Martin Mansergh (Tipperary South, Fianna Fail)

In the context of the peace process, the handling of the legacy of the past is crucial. In Northern Ireland, the appointment of the Eames-Bradley group, as well as some recently appointed victims commissioners, was not free of controversy. I congratulate the members of the sub-committee on the vast volume of work over a long period. When I was in the Seanad I spoke with my colleague Senator Jim Walsh and I know how much work went into it. I am sure that is true of all members, including Deputy Costello. The committee members had to sift through the Barron report and hold hearings. This shows that the State and the Government has gone to considerable lengths to try to clarify issues.

All of us share deep sympathy with the families of the victims who, in the vast majority of cases, were simply blown apart on a certain day without warning. Those wounds do not heal over a lifetime and going through these reports there is a strong desire for the search for truth, knowledge of what happened and why it happened.

All the attacks have in common that they were carried out from Northern Ireland, mostly at a time when co-operation between the two jurisdictions was limited, certainly more so than at present. Relationships between governments could be strained at times and these were periods of high tension. The violence in the North reached its peak in 1971-76. I remember seeing the events of the 1972 and 1974 bombings on the television in Tipperary. I had the feeling that if the perpetrators managed to escape across the Border without being apprehended there would not be much more to do that was in the power of this State. We must remember that there was no extradition at the time and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, which might have allowed reciprocal prosecution across borders, did not exist until the end of 1976. The State and its organs were chary of demanding too much of counterparts north of the Border because facilities such as hot pursuit, questioning and handing over suspects would be requested in return. In this State, public opinion was at a certain state, far removed from the present position. It is important, particularly in sensitive matters such as security, that there is a broad consensus as far as possible among the vast majority of the population on what the State and the Government is doing.

An unfortunate feature of some of these cases is that many official papers have been lost or removed. Frankly, I do not know which. Those who have not worked in Departments underestimate the vast quantities of paper that were generated, particularly in the pre-electronic age, even in non-sensitive matters. As a young civil servant I had the experience of having great difficulty in retrieving files on non-sensitive issues, even if they were only two or three years old. One lesson I hope has been long since applied is the need to improve the archiving of Government papers, especially those relating to any matter that is particularly important and sensitive. That includes murders, terrorist attacks and so on. One of these reports suggests that perhaps it was because files were put in a special place that they became lost.

Notwithstanding the vast improvement in intergovermental relations, I deeply regret a recurring feature in these matters over the period is the very limited, not to say minimalist co-operation, from the British Government. I interpret this as an attitude of the British Government, its senior officials and security authorities, not to be prepared to lift the lid on the methods used to fight the war. They might have officially called it something different but for those involved, fighting the war was effectively what they saw themselves as doing.

We know there was considerable infiltration of and relationships with paramilitary groups, especially but not exclusively, loyalist ones. The question arises as to what extent they were used as proxies to fight the war. The British Army came to Northern Ireland from various colonial engagements in Aden, Cyprus and Malaysia where it was able to do very much what it liked with minimal scrutiny back home.

Earlier this week I saw an interesting film, "Charlie Wilson's War", set during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It claims to be based on a true story of how certain American agencies provided the Afghan mujahidin with the equipment with which they were able to claim victory in that conflict. In theory, the mujahidin won the war but the film made it obvious it was because of American aid. An open question in my mind is to what extent loyalist paramilitaries were used to hit targets, communities and intimidate this State through attacks and bombs.

The timing of the 1972 Dublin bombs changed the outcome of a division in this House. The then Government was on the point of falling but after the bombs went off the outcome of the division was different. One can argue this was pure coincidence but I do not believe so. At the time I believed — and still do — that they had a political intent. The question is what was that intent. However, one can only speculate about it.

The Dublin-Monaghan bombings of 1974 must be seen in the context of the struggle to bring down the Sunningdale Executive reaching its climax. There is no doubt they were intended to deter this State in all sorts of ways. From a Unionist and loyalist point of view, an Irish dimension in northern affairs was a no-go area.

When I worked with Fianna Fáil in Opposition in the mid-1990s, a former member of the northern security forces — but from Northern Ireland, not from Britain — gave me details which I noted and subsequently supplied to the secretariat of the Department of the Taoiseach for fitting into the Barron inquiry. The information I was given was not very different from versions given to several other people.

The question arises as to whether British operatives fitted into a larger context. We know the British Labour Government of 1974 to 1979 was deeply unpopular with right-wing elements in Britain, including the intelligence services. It has been suggested this could be seen as the wider context to the bombings.

During the past ten years I have the sense the British Government's control of its security services is limited. There is the famous remark by the Queen, a very well-informed individual, about shadow forces in the country of which we know nothing. Did the British Government know or want to know about these events?

There was the disgraceful episode of collusion, referred to by the last speaker, relating to the murder of Pat Finucane. I am glad the public career of the British Minister of State who made disgraceful comments in the House of Commons at the time did not prosper.

We must keep an open mind on these matters. More evidence will come to light but there must be pressure for this to happen. We must encourage those concerned to tell their stories and not to take secrets to the grave. There were lessons from that period. The Government was not intimidated by threats of loyalist attacks. I recall in the mid-1990s being given a list of targets in Dublin which I promptly passed to the then Department of Justice.

We have an important duty to ensure any misconceptions or myths about what the then Government was about are dispelled as quickly as possible in case they form a basis for attacking people. I commend the reports and after the debate further consideration must be given in how this process can be carried forward.

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