Dr. Mary Neal:

I thank the Senator for asking that question. All of us witnesses have said we support the facility for conscientious objection as part of this but it is important for that to be explained. There are arguments for and against conscientious objection and it is important that it does not go unchallenged. It is important the Senator has raised that question. The limits of conscientious objection is an important question. I devote most of my energy to writing about it. I cannot speak for the other witnesses but where I begin is by asking what conscientious objection is designed to do. It is designed to protect people against having to share in moral responsibility for something they regard as seriously morally objectionable. Taking that as a starting point, I then ask what kinds of activities render people morally responsible. The Senator referred to the giving of information or the referring of patients on to another provider. How do we strike that balance? It is a delicate balance that needs to be struck. My question when thinking about this is whether those kinds of behaviours involve people in moral responsibility for the outcome. That is a difficult question in the context of a controversial issue, such as assisted dying or abortion. In some of my published work on this issue, I have written about the example of the Nazi genocide - something that is unquestionably wrong and we would all regard as very wrong. If we look at something that is unquestionably heinous and wrong, we would regard those who are involved in more administrative, hands-off or indirect ways as sharing in some of the responsibility.

That is not to say they are primarily or seriously responsible, but they share some of the responsibility for facilitating and promoting the outcome. We saw that in a case a few years ago where an old man in Germany who had been administratively involved at Auschwitz was tried for genocide. His name was Oskar Gröning and he was known as the bookkeeper of Auschwitz, which emphasised the administrative nature of his involvement. Although he argued he was not legally guilty of genocide, he acknowledged the issue of moral responsibility. When something is very obviously wrong, it is easy for us to see that people who are involved in small, bureaucratic or indirect ways share in the responsibility for that-----