Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Wednesday, 21 June 2023

Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Union Affairs

EU Security and Defence Policy: Discussion

Mr. Eoin Miche?l McNamara:

The question of unanimity relates to European security among European states, be it with their NATO or EU hats on. I have worked in the Baltic states and currently work in Finland. I have been active in different policy and academic networks for approximately a decade since I left Ireland in my early 20s. I will go to Warsaw next week, after the consultative forum, to speak at a big policy conference. I get around and hear what other European countries think. I engage with people and experts in other European countries. There is a strong sense of consensus, particularly in NATO, which is the lead security organisation for many of our European partners, the United States and Canada. Consensus can be frustrating. If we were sitting in the Swedish ministry for defence, ministry for foreign affairs or another office of state, we would be very frustrated at Turkey being the one country currently blocking Sweden's entry to NATO. That is down to consensus and that consensus gives NATO its strength. It is why NATO is the most successful defence alliance in the world and why it has not broken up. The history of defence and military allowances shows they tend not to stick together for too long. They tend to be constantly reformulated. NATO has constantly endured because consensus keeps bringing democratic nations back to the table. It is a democratic alliance, for the most part, and democracies keep renewing. We saw this recently with Donald Trump, who allegedly threatened to take the United States out of NATO. Democratic renewal meant he had to stand aside and we got President Biden instead. NATO has been rejuvenated. Consensus lies at the core of that and all European nations, whether wearing an EU or NATO badge, will always emphasise consensus because it gives us long-term strength as a democratic community. I see a move away from unanimity as very unlikely, although it will be discussed.

I will turn to EU-NATO burden-sharing. We are seeing more of a complementing division of labour in that regard. At the beginning of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999, the EU tried to do a lot of replication of NATO. It was a kind of NATO-lite. If the United States did not want to act, the Europeans could go it alone. That was mostly in respect of crisis management missions. There was a lot of replication of NATO in that regard.

On the battle group model, no EU battle group has ever been deployed. The model was designed to make sure we had permanent and structured co-operation and that forces were familiar with each other so that when they were in pressured situations in the developing world or in peacekeeping or crisis scenarios, the Swedes knew the Irish, the Irish knew the Germans and the Germans knew the Poles, for example. They all knew each other and were able to work together, so when the pressure came on, they were able to perform as a single unit. That was the idea between the battle groups. They are still going; they were not very successful at the beginning. Ireland has just joined a new German-led battle group; we will have to see how that goes. Elsewhere, for instance, I have done a lot of work on NATO's eastern flank. Logistics are key because NATO still does not want to create a bigger build-up in eastern European with Russia. If things get really bad, NATO will defend every inch of its territory in Poland or in the Baltic states, but it relies on mobilisation. The NATO battle groups along the eastern flank are very small; they are trip-wire battle groups to signal to Russia that we do not want to fight but it will trigger a big international conflict with Germany, France, the United States and the United Kingdom if it comes into central or eastern Europe. It will not just be Poland or the Baltic states. Infrastructure such as bridges, road and rail are key. The EU funds that transnational infrastructure, which can help the mobilisation we might need in a crisis if hostility escalates. We are getting tight on time - I did not get to a couple of the Deputy's other very interesting but complicated to answer questions. We may get another chance.