Dr. Peter Rigney:

I apologise on behalf of my colleague, Mr. Ger Gibbons, who cannot attend as he is at the national economic dialogue today. Congress was asked to address the committee on the subject of Brexit and its implications in October 2017. In my concluding remarks on that occasion, I said:

In the world after Brexit, Ireland's foreign policy in Europe will have to undergo a re-appraisal. Our traditional ally among the large countries will be gone and the Franco- German axis will probably be revived. Where will Ireland sit in this new scheme of things? Where will our allies be?

To misquote the 1916 Proclamation, we might have to find new gallant allies in Europe. While I hope to address the issues raised above today, I must say first a brief word for the guidance of the committee about how trade unions structure their international work.

Traditionally, the ICTU avoided international associations until Ireland joined the EEC in 1973 and we joined the European Trade Union Confederation. The big players in the ETUC are Germany's DGB, an informal alliance of Scandinavian unions, and the Italian unions, where the three confederations representing Christian, communist and socialist tendencies work together. The French, with five major trade union centres, punch below their weight for that reason. Another big player is the British TUC. It is noticeable when one visits Brussels now that the influence of the British TUC is ebbing away even though the UK continues to be a member state. In a new development last September, the German group of unions, the DGB, hosted a meeting in Berlin on governance within the eurozone area. This is an echo of the increased level of Franco-German debate on a eurozone budget. The TUC and the Scandinavian unions were not represented at that meeting. I cannot see that meeting having taken place before the Brexit debate took off. The issue of alternative alliances seems to be already decided, at least according to the Financial Times and The Economist. We have joined what is termed the "Hanseatic league", a loose alliance of the Netherlands, the Scandinavians and the Baltic states. Some of these countries in turn have more enduring alliances. Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg have worked together since before the Treaty of Rome as the alliance of Benelux countries. Deep institutional ties exist between all the Scandinavian countries through the Nordic Union. According to the Financial Timesin November 7 2017:

While the [Hanseatic league] countries are far from united on all EU policy issues, they share a common outlook on many economic questions, favouring dynamic competition on the single market, and stressing the need for national budgetary responsibility within the eurozone.

Europe is a half-way house between domestic and foreign policy. Ireland has a radically different foreign policy from the policy positions of some other member states, including on neutrality and, to an extent, Palestine, whereas internal EU matters are really just extensions of domestic matters and are handled by the line Departments through the permanent representation in Brussels. We work with the ETUC on lobbying matters and, through that body, on statutory committees on social dialogue, on migrant workers and vocational training. The social policy area is one in which Brexit may cause significant change. Up to now when discussing European proposals with Irish civil servants we would be told "this proposal won't progress as the British will veto it". That response is now obsolete. A case in point was the process that preceded the adoption of the information and consultation directive in the mid-1990s when Ireland and the UK argued for unanimity as opposed to qualified majority voting in an attempt to veto the measure, which, thankfully, did not prevail. Some of the new alliances we make will be custom built. An example is France which will be our strong ally on CAP but far from an ally on the question of corporation tax. What relationship do we want with the Visegrad group of central European countries given the number of their citizens who now live in our country? This group has traditionally taken a very hostile attitude to progress in workers' conditions and labour law. A case in point is a recent spat between France and Germany on the one hand and the Eastern countries on the other. France and Germany decided to apply their minimum wage laws to trucks passing through their territory, for example travelling from Hungary to Spain. The Commission launched infringement procedures against them. Bizarrely, Ireland joined with the Eastern countries, Spain and Portugal in supporting the Commission's action. How this builds our influence with France and Germany is beyond me. The decision making process in Ireland to support this stance also remains a mystery. This is an illustration of how things which happen in Europe are really not matters of foreign policy but of domestic policy. However, it could have foreign policy implications in that putting a foot wrong on one issue could affect something else.

In the century since the foundation of the State, Ireland's foreign policy has fallen into two phases. Up to the mid-1950s, it was all about regulating our relationship with Britain and protesting about partition. This reached its high point in 1949 when Seán MacBride offered to abandon neutrality and join NATO in exchange for an end to partition. From the late 1950s, the emphasis moved towards Europe in tandem with Britain's move in the same direction. We are now heading into a third phase at a time of increasing uncertainty in world politics. As a focal scor, I notice the latest utterance from Boris Johnson is that the application of external tariffs by the EU would be the equivalent of the continental blockade of the Napoleonic wars. I leave my remarks on that happy note.