Mr. Finn Keyes:

The distinctions I drew in my opening statement would largely fall away in utility in the event that an assisted dying regime were to be enacted. These distinctions are, as I have described them, necessary fictions in the current framework to allow for certain more humane end-of-life practices. As the Senator pointed out, while I described them as humane end-of-life practices, there is an aspect in which they are not humane, for instance, in the Anthony Bland case I spoke about.

In that case the court, while drawing out this acts and omissions distinction, said openly that it did not understand why it was allowed, as a court, for nasogastric feeding and ventilation to be withdrawn - or allowing just nasogastric feeding in his case - which is essentially allowing him to starve to death and could be a very painful process, but it was not allowed to permit the administering of a relatively painless lethal injection. These might be very fine distinctions but if you are someone is concerned about the sanctity of life and protection of the vulnerable you might say these are essential distinctions within the current framework that you might support to serve the competing values and interests at stake. As the Senator said, these anomalies create very real costs such as in the case of allowing someone to potentially starve to death but not being allowed to kill them relatively painlessly. On the other hand, it might be said that these anomalies are necessary for the balancing of the competing values at stake. What we strive for in law is not always absolute logical coherence and consistency above all else but sometimes working solutions that best balance rights and interests. With these very fine distinctions the question is really whether they are worth the costs in terms of this current regime.