Ms Joanna O'Riordan:

Good morning, Chairman and members of the committee. In June of this year, Senator Colette Kelleher commissioned the Institute of Public Administration, IPA, to prepare a research paper looking at the organisational and governance options in respect of the establishment of the national adult safeguarding authority. I will confine my comments to the substantive issue of how Cosáint, which is the working title for the national adult safeguarding authority, could be established.

The paper I wrote for Senator Kelleher provides a short background to the approach in Ireland to the need for new public functions or services, and then reviews the most likely options in respect of Cosáint. There has been criticism of the proliferation of agencies across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ,OECD, countries in the past, and many countries have engaged in agency rationalisation. However, in its review of the Irish public service, the OECD comments that agencies are not good or bad per se. What matters is why they were created and how they are governed.

In recent years the number of Irish agencies has declined. Where new agencies are created, it is in a more regulated environment which includes the use of performance frameworks between agencies and their parent Department. International experience indicates that there is no one way which is best in carrying out new public service functions, rather there is a need to review the proposed services in the light of a range of objective criteria.

My report assesses the advantages and disadvantages of four possible arrangements for establishing the new adult safeguarding authority. Of the four, the incorporation of the authority into the HSE would be problematic. From a governance perspective, difficulties arise where an organisation is both a provider and the regulator of services. It is important that Cosáint be perceived by users of services to be impartial and independent.

The second option, establishing Cosáint as an executive office of the Department of Health, has some merit. Executive offices allow for independent branding of a service, facilitate interdepartmental working and have a degree of independence, for example, in staffing. It is probable that an executive office could fulfil admirably the education, training and public awareness functions of the proposed authority. However, the issue of independence would arise again. The proposed authority will be required to investigate reports of abuse or harm and direct the HSE and others to act. Questions remain as to how an executive office would be independent if it was not legally separate from the Civil Service and if its chief executive would report to the Secretary General of the Department.

The two remaining options are establishing Cosáint as a completely new agency or amalgamating its functions with those of an existing agency, the most realistic options being the Health Information and Quality Authority, HIQA, or the Mental Health Commission, both of which operate in the same regulatory space. Notwithstanding the Government's general policy to rationalise agency numbers, research conducted by the IPA shows that 11 completely new agencies have been established since 2010. This reflects the fact, as my colleague Dr. Richard Boyle put it, that "agencies are often established for good reasons" and "focusing the debate simply on the number of agencies is unhelpful." It is more pertinent to have objective criteria for agency creation and systematic policy on performance management. In 2011 the Government agreed to a series of guiding principles for agency rationalisation and reform. The full list of principles which reflect good practice internationally is included in my report. However, it is important to highlight that the guidelines acknowledge that a separate body may be required if specialist skills are needed or where independence in the performance of functions requires functional separation from Departments.

Amalgamation with another agency is also a possibility. In the case of the Mental Health Commission, it has already been determined that it will have responsibility for the assisted decision-making support service, which might preclude further expansion. It is possible that Cosáint could be incorporated into HIQA. There are parallels between the proposed authority and HIQA in that both have statutory responsibilities for the protection of vulnerable citizens and both have a role in promoting standards and providing information. The Government's guidelines for agency rationalisation indicate that the merging and restructuring of bodies should have a clear and demonstrable benefit in delivering greater democratic control, providing for improved service delivery and-or financial savings. In other words, there should be a strategic imperative for a merger, rather than simply a desire to reduce agency numbers.

My paper sets out the advantages and disadvantages of the most likely institutional and governance options for Cosáint. All of the options will require more detailed consideration and assessment before coming to a final decision. Regardless of the option chosen, there will be a cost and a period of very intensive work for those involved. Acceptance of the cost is a political decision that will have to be set against the benefits of the proposed authority and its work.