

This was a truly horrendous event. In some ways I find what we now know about potential collusion less shocking than perhaps I should because I suppose most of us suspected that all along. What is shocking is the extent to which this State failed in terms of the Garda investigation and to some extent — I am not totally persuaded by the defence that has been put up by Dr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cooney — at governmental level to pursue this matter as far as one might reasonably have expected, even allowing for everything that has come to light with the benefit of hindsight. That is truly shocking and, on the basis of the one or two details isolated by the sub-committee, deserves further investigation. I trust the Government will soon take a decision to go that route.