Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Wednesday, 10 July 2019

Joint Oireachtas Committee on Communications, Climate Action and Environment

ESB Networks: Discussion (Resumed)

Mr. Seamus O'Loughlin:

I thank the members of the Committee on Communications, Climate Action and Environment for inviting me here today on foot of the "RTÉ Investigates" programme, "ESB Leaks", which aired on 5 June 2019. The years preceding the broadcast and, indeed, the weeks since have been an incredibly difficult journey for me and my family. I have been unable to work since 30 May 2018.

I would like to take this opportunity to outline my experience of the background behind some of ESB’s non-compliance issues.

First, with regard to propane gas, ESB Networks staff use propane gas primarily to heat plastic type insulation. In April 2015, ESB Networks staff ignited a high-pressure gas main in Knocklyon in Dublin. The subsequent investigation found serious shortfalls across three broad categories: training; documented safe system of work; and safe tools and equipment. The risk was so large that the ESB Networks health and safety programme board committed to resolving all the issues by June 2016. This commitment preceded my appointment to the role of technical development manager. However, once I came into the role I started receiving ongoing complaints from staff as regards hot works issues. What brought the issue to a head was that most of the actions from the investigation were not started by December 2017 when a near carbon copy incident occurred in the UCD campus in Belfield. Thankfully, no one was seriously injured that time.

I raised the propane gas issue as one of 20 risks in February 2017 in what I understood to be a protected disclosure. However, in the 12 months post February 2017, I received six different instructions from senior management on how to progress the propane gas issue and despite my best endeavours I received no commitment on resources, senior management buy-in or finance in that time. That led to understandable frustration on my behalf. I understand a full roll-out has been happening since I submitted protected disclosure No. 4 to the Minister in January 2019.

Second, with regard to fluid-filled cables, ESB Networks has approximately 120 km of high voltage cables which use a mixture of fluids as an insulating medium. As per the agreed PR3 submission to the regulator, they contain 300,000 l of oil. The annual leakage rate over the past 20 years averaged 50,000 l per annum. That is a leakage rate of 17%; in the worst years it ran at 30%. UK utilities using similar cables have a leakage rate of approximately 2% annually. ESB is an associate member of the UK based Energy Networks Association, which provides expert guidance on dealing with fluid-filled cable leaks. The average leakage rate of 50,000 l compares poorly against the ESB Networks policy target of 15,000 l per annum. In 2017, five cable circuits were shown to have an environmental risk rating of nine and were all non-compliant with both the UK and ESB standards.

The PR4 submission to the regulator by ESB Networks referred to environmental risk 23 times. Although the replacement fluid is biodegradable, 90% of the fluid employed by the ESB contains some element of mineral oil, and the internal ESB guidance is quite clear that ESB Networks is obliged by law to design out and manage the environmental risk posed by leakage from fluid-filled cables on its network. It is my understanding that leakage detection and minimisation performance have improved since I submitted protected disclosure No. 1 in January 2019.

Third, regarding sulphur hexafluoride or SF6 reporting, in February 2017 I raised an issue concerning maintenance, repair and calibration of SF6 handling equipment. Due to resource constraints since 2013, these high-cost units were not subjected to any oversight as regards a maintenance regime. This was causing significant issues for front-line staff as regards complying with the F-gas directive. The more I looked into the overall SF6 issue, the more concerned I became. Once again I raised any issues I came across with management along with proposed solutions. However, SF6 did not seem to be a priority. I escalated the Moneypoint leakage issue in August 2017 and I understand that the reporting to the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, was amended following this. However, I was instructed after this by a senior manager not to raise any other environmental issues within ESB Networks. Moneypoint 400 kV substation leaked more SF6 gas in 2017 than the entire of the UK transmission network. As per the F-gas directive, records are to be kept for five years. However, there has never been a coherent national approach to SF6 reporting, and our regime will not stand up to external scrutiny across any of the 18 high-voltage supervisor areas. This is an institutional fault, not any individual's fault. However, front-line staff may be exposed to draconian personal liability if they knowingly keep topping up a leaking device. It is my understanding that significant improvements to the SF6 gas handling and reporting regime have been made since I submitted my protected disclosure No. 7 to the Minister in January 2019.

Fourth, regarding flexible earths, in June 2016 I was asked to go to the UK to carry out an in-depth study of ESB Networks' earthing practices on foot of allegations made by a supplier of earthing material to ESB Networks. Rather than debunk these allegations, the study validated many of them and also showed other areas where ESB Networks were not aligned with minimum industry standards in the UK. I expected that this report would be acted on within a reasonable timeframe. However, it was not until the disaffected supplier contacted the Health and Safety Authority that ESB Networks started allocating proper resources to resolve the issues. It is my understanding that further improvements have been made since I submitted protected disclosure No. 4 to the Minister in January 2019.

It is with a profound sense of regret that I find myself before the committee washing the dirty linen of a company for which I have worked all my adult life and to which I owe an awful lot. I continue to try to operate in the best long-term interests of the ESB, and this has taken a very heavy toll on my personal and professional life. The ease with which the ESB can choose which parts of its own procedures and policies, and indeed national and European legislation, to comply with and which parts to ignore is not a work practice that is sustainable in the current climate or which aligns with the company's purported values. I take some succour that the ESB is now a more compliant and safer utility for its workers and the public on foot of my actions. I do not regret appearing on the "RTÉ Investigates" episode "ESB Leaks". I am perplexed, however, as to how it ever got this far. I offer my time to all State agencies and any subsequent investigations which require clarification on any of the issues I have raised. I also wish to place it on record that I never acted with malicious intent. I was simply trying to live by the ESB motto, "Never turn a blind eye". I was also trying to do the right thing for my colleagues' safety at what has turned out to be substantial personal cost. I thank the committee for its time and would welcome any questions members may have.