Mary Seery Kearney (Fine Gael)
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I thank all three of the witnesses for putting forward their positions. This discussion comes to the heart of the question as to whether it is constitutionally permissible to change the parameters of social policy in Ireland by having a provision whereby people, at a time when they are anticipating or approaching incredible suffering, can opt to have assistance in the ending of their life.

At the conclusion of these meetings, we take a vote on publishing the witnesses' opening statements. I want it noted that I object to the publication of Dr. Casey's opening statement as submitted to us and propose instead that it be taken as the statement he gave in public. The statement that was sent into us had language that was unbecoming for this committee. There was reference to such on one occasion in his submission. I remind Dr. Casey that in the JJ case, the Supreme Court noted the following at paragraph 68:

The contention, made both in the High Court and this court, that the orders made were simply constitutionally impermissible, because they amounted to an acceleration of death, deliberate killing [that is the term the court used], and therefore euthanasia, is a striking one.  Robust argument can be of considerable assistance in any case.  [This next is the most important part.] Language in this area is important.  There are occasions upon which it may be essential to bluntly confront euphemism, especially when it conceals an ugly and unpalatable reality.  But we do not think that this argument was justified here, and was, if anything, unhelpful to the just resolution of the issues in this case...

I ask Dr. Casey to bear that in mind in any contribution he makes in the course of the meeting this morning.

Under Article 40 of the Constitution, we have the requirement to preserve from unjust attack the right to life. Within it, we have made a specific provision regarding termination of pregnancy. Was that necessary? The eighth amendment was appealed. There was an express provision that had to be removed to look at termination of pregnancies. We had a hierarchy of rights that put two rights at the same level. That is a whole other argument. In Article 40.3.3°, we put in that express provision. Strictly speaking, did we need to do that? If we, as legislators, have the right to put in safeguards and to provide for very narrow instances in which life can be taken, which we are very careful around, did we really need that provision?

Do we need an additional line in this instance? In wanting to legislate and have safeguards, my concern is whether we need an additional line. If we do not need such a line, then we are free to legislate. Why did we need that particular line in Article 40.3.3°? Was it merely that we had to replace the existing provision with something, or not, as the case may be?