Professor Ben Tonra:

I will kick off because Finland and Sweden were at the top of the Deputy's list. She is right; there is no immediate prospect of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. However, we need to consider their defence postures and defence structures. The Swedes have sent troops to Gotland and they normally never have troops on Gotland. They have done that specifically because of this crisis. Finland and Sweden are almost ad idem in their own defence and security co-operation. They are now deeply embedded in NATO. It is not possible to put a cigarette paper between the Finnish and Swedish armed forces and NATO in the context of their relationship. The only thing they do not have and thus far do not want is the Article 5 security guarantee. They are both members of Partnership for Peace, as is Ireland. It shows the flexibility of Partnership for Peace to provide for a really close relationship, as Finland and Sweden have, and a very distant relationship, such as Ireland has.

The Deputy asked a very good question about Nord Stream 2. We need to remember that 40% of Europe's gas comes from Russia. Germany is decommissioning all its nuclear power plants. It needs that gas. France took the opposite approach. It is bumping up its nuclear programme because it does not want that dependence on natural gas. Very tangible interests and realities need to be acknowledged. The Deputy is right that the game between Russia and Europe with respect of gas is in a sense something of a game of chicken. Neither side can afford for that to be turned off. However, Russia has thought about this and has build up enormous reserves in recent years. It knows that if it were to do something, sanctions would hit it and it has prepared for those sanctions. The capacity of the Russian people to bear hardship is unparalleled in comparison with anybody else's.

The Deputy asked where this might hit France and what France might do. France is a fascinating case study. There is a traditional row in Europe between a sort of Gaullist vision of a European security defence, which is independent, and an Atlanticist NATO vision of defence which is very transatlantic. The French also have deep historical ties to Russia going right back through history. President Macron is playing his own politics with respect to being seen to lead Europe - the man who flies to Moscow and has conversations with Vladimir Putin. He wants that. What we used to call le Front National, which I will still call the National Front, has its own very particular relationship with Putin and his allies, which plays into domestic French politics in the way the Deputy said.

The Deputy's final point was on the UK no longer being with us. She will have seen the reports today of some sort of amorphous strategic conversation between the UK, Poland and Ukraine. That concerns me, if only because it evokes memories of the First World War and the way in which multiple bilateral alliances fed into the actuality of war in Europe in 1914. We need to remind ourselves that we have security structures in Europe. We have the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, and the Helsinki Accords. We have guarantees about the inviolability of borders and a Europe whole and free. Russia is breaking those agreements. Ireland should be very voluble in defending that.