Brian O'Shea (Waterford, Labour)
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Question 44: To ask the Minister for Defence if there will be a change in the role of Irish troops serving in Chad as a result of the decision to transfer command of the operation from the EU to the UN; if he is satisfied with the preparations for the handover of the command of Irish troops in Chad from EUFOR to the UN on 15 March 2009; the latest information regarding the security situation in Chad and the potential threat to Irish troops, particularly in view of reports that large numbers of heavily armed personnel could cross the border from Sudan; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [10087/09]

Jimmy Deenihan (Kerry North, Fine Gael)
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Question 47: To ask the Minister for Defence the contingency measures that have been put in place for the protection of members of the Irish Defence Forces on duty with EUFOR in Chad and due to remain as part of the UN mission in view of the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, on charges of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, and the resulting demonstrations in favour of Bashir amid criticism of western countries for their support of the warrant; his views on whether the risks to the safety of members of the Defence Forces on duty in neighbouring Chad have increased; if he has been in contact with other states with EUFOR soldiers in the Chad region over rising tensions there; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [10023/09]

Willie O'Dea (Limerick East, Fianna Fail)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 44 and 47 together.

The mandate of the European Union military mission to Chad and the Central African Republic, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, established under the authority of United Nations Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), is due to expire on 15 March 2009.

Ireland is the second largest contributor to the mission with 439 Defence Forces personnel. The aim of the mission is to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons or IDPs, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and protect UN personnel and equipment.

As the humanitarian and security situation in eastern Chad will clearly continue to warrant an international presence beyond March 2009, the Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1861 (2009) on 14 January 2009. This resolution authorised the deployment of a military component of the United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT, to follow on from the EUFOR mission at the end of its mandate.

Following consideration of a request from the United Nations on 5 March 2009, Dáil Éireann approved the transfer of command of the Irish contingent currently serving in Chad with EUFOR TCHAD/RCA to the United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT.

The Defence Forces contribution will be similar in size and nature to Ireland's existing contribution to EUFOR. The nature of the Irish battalion's duties with MINURCAT will be similar to its duties with EUFOR, which include, inter alia, short and long-range patrolling, situational awareness and providing an overall security and deterrent presence within its area of operations.

As the House will be aware, the International Criminal Court, ICC, issued a warrant on 4 March 2009 for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, president of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting Head of State by the International Criminal Court. Since its issue, there are fears the Sudanese reaction against the international community could include giving fresh support to Chadian rebel groups. Any such actions could have serious consequences for the large refugee population in eastern Chad, many of whom have fled from the conflict in Darfur.

The security situation in Chad and neighbouring Sudan is kept under constant review by the Defence Forces. Prior to the indictment of the Sudanese President, al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court, a specific threat assessment review was conducted on the possible effects for the 99th Infantry Battalion serving in Chad. It is assessed that the overall threat has not changed and remains at medium. The Defence Forces are in constant contact with their EUFOR partners in the theatre of operations and with operational headquarters in Paris which all concur with the current Defence Forces' assessment. Indication for any change to the security situation is being monitored by both the Defence Forces and EUFOR's operational headquarters.

The detailed threat assessment and reconnaissance undertaken informs decisions regarding the configuration of the contingent and its armaments and protection. In the case of the current EUFOR mission, the Defence Forces have deployed a full range of force protection assets, including 18 MOWAG armoured personnel carriers, four close reconnaissance vehicles and indirect fire capabilities, such as mortars. Together, these provide the necessary armoured protection, mobility, firepower and communications. This will also be the case when Irish personnel transfer to MINURCAT. The MOWAG armoured personnel carriers deployed were also deployed with the Defence Forces when they served with UNMIL in Liberia and UNIFIL in Lebanon, where they performed effectively. The Defence Forces have also deployed a suite of robust tactical communications systems.

Concerning the security situation, there has been a noticeable decline in incidents of banditry in the Irish-led multinational battalion south's area of operations during January 2009, compared to December 2008. A significant redeployment of Chadian forces in the general area has added to the security and has assisted the reduction of banditry against the local population.

The UN follow-on force, which will take over from EUFOR on 15 March 2009, is expected to have a wider deployment in eastern Chad so as to further deter armed and criminal elements. MINURCAT will act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means the force will be authorised to take all necessary measures in its capabilities and its area of operations in eastern Chad to fulfil its mandate.

Additional information not given on the floor of the House.

The UN follow-on force is the first example of a transfer of authority between the EU and the UN. Arrangements in this regard are progressing well. There is excellent co-operation between the UN and EUFOR and it is expected that there will be no security gap in the transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT. Negotiations with the Government of Chad on the hand-over of EUFOR assets to the UN were very prolonged and detailed, but these had now been finalised.

I wish success to the Irish personnel transferring over to the new UN mission. I know the Defence Forces will continue to acquit themselves well, and will make a vital and important contribution to the success of MINURCAT, as they have done on so many occasions in the past.

Brian O'Shea (Waterford, Labour)
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I am relieved to hear the overall threat assessment is medium. That is an encouraging development but, as the situation needs to be kept under constant review, there may be changes to this status.

With up to 13 NGOs having been expelled, a disastrous situation has emerged in Darfur with, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF, being forced to leave while dealing with two meningitis outbreaks. Will many more refugees begin to cross the border from Darfur and Sudan to eastern Chad? Is there any evidence that the Chadian rebels may be receiving new assistance from Sudan? What impact will the approaching rainy season have on the situation, which I understand is three months away?

Willie O'Dea (Limerick East, Fianna Fail)
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As I indicated in my reply, it was felt that the issue of the arrest warrant against the Sudanese President, al-Bashir, would result in a renewed effort on the part of the Sudanese Government to further support the rebels attacking Chad and trying to undermine the Chadian regime. There is no evidence that this has happened to date. If it were to happen, it would have profound consequences, as the Deputy rightly anticipates, for the refugees. It will mean more refugees in already overcrowded camps, which I saw myself on a recent visit to the area.

To a certain extent, we have been the victims of our own success because the security brought about by the EUFOR force has encouraged more refugees and internally displaced persons to come to its camps which are run in a fairly disciplinarian manner. The threat remains live.

The initial action taken as a result of the issue of the arrest warrant was the expulsion of a large number of NGOs from Sudan. Several Irish NGOs on the ground in Sudan, with which we have been in touch, have not been affected to date. Their working environment, however, is becoming progressively more difficult and tense.

Paradoxically, the rainy season, which is not due for three months, tends to minimise rebel activities. Rebel movements across the border, operating to destabilise the Chadian regime, are severely restricted during the rainy season. There tends to be a lull during the season with groups rearming and reorganising.

I have not seen any evidence of further support from the Sudanese Government to the rebel groups. Last November, however, several rebel groups came together in an unified organisation which has created tension between Sudan and Chad with the Chadian President blaming Sudan for facilitating this development.

While it is a case of "so far, so good" and the threat has been assessed as medium, the situation is quite tense and we are keeping it under constant review.

Jimmy Deenihan (Kerry North, Fine Gael)
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According to today's The New York Times, the American embassy in the Sudan is allowing a large number of its staff leave the country. Embassies beginning to move staff out of countries is a serious development. Of the 85 NGOs operating in the Sudan, up to 16 have been expelled by the Sudanese President with threats to the others. If the peacekeepers were moved from Darfur, it could lead to the internal displacement and the movement of millions into Chad. Is the Minister confident that EUFOR will have the capacity to handle such a doomsday situation if this were to happen? If it does not have the resources, what will the Minister do to ensure it has adequate resources? Has he contacted the other countries involved in the mission? Initially, Lieutenant General Pat Nash was concerned about the Defence Forces' equipment for the mission? Does the Minister believe they are sufficiently equipped to face this highly possible doomsday scenario?

Willie O'Dea (Limerick East, Fianna Fail)
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I was not aware of the news concerning the American embassy in Sudan. I must point out to the Deputy the peacekeeping force is in Chad. I agree there is the possibility that, if the Sudan disintegrates or intensifies its support for the rebel groups, more refugees will be created. We do not know how many and over what a timescale. The situation is, however, being constantly monitored.

The military component of the EUFOR mission consisted of 3,400 troops who, it is commonly agreed, did a tremendous job in providing a sense of security in the area, particularly in the refugee camps, and allowing some internally displaced people to return home. The military element of the MINURCAT mission will be expanded to 5,200 troops with a number of police and military liaison officers. We are anticipating a potentially worse situation.

We are in constant contact with both the UN and our fellow members in MINURCAT about the situation on the ground. It is reviewed on a daily basis as it evolves.

Brian O'Shea (Waterford, Labour)
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I take the point about restricted movement during the rainy season. In the intervening three months, does the Minister envisage the withdrawal of the Irish or UN contingent from Chad? As matters stand, such a withdrawal is not a direct possibility. However, has a military assessment been carried out with regard to what would happen if our troops were placed at risk as a result of a serious deterioration in circumstances? Did the Minister discuss this matter with the Chief of Staff?

Jimmy Deenihan (Kerry North, Fine Gael)
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Are the logistics in place to move our mission in the event of a doomsday situation? Is the Minister confident of our troops' safety in the event of a large movement of people from Darfur into Chad should what is being threatened by President al-Bashir come to pass?

Willie O'Dea (Limerick East, Fianna Fail)
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There are a number of aspects to this matter. The increase in the price of oil last year enabled the Government of Chad to build up its defence assets. In that context, it has acquired a number of substantial air assets and also appears to have improved its military capabilities. The Government of Chad has placed troops in an area adjacent to the Sudanese border in order to prevent rebel movements across the frontier. This has nothing to do with us, as such, but it has certainly improved the security situation.

I do not envisage a United Nations withdrawal over the next three months. I discussed the position of our troops with the Chief of Staff, and we are open to all possibilities and are examining all contingencies. However, I spoke to representatives of local communities in Chad and the governor of Goz Beida — whom I met for a detailed briefing — in addition to our troops and commanders from other countries during my recent visit and I do not envisage a doomsday scenario arising. The possibility of Ireland or the United Nations' force as a whole withdrawing at any time in the near future is seen as extremely remote.