Mr. John Devitt:

I thank the committee for inviting me to share my observations on this Bill on behalf of Transparency International Ireland. I should start by briefly explaining what interest we have in this issue, before moving on to some preliminary observations on the Bill and some broader recommendations that might further strengthen the Act and its implementation and operation.

In 2009, Transparency International Ireland identified the regulation of lobbying as one of six key recommendations aimed at preventing corruption arising from our first national integrity systems study. Since then, we have undertaken research and produced three publications on the topic, including an overview of voluntary lobbying standards and practice among public relations firms in Europe, and we published Responsible Lobbying: A Short Guide to Ethical Lobbying and Public Policy Engagement for Professionals, Executives and Activists.

Earlier this year, we looked at the disclosure practices of 30 of Ireland’s top companies across a range of indicators including responsible political engagement and found some companies showing leadership on this issue. However, it is important to note that most companies did not disclose a policy on responsible lobbying or political engagement and the highest score achieved on this dimension was 57%. Moreover, 28 out of 30 companies did not publish rules or policies dealing with revolving doors, namely the movement of staff from the public sector to companies or vice versa.

It would be churlish to not acknowledge some of the progress made since we began work on this issue. The 2015 Act in particular has regularised the practice, setting boundaries and standards of conduct that were not always clear. In doing so, it has raised public expectations of both lobbyists and policy-makers and I would speculate that the term "lobbyist" carries a degree more respectability than was the case before the Act was passed. Nonetheless, the Standards in Public Office Commission has recommended reforms, which have yet to be adopted, and a small number of cases appear to have undermined the reputation of the profession since 2015, both of which appear to have influenced the publication of this Bill. The only cases that I am aware of that stirred public controversy surrounded the movement of former senior advisers or public officials to roles in public relations firms or in business associations. I am unaware of any more serious compliance failures or offences committed since then. It is welcome therefore to see a provision in the Bill for an extension of the cooling-off period for officeholders moving to the private sector from one to two years. We also welcome the proposed requirement for a designated public official, DPO, to cease communicating with a lobbyist where he or she is aware that the person or body carrying on lobbying activities has failed to comply with the Act.

We agree with the sponsors of this Bill that the most effective way of encouraging compliance would be to deny those who refuse to comply with the Act the opportunity to lobby public officials, and in the same way to penalise those companies that hire public officials in contravention of statutory cooling-off periods. While the broad approach may be sound, we might suggest a small number of technical amendments that could avoid any potential confusion or unforeseen consequences which I am happy to address after these remarks. In addition, we would recommend providing the Commission with the power to impose financial penalties on those persons, including DPOs, who fail to follow a direction from the Commission to comply with the Act.

I should draw the committee’s attention to what we see as the primary goals of lobbying regulation. The first is to prevent trade in influence; the use of personal connections or intermediaries to secretly influence policy. The second is to improve the quality of public policy by allowing the public and policy-makers full sight of the information used to influence that policy and to determine whether the policy is in the public interest. If the Act is to meet its first purpose, there should be a requirement to disclose not just the source but the amounts of funding received or fees charged by lobbyists with the lobbying regulator. This would allow enforcement agencies, including the Commission and An Garda Síochána, to evaluate information that could assist with any future investigation into allegations of breaches of the Act or attempts to trade in influence, an offence created with the passage of the Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act 2018. Without a disclosure requirement it is difficult to know who has paid what to an intermediary or whether he or she has done so lawfully, and it is equally difficult to determine whether anyone has sought to illegally influence policy. Such a requirement has been instrumental in detecting corruption or trade in influence in other jurisdictions.

The second purpose could be fulfilled without requiring an amendment to the Act. Instead, the online register could allow for much easier download and third-party analysis of data stored on the register. It could allow for lobbyists to voluntarily upload information or to provide live external links to those documents. It could also provide links to legislation moving through the Oireachtas or relevant information held by public bodies, such as rezoning decisions, on the website. This would make it easier for the public to access information shared with policy-makers in the course of lobbying. It would also help reduce the volume of freedom of information, FOI, requests and encourage others to be more open about their lobbying activities. It could also provide for a comprehensive and accessible legislative footprint that could simultaneously make the most of existing digital platforms and help make the legislative process more open and accountable. Time does not allow me to address the full scope of the Act or Bill but I am happy to answer any questions members might have.