Mr. Christopher Holt:

I thank the Deputy for his questions. I will start and then hand over to Mr. Randles.

On the value or the loss as a result of demolitions, it is important to note that we are only speaking to what the consortium has lost as a result of demolitions. Obviously, the financial impact on Palestinians and other aid actors is much greater. We can only speak to our interventions. Since we began our interventions in 2015, the financial injury that has resulted from demolitions and seizures amounts to €750,000. As I mentioned, that is less than 1.4% of the overall investment. Therefore, we still believe that it is an effective investment, particularly considering the fact that what we are providing is vital humanitarian aid.

In terms of what is at risk, around €1.6 million is under threat. That means they have either been issued with a demolition order or a stop work order. In most cases, the matters are before the court, with our legal aid actors seeking to have those demolition orders overturned. Generally, injunction orders are in place, preventing the demolitions. As I mentioned, €1.6 million is under threat. That involves a large number of homes, and as discussed previously, some 53 schools as well as health clinics, community centres, water and energy infrastructure. It is important to note that that is purely what is under threat in terms of what we have provided. What is under threat of demolition beyond our intervention is far greater than that, and puts at significant risk the viability of the two-state solution.

In terms of the impact on our interventions and our beneficiaries, it is a very difficult operating environment. We have chosen to operate in East Jerusalem and Area C because that is where the needs are greatest and Palestinians are most vulnerable, where they have the least access to livelihoods and essential services. As humanitarians, we make these decisions based on humanitarian principles of where the needs are greatest. That is why we choose to operate in Area C, but it is difficult. The case of Humsa Al-Bqai'a, which was referenced previously, is a very good example of a situation in which aid actors were under considerable pressure and blocked from accessing communities. Once we did deliver much of that aid, it was then seized and confiscated. That does make it difficult to provide effective aid in an environment like that.

On the question as to why we deliver this assistance, despite the fact that we know that some of it will be demolished, going back to what we refer to as our retention rate, over 92% of the physical structures that we have provided remain in place with the Palestinian communities for which they were intended. It is still an effective investment in that we have been able to ensure that most of the aid we provide remains with Palestinian communities.

On the question of why we would intervene in "disputed territories", the first point to note is that the territory is not disputed. It is occupied Palestinian territory. That is almost unanimously agreed under international law by multiple UN Security Council resolutions, which are obviously supported by quite diverse permanent and non-permanent members, as well as resolutions of the General Assembly. The majority of UN member states recognise that it is occupied Palestinian territory and not disputed territory. That is the reason that we provide aid in occupied Palestinian territory. We act in accordance with international humanitarian law. We ensure that we comply with all of our legal obligations as humanitarian actors. We provide the Israeli authorities with prior notice of our interventions. All of our interventions are contained in the UN humanitarian response plan. That is shared with the Israeli authorities, so they know that we are providing humanitarian aid that is based on humanitarian needs assessments, is vital to Palestinians and without which they would be at great risk. However, the demolitions still continue.

Finally, on why we could not seek approval for interventions, for example, through the Israeli legal system, there is an inherently discriminatory illegal system that applies in Area C. Less than 1% of territory in Area C is allocated for Palestinian development. The vast majority is completely off-limits or is highly restricted, which means that it is almost impossible for any application for Palestinian construction to be granted. Any sort of notion that there is a way to apply for a construction permit when less than 1% of the area is designated for Palestinian construction, is unfortunately a fiction. However, the same authorities do grant permission for illegal Israeli settlements to be built in Area C and in fact, legalise, under Israeli law, what are illegal Israeli outposts.

I will hand over to Mr. Randles at this point to address the other questions.