Dr. Martin Mansergh:

I would like to my statement onto the record. I thank the Cathaoirleach and members for this opportunity to reflect on the Good Friday Agreement 25 years on. As I recall, I was once a member of this committee. Before I move on, I would like to signal the enormous contribution made by the Chair's brother, Niall O'Dowd, from a similar Tipperary background. He had enormous success in marshalling Irish-American political opinion during the crucial 1990s.

I am delighted to be here with two former colleagues. Dr. Wally Kirwan was a key figure as assistant secretary in the Office of the Taoiseach, indefatigably handling information, writing drafts and making indispensable inputs into both Northern Ireland and European policy. He led the secretariat behind the modernisation of the Irish nationalist position in the New Ireland Forum of 1983-84, which recognised the unionist tradition and its validity for the first time. Ambassador Eamonn McKee made an incisive contribution to internal deliberations on reformulating Articles 2 and 3 but was also a front-line observer and liaison during stand-offs at Drumcree in the mid-1990s.

The Good Friday Agreement was both a peace settlement, ending a violent conflict lasting 25 years, and a political settlement that had to redraw the one of 1921-22 creating Northern Ireland, because of its shortcomings. Last week, Sir Keir Starmer in Belfast called the agreement the biggest achievement of the Labour Party in his lifetime, without question, and praised not only Tony Blair, but also John Major. The agreement covered all issues and involved all Northern Ireland parties, bar the Democratic Unionist Party, DUP. The two governments, regardless of other differences or developments, recognise a shared responsibility to maintain peace in Northern Ireland within the democratically-endorsed parameters of the agreement.

My involvement as adviser to different Fianna Fáil taoisigh, from Charles Haughey to Bertie Ahern, centred latterly on the formulation of broad principles that could bring the conflict to an end and offer an alternative political path. This involved direct back-channel discussions mediated through Fr. Alec Reid, Redemptorist priest, in 1988 with Dermot Ahern and in 1993-94 and in mid-1997 on my own. Written messages and draft replies to and from the then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, deemed to have come through Fr. Reid, were shared in close partnership with and advised upon by Seán Ó hUiginn, heading up the Anglo-Irish control centre, if I may call it that, in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Trust had to be created and that was, in some ways, as much the purpose of the channel as working on specific draft principles. This was despite the serious political risks for all concerned.

In the Downing Street Declaration of 15 December 1993, the principle of self-determination, concurrently exercised, complemented the principle of consent. It included, among other things, two key statements. The aspirational statement formulated by John Hume was that: "Irish unity would be achieved only by those who favour this outcome persuading those who do not ... without coercion or violence...". The second, by the Taoiseach, considered that the lessons of Northern Ireland: "show that stability and well-being will not be found under any political system which is refused allegiance or rejected on grounds of identity by a significant minority of those governed by it." That is a principle that operates both ways regardless of who is the minority.

A second phase of involvement was overseeing politically the replacement of Articles 2 and 3, working with the Attorney General, David Byrne, - I express my sadness at the death of previous Attorney General, John Murray, whom I worked with on other matters at an earlier time - and his senior official, James Hamilton. While legally watertight, the wording had to be accessible and have public appeal. "Entitlement" to Irish citizenship in the North, a word we owe to ambassador McKee, meaning a right that did not have to be taken up, squared the circle of the one-nation and two-nation theories. Constitutional recognition of the diaspora was much welcomed. Article 3 references the firm will of the Irish people, "in harmony and friendship", to unite everyone on the island. The shared island initiative, which is without prejudice to any future constitutional choice, is reflective of and consistent with that spirit. There is a danger in ratcheting up pressure, with claims that unity can be brought about in seven years because of demographic change, or the Government creating citizens' assemblies and a Ministry of national re-unification, as if unity is almost inevitable and can, if necessary, be shaped without unionism.

We have recently commemorated the centenary of the State and most people cherish the democratic stability and progress achieved. Despite some past vicissitudes, the experience of the minority tradition has shown that there is life after the union. The agreement envisages the decision on a border poll by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland being evidence-based when it is likely to result in change, which means, in practice, estimated initial opinion in favour being steady at well above 50% plus 1. This is because the Secretary of State could not come to the conclusion that such a poll would pass if there was effectively deadlock between the two views. When we see the difficulties experienced by the evenly balanced Good Friday Agreement, which had 71% support in Northern Ireland in the 1998 vote, what makes us sure that far more sweeping change would be easier?

A united Ireland would not be like German unity, where the stronger part absorbed the discredited other. It would de facto be about creating a successor state to both the Republic and Northern Ireland, bringing together the best elements of each. It would likely entail significant reappraisal of ethos and identity, both North and South, as well as Ireland's history and place in the world. Until enough people all round are ready for this, then we must focus in the meantime on making the Good Friday Agreement work better. It has saved lives, ended destruction, and given us peace and stability - although not enough reconciliation - abolition of the hard Border, valuable sectoral co-operation and even integration. I recommend a report by IBEC that has just come into my hands this morning, which I read on the way to this meeting - For Peace + Prosperity: The Economic and Social Benefits of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. This report is positive regarding what has been and remains to be achieved.

My final point is that the overriding responsibility of everyone is to ensure that whatever evolution in relationships takes place is kept on a strictly peaceful path.