Professor Donnacha ? Beach?in:

Just to add to that, it is imperative that we emphasise the fact that the EU does not act with one voice. That is something that Russia has tried to take advantage of over the years in different ways. The main drivers of EU policy towards Russia have been varied and are dependent on individual member states. The size of states is relevant. As Professor Tonra mentioned, small states have particular priorities. Small states like Estonia and Latvia do particularly well within the European Union because they can use the European institutions, potentially, to drive their point home. This is an issue which is of much more relevance to countries that border the Russian Federation.

That brings me to the second point which is that the geographic location of individual member states also has an impact on what kind of policies they try to get the EU to adopt. Their own historical development is also relevant. There is a huge difference between how countries in the Baltic region and eastern Europe generally approach Russia and countries west of a certain line. Russia is aware of those divisions and has tried to replace conversations with the EU, as an institution, with bilateral arrangements where it can. Germany, as has been mentioned; is a classic example of that. It was after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that most of the progress on Nord Stream 2 was made. The pipeline has only been completed in relatively recent times. The Kremlin has supported different parties and factions within the European Union, including Euro-sceptic, far-right and populist parties, that have sowed division. That has been a particular policy.

When it comes to the question of Irish exposure if there was an invasion, the first thing one would have to address is the type of invasion we are talking about and there are several possible scenarios. One would be a full-scale invasion but I think that is unlikely. Whatever about the appetite, the digestion would not be good from a Russian military perspective. A country of 40 million people would be an awful lot to occupy and there would be a severe risk for Russia of a backlash within the Russian Federation itself. Domestically, it would not be a popular war so I do not think that is what we are talking about. We are, therefore, probably looking a partial expansion from the base which Russia enjoys at the moment in Ukraine. Another possibility, which has not achieved much attention but which is there, under the radar, and which may actually be kept in reserve, is the recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk as independent states. The Duma in Russia is going to discuss this matter later this month. A motion has been put down before parliament and of course, it would follow the practice that we saw in Georgia in 2008 where Abkhazi and South Ossetia were recognised. That would then put an end to the whole negotiation process on the conflict zones in south eastern Ukraine and the EU has not really thought through what its response would be in that event. The sanctions that are being mentioned at the moment are very general but as we have seen, sanctions have not, until recently anyway, seemed to modify the behaviour of the Kremlin in any respect. There would have to be a very clear articulation of what those sanctions would be so that the Kremlin would be able to estimate the cost of pursuing its policies militarily.

On the question of what Ireland could be exposed to in terms of cyberwarfare, one would only have to ask the Estonians. In 2007, when a Soviet-era statue was moved, on the initiative of local government, from the centre of the city to a military graveyard, the Estonian Government, which is very dependent on e-government, was exposed to intense cyberwarfare over a couple of days which disabled its ability to communicate with its citizenry. Obviously, that is unlikely to happen in the Irish case but it shows what is possible for small states that incur the wrath of the Kremlin. Ireland, of course, is not a member of NATO. That is something that is particularly valued in Russia, and it has tended to emphasise that in its relations with Ireland.

Finland has a different type of non-military-alliance status but it does have conscription. It has an historical experience with Russia which is very different from Ireland's experience. A part of Finnish territory, Karelia, was occupied as a result of the war in 1939 or 1940. I am not sure the Finnish experience is one that we can really transfer because geography really dictates the relationship, but certainly how the Finns can have an armed or more meaningful neutrality is an ongoing source of comparison.