Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Wednesday, 19 December 2018

Joint Oireachtas Committee on Health

General Scheme of Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017: Discussion (Resumed)

9:00 am

Photo of Rónán MullenRónán Mullen (Independent)
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I do not know if Dr. Rose was going to say what I am about to say. It is clear from this session how complex and varied are the issues we must consider. I certainly suggest it could be a good idea to devote some time to looking at research and what it states as a key aspect that should be considered discretely. That said, we must be conscious that research is not everything because it is emergent or incomplete. It is an indicator of the possible effects on people, but it does not state if their rights are breached in principle. Not being able to demonstrate positive or negative effects does not dispose of all of the issues. A person's rights may be breached, but it may be impossible to demonstrate the suffering of harm. That does not make it okay to breach those rights. We must look at the research, but as Churchill famously said about scientists, they should be on tap but not on top. There are other issues, apart from what research shows in the area.

On the subject of surrogacy, the delegates should contradict me if I am wrong on any of these issues as I do not hold myself to have specialist knowledge. I understand Sweden is considering banning altruistic, as well as commercial, surrogacy and that there are quite a few countries that ban surrogacy. It is not the case that the entire civilised world is moving towards recognition that because some individuals or couples engage in or avail of this practice, or have a deeply personal need to avail of it, the only direction in which public policy can move is permitting the practice. I presume I am correct and that it is not settled ground of consensus. It is a very divisive issue.

If I am correct about what I understand to be the case in Sweden, is it because of cases such as that described by Professor Madden? If I understand it correctly, she has indicated that to prevent misunderstandings, heartbreak and problems, it should be clearly understood - ideally before conception but certainly as soon as possible and before birth - that the genetic or "commissioning" parents will have the child. It is not a phrase I like. This means that if the birth mother bonds with her child or the child bonds with the mother, it will not be reckoned in the final analysis. It is a consequence of wanting to regulate surrogacy in a way that is effective. It is a perverse outcome, about which many people would be concerned. It seems to go against our deepest instinct. where a birth mother is bonding with her child, that some prior contractual arrangement would take precedence. That is why the Supreme Court made its decision and overturned the High Court's decision, but it is just my opinion. Is it not the inevitable consequence that one must make these Solomon-like decisions? It is a case of once we practice to conceive, as opposed to deceive, which is where we go with surrogacy.

In the light of this, it comes down to whether people think surrogacy is good on balance. Should we not be considering, whether we legalise or regulate it, if there ought to be a public policy campaign to discourage it on the basis of rights being violated as argued by our guests, Dr. Rose and Ms O'Friel? It is, I presume, conceivable, if those present pardon the pun, that one could publicly discourage something through whatever means the State uses such as advertising or counselling. In other words, the message would clearly be sent that this is not something that ideally should be done, that there are other and better ways to try to ease the pain of infertility and so on. As it involves a fundamental violation of the rights of the child, it should not really happen at all. If we were to regulate it, we would be recognising the fact that we could not control and would not seek to control people's travel to other jurisdictions to avail of very different legal arrangements. We do not criminalise smoking, but we permit it. However, we do everything we can to discourage people from engaging in the practice, including having rules for packaging and limits on advertising, etc.

Would the witnesses accept that, in principle, this is something that we ought to discourage given that, without trying to put words in people's mouths, the issue of rights being violated has not been contested here, if I understand it correctly?