Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Wednesday, 22 March 2023

Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Union Affairs

EU Strategic Autonomy: Discussion

Professor Andrew Cottey:

What is particularly important about that is that it is substantive. It is not just rhetorically saying we care about the concerns of the global south; it is actually giving substance to that.

Ironically, one of the explaining roles Ireland could help play would be to explain to EU member states that, if the EU wants the global south, to use that somewhat ugly term, to align with or support European concerns, Europe needs to address substantively and not just rhetorically issues of concern to the global south. An explaining role may be played within the 27.

Regarding the Baltic states, central and eastern Europe and former President Trump, the irony is that, notwithstanding the former President, his Presidency did not lead to Baltic or other central and eastern Europeans recalculating and deciding that maybe they needed to think about the EU as a second option. Instead, they doubled down in a sense on NATO and the transatlantic commitment. For central and eastern European states, NATO and the US are still very much number one, notwithstanding the Trump Presidency. If we had a Trump 2 or a neo-isolationist American president who, in the most extreme case, decided to withdraw the US from NATO, that would be a radical moment, particularly for central and eastern European states.

On a possible Irish role outside permanent structured co-operation, PESCO, I agree about peacekeeping. Ireland and its Government could do more to make more of that. The proposal for a centre on peacekeeping and leadership was included in the 2015 White Paper on Defence. Nearly a decade later and it has not really been delivered on, however. The Irish Government could do more in this space. It needs to up its game.

Clearly, Brexit shifts the political balance within the EU in that the leading Atlanticist country is no longer a member of the EU. I do not believe it shifts the political balance as decisively as some people suggest, though. Germany, which is the swing country, is a strong Europeanist that supports European defence co-operation but is also very committed to NATO. NATO and the relationship with the US will remain central for Germany, which has a significant bearing on the internal politics of the EU.