Mr. Eoin Miche?l McNamara:

To address the Deputy's first point, the Taoiseach, Deputy Varadkar, had a good argument on this a few weeks ago. I remember tweeting it because he framed it very well. On the question of Ireland vis-à-visFinland, the answer is both "Yes" and "No". As I mentioned, Finland has a very strong security system that can deter but Ukraine flipped a switch. Finland essentially had what was called a deterrence by denial system, a deterrence by punishment system or maybe a combination of both. Essentially, it projected that if the Russians came in, the Finns would create a whole lot of pain for Russia and therefore, the Russians do not want to come in. The message was, "Stay out, do not encroach militarily on our territory". That was the signalling of the Finnish deterrence. What we have seen in Ukraine, in cities like Bucha, Irpin, Mariupol, Nikolaev, Kherson and Bakhmut - the list goes on and on - is that the Ukrainian military has inflicted a lot of punishment and pain for what Russia has done but some Ukrainian cities have been levelled to the ground, a lot of its territory has been taken and an immeasurable number of atrocities have occurred on its territory. That mix of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment is not a scenario that Finland wants to see itself in now or in the future. If one knows Nordic societies like I have come to know them, one knows that they are all about sustainability, social development and locking down their prosperity and their social model over the long term. Nordic societies are always thinking about the future. Maybe it is useful to think about the Norwegian case in this regard. The Norwegians have a sovereign wealth fund and they are always thinking about the future with their oil money. The Norwegians believe in saving for the rainy day and saving to boost their prosperity. The Finns think about this too, maybe not in terms of their financial assets but in terms of their security. Joining NATO would lock down their security over the long term. At the moment Russia is throwing so many military resources into the war in Ukraine that it cannot threaten anyone else for another two or three years. We do not know what is going to happen over the medium term with Russia or what sort of regime is going to be in place there. The likelihood is that hostility will prevail, no matter the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Reducing uncertainty was the logic behind Finland's entry to NATO, despite its very strong independent posture.

Here in Ireland, and the Taoiseach has said this, we cannot keep thinking in terms of land threats. That is a very basic way to think and is not a way of thinking that wholly fits the current strategic environment we face. Of course Finland has a far greater land threat than Ireland. It has a large border with Russia whereas Ireland is an island but Russia can still project power here. It can do it in the airspace and we have seen this already. One of the concerns that has been most loudly raised, and I have been reading the documents on this, was by the Irish Aviation Authority, IAA. The IAA's job is to look after civilian aviation safety. It has raised a concern that Ireland does not have intercept capacity, that Russian jets can fly dark with their transponders off and that there can be near misses. There have been near misses over the Baltic Sea in the past. A civilian jet flying between Copenhagen and Rome, I believe, nearly collided with a Russian jet that civilian radar could not see. At the moment Ireland does not have primary radar so we cannot see such jets. However, it is included under LOA 2 so it is forthcoming. The threat is also out at sea to electricity supply lines and undersea telecommunications infrastructure, which are very vulnerable. We see how Russia can project power there. There was very good reporting by the four Nordic broadcasters on how Russian vessels, under the cover of being business or research vessels, as well as military vessels, are manoeuvring to disrupt that infrastructure. Ireland's prosperity and reputation rests on the safety and security of that infrastructure.

Right now, and it has been said before, we do not have the capabilities to protect that infrastructure. We need to bridge that gap in different ways.

On the subject of joining a military alliance, this is an interesting and controversial question. As I flew here from Helsinki yesterday, I read up on this matter and followed the debate on it. That is a long way off. I am a democrat, and that is a democratic decision for the Irish people. As I have seen in northern Europe, Sweden and Finland, people can change their minds and can weigh up the strategic circumstances. We need to invest primarily in our independent defence capacity. We are not a member of a strong military alliance. That must come first. Nevertheless - and I mentioned this in my opening statement - we have seen with Sweden, which is another neutral country, that even after the geopolitical constraints of the Cold War were lifted, it still wanted to remain outside NATO. It wanted to remain outside the military alliance. Yet, it wanted to keep its armed forces sharp and effective. Armed forces have to train together, pass on knowledge and techniques, use equipment and learn from each other. Finland and Sweden, despite saying outside of NATO, co-operated in NORDEFCO. They co-operated with different EU and NATO initiatives. They had enhanced opportunities in partnerships. We can do that through the Partnership for Peace as well.

Independent defence capacities should come first, but co-operation is also vital to help us shut down gaps in our strategic environment and keep our Defence Forces sharp. It is not a matter of a linear choice; it is a combination of the two.