Ms Claire Quinn:

The Independent Guardian ad Litem Agency thanks the committee for the invitation to appear. I am joined by my colleague, Ms Nicola McCarthy. TIGALA welcomes the opportunity to comment on the proposed general scheme of the child care (amendment) Bill 2023. We believe TIGALA can provide a unique insight into some of the proposals in the general scheme by outlining issues that have arisen in the cases of our guardians.

TIGALA is an independent provider of guardians ad litemfor court proceedings taken under the Child Care Act 1991. Guardians are appointed to children and young people by the court for the duration of those proceedings. We ensure the voice of a child or young person is heard and advise the court of our professional opinion on the best interests of the child or young person. This ensures his or her participation in the proceedings and that the court has an independent view in respect of his or her best interests. TIGALA is a service provider that operates nationally and we have 29 guardians within the service. Our guardians bring their skills and knowledge of working with children and young people in court proceedings. We ensure a consistently high level of practice standards for all guardians within our agency. All our guardians have a minimum of ten years of experience and are fully Garda vetted. Their qualifications are verified and there is confirmation of ongoing professional standards. We work throughout the country and strive to work collaboratively with all stakeholders in the court process to ensure the best outcomes for children and young people.

I will speak now to heads 7 and 27 of the general scheme. Head 7 provides for amendments to section 4 of the principal Act, relating to voluntary care. TIGALA supports the amendment to section 4 of the Child Care Act 1991. In particular, we welcome the intention for voluntary agreements to be the subject of ongoing review and monitoring. This is particularly welcome as the majority of children and young people in the care of the State are subject to such voluntary arrangements. However, TIGALA believes further and greater oversight is required to ensure uniformity of service provision for children in the care of the State. In particular, the right of a child or young person to be involved in the decision-making process of their care should not be purely contingent upon the decision-making of his or her parents. Children and young people are stand-alone rights holders and must be recognised as such. The rights of children or young persons in the care process must be the same irrespective of whether they are the subject of voluntary care or in court-ordered care. It must follow, therefore, that all children and young people in care must have access to a guardian and provision should be made for same. Our guardians have worked on cases with voluntary agreements of indefinite durations and have experience of cases where children or young people have been left without the long-term care planning, oversight, aftercare and supports which children in care on foot of care orders have received.

TIGALA offer the following example for consideration to bring this to life for the committee. Child A is 12 years old and has been in the care of Tusla since she was four years of age. She is the subject of a section 18 order. When the order was made, a number of standard directions sought by the guardian were made. In particular, the court ordered that the case would come back before it for review if there was a placement breakdown, the case had an unallocated social worker for more than six weeks, there was no fostering link worker or the placement was not long-term matched within six months. It ordered that the matter would come back before the court for aftercare review before child A’s 17th birthday. In this instance, child A derives the benefit of court oversight, which ensures all planning is completed and the child or young person is safeguarded. In addition, the views of child A are considered as part of that planning.

Child B is 12 and has been in the care of Tusla since she was four. She is the subject of a voluntary agreement. There are no court directions in being. Due to staff shortages, child B has no allocated social worker from the age of 13. She has never been allocated an aftercare worker and no long-term planning is made for her upon reaching the age of 18. Child A and child B are both in the care of Tusla but, as a result of the different ways they came into care, they are left with completely different service provision. We submit that no part of the 1991 Act should serve to render some children in care at a disadvantage compared with others.

The recommendation of TIGALA, therefore, is that all children or young persons who become the subject of a voluntary care agreement should have access to a guardian, even on a review or periodical basis, to ensure their rights are heard and for their views to be firmly ensconced in the care planning that it is enshrined in statute.

I will now speak to head 27, which contains amendments to section 47 of the principal Act. TIGALA welcomes the proposed amendments to section 4 and recognises that these amendments support interagency co-operation, which is vital. That said, TIGALA believes that the court requires further powers to ensure these amendments have the desired effect for children and young people. We believe the court should have the power to make directions for services to additional public bodies to maximise this interagency cooperation. For example, child C is a young person with profound disabilities who is the subject of a full care order. She is non-verbal and requires long-term residential care as she approaches 18 years. Child C will need an interagency plan as she transitions into adulthood. Her aftercare plan is before the District Court for review and, to date, no long-term planning has been completed. In this instance, the guardian brings an application pursuant to section 47 to obtain a long-term care plan for child C. The HSE is joined to this application but the District Court has no clear statutory jurisdiction to make directions that bind the HSE in the welfare interests of the child. The court, therefore, has limited powers and in some instances has declined jurisdiction to engage with applications due to the lack of clear statutory authority to act. We recommend that section 47 provide the court with the jurisdiction to make directions in the welfare interests of specific children. The guardian or the person bringing the application must show the direction is necessary and for the welfare of the children. The powers of the court should be clearly expanded to public bodies in addition to the Child and Family Agency where it is in the welfare interests of the named child. This would result in better and more effective service provision for children where interagency co-operation is required and ensure greater accountability through direct court oversight.

In conclusion, TIGALA thanks the committee for the opportunity to attend and welcomes the opportunity to answer any questions members may have.